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Abstract 
This thesis argues that the dominant assessment of the anomalous phenomena associated 
with psi requires re-evaluation, as hidden beliefs and explanatory assumptions about the body 
of evidence underlie the mainstream philosophical arguments regarding psi. 
A re-evaluation of pertinent issues with reference to contemporary explanatory concerns 
is therefore undertaken. 
The current state of discussion about psi is outlined. It is shown that there is tension 
between the apparent evidence for the phenomena and lack of a tenable explanation for the 
phenomena. The mainstream arguments in philosophy, which ascribe fraud as an explanation 
for psi, are critiqued. In generic form the arguments are shown to be a problematic inference 
to the best explanation. It is argued that if the assessment of the phenomena is to be a 
legitimate inference to the best explanation the outline of the evidence, the compilation 
of hypotheses and the process by which the 'best' is selected requires re-assessment. 
The process of re-evaluation is carried out in the rest of the thesis. 
The re-examination starts with an outline of the three types of evidence for psi. 
The discussion regarding potential explanation of the body of evidence for psi is shown to 
be similar to another problem in philosophy—the hard problem of consciousness. 
.The competing hypotheses are then divided into comparable-options in relation to psi theory: 
the Skeptic hypothesis, the Small Change Natural hypothesis, the Big Change Natural 
hypothesis and the Supernatural hypothesis. The unresolved debate about psi is thus 
transformed into a 'psi hypotheses discussion' which allows for more productive discourse 
regarding possible explanations of the phenomena. 
An argument is made that changing explanatory schemes have historically accounted 
for psi phenomena and it is shown that one of the hypotheses, the Supernatural hypothesis, 
is untenable. The remaining three hypotheses are examined in more detail in the second part 
of the thesis. 
A recent discussion between scientists and a philosopher regarding the potential to 
develop psi theory is used to show that when competing hypotheses for psi are debated, the 
contrary approaches to the data represent different research traditions. It is concluded that 
explanatory considerations regarding the various hypotheses require reassessment. 
It is shown that an outdated explanatory system (the covering law model) has most 
likely influenced the mainstream assessment of psi phenomena and that this assessment has 
informed the dominant Skeptic hypothesis. However, because covering law model has been 
superseded by new theories of scientific explanation, an argument is made that a reassessment 
of the competing hypotheses is warranted. 
An examination of the competing psi hypotheses in the light of three major 
contemporary explanation theories (causal, pragmatic and unificatory) is therefore 
undertaken. It is argued that the anomalous nature of psi usually prejudices the manner 
in which the explananda are presented. The psi explananda are therefore recast in terms 
acceptable to the contemporary explanation theories. Each competing psi hypothesis provides 
a possible explanation to the psi explananda. Then a comparison of the explanations is carried 
out using the precepts of each contemporary explanation theory as a guide to making an 
assessment of the competing explanations. 
It is concluded that it is important the three psi hypotheses continue to be explored 
in relation to progress in science, psi theory and issues of explanation in science. The main 
achievement of the thesis is to provide a new platform for productive dialogue between the 
competing hypotheses with explanatory concerns upfront. 
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Foreword 
The study of psi in philosophy is controversial. Psi is often invisible in philosophical 
discussion because the plausibility of the evidence for psi is dismissed out of hand. 
However, there is a long and interesting history of rigorous investigation of psi and 
there are obvious consequences for philosophical topics if the evidence for psi is ever 
considered established. Unfortunately, the extensive literature which discusses the 
elusive phenomena is rarely represented in philosophical discussion. The study of psi 
retains a maligned status in mainstream academia today. 
I became interested in the academic study of psi during my undergraduate 
years at the University of Sydney, where I was fortunate enough to happen across 
a considerable stash of psi literature which piqued my interest in the subject matter. 
Due to the Dewey Decimal cataloguing system in the infamous Fisher Stacks, 
a substantial collection of parapsychology texts were situated right next to the 
philosophy of mind books that were required reading at the time. 
As I dipped into this heretofore unmentioned subject matter I became aware 
that there was much more to the investigation of psi than was recognised in most 
mainstream philosophy. The works were intriguing, rigorous and worldly and the 
discussions lively and philosophical—I was enticed into the world of psi theory. 
At the same time I came to realise how invisible the subject matter was outside the 
small world of psi theoreticians and researchers; that psi doesn't exist is almost a 
mantra in contemporary philosophy of mind. 
This thesis is not an attempt to change the minds of those who maintain that 
psi should not be investigated in philosophy because it is implausible, nor does make 
an epistemic defence of the evidence against charges of fraud or flaky methodology. 
The dominant mainstream Skeptic hypothesis remains at the end of the thesis as one 
of two other explanatory avenues to explore. Instead, this thesis is an investigation 
of the explanatory issues that inform assessment of the anomalous phenomena. 
The aim is to provide a platform for more general philosophical discourse regarding 
psi. I hope that it becomes clear there is much to discuss. 
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Beyond Beliefs: Introduction 
Lurking deep within the idea of explanation is a rudimentary appeal to rationality. 
Charles F. Adams 
This thesis is concerned with anomalous phenomena and explanation theory. 
The focus wil be particularly on anomalous communication and anomalous action 
at a distance, otherwise known as telepathy and psychokinesis respectively. 
These two intriguing phenomena are often refered to under the umbrela word 
'psi' (pronounced 'sigh'). The mainstream assessment of psi in academia is to 
ascribe fraud or fluky results to account for the phenomena. Despite this a smal 
but persistent group of researchers continues to investigate the phenomena as 
genuine. They maintain that fraud cannot account for the data and have developed 
various theories to explain the phenomena. The two approaches are unreconciled 
and a Catch 22 has developed. If fraud or fluke can't account for the phenomena 
then some other theory must be employed, however, the mainstream wil not 
accept psi until it is explained; but psi is unlikely to be explained until it is 
incorporated into more inclusive scientific problem-solving. There is therefore 
a tension between the apparent evidence for psi and lack of a tenable explanation 
for the phenomena. 
I wil partialy resolve this problem by showing that the mainstream 
assessment of psi is first and foremost representative of beliefs about psi rather 
than an examination of possible explanations of the phenomena. It is hoped 
that the ensuing discussion takes the debate beyond beliefs—hence the title—by 
addressing the tension caused by psi phenomena with regard to pertinent issues 
in explanation theory from the philosophy of science. 
First I give a brief overview of psi and define the various components 
before clarifying the nomenclature used in this thesis. Then I outline the psi debate 
before sketching out the structure of the thesis. 
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0.1 What exactly is psi? 
For milennia, psi events have been widely accepted as part of the human 
experience across many cultures. There is a lengthy literature on the performance 
of psi feats witnessed by credible people, and since the 1920s laboratories 
in university departments have replicated the phenomena to some extent. 
Consequently there has been a continued build up of historic, anecdotal and 
laboratory evidence for both anomalous communication and anomalous action 
at a distance.' 
The words that describe the phenomena covered by psi have changed over 
time and new words have been coined as theories about the phenomena developed. 
There is discussion amongst current theorists regarding the best way of defining 
and naming psi and the various effects associated with apparent evidence for the 
phenomena. This thesis is a philosophical (rather than psychological) discussion of 
psi, and I therefore draw in part on the work of the philosopher Stephen E. Braude 
as a guide to:definitions and usage. Braude is a philosopher who has.scontributed 
significantly to discussion of psi and related philosophical issues. I also use the 
book A Glossary of terms used in Parapsychology by Michael Thalbourne as a 
standard for general definitions. 
Psi is otherwise known as telepathy and psychokinesis. The former is 
anomalous communication and the later anomalous action at a distance. Psi is 
commonly broken into the folowing elements: 
Psi 
Anomalous communication 
(extra-sensory perception - ESP) 
----- 
Anomalous action at a distance 
(psychokinesis - PK) 
Telepathy Clairvoyance Precognition 
Retrocognition 
(time-displaced psi) 
I outline the body of evidence for psi in Chapter 2 where examples of the historic, anecdotal and 
experimental evidence are provided. 
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I define the two types of anomalous phenomena that constitutes psi, ESP (and its 
three subcategories) and PK below. 
Anomalous action at a distance — psychokinesis - PK 
Anomalous action at a distance is thought to occur when mater is afected by a 
person without any known force or mechanism. The term psychokinesis, 
sometimes also known as telekinesis, is used to describe an event that appears to 
fal into this category. I wil use the former term, which is often abbreviated to 
'PK'. The target of PK can be an object outside someone's body or substances 
within the person's own body. To encompass both of these aspects of 
psychokinesis it is defined by Braude as: 
the causal influence of an organism on a region r of the physical world without any 
known sort of physical interaction between the organism's body and r. _ 
(Braude 1986, p220) 
Importantly, PK is defined by what it is not; if something occurs that cannot be 
explained mechanisticaly by reduction to any of the four known forces then an 
instance of psychokinesis is thought to have occured. 
In the psi literature examples of evidence for PK are given on both the 
large, everyday macro scale and the micro quantum level. On the macro scale PK 
is gvidenced by spontaneous cases such as those in poltergeist incidents in which 
objects appear to move without any known means. On the micro level anomalous 
action at a distance is measured by, for instance, the decay of an atom. I present 
more concrete examples in Chapter 2. 
Anomalous communication — ESP - telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition 
Anomalous communication is similarly defined negatively as the acquisition of 
information about a person or event in the past, present or future without the use of 
the ordinary five senses (taste, touch, sight, hearing or smel). The term 
extrasensory perception (abbreviated to ESP) is often used to cover the three forms 
of anomalous communication covered by this term. They are: 




Information gained about another mind or minds 
without the use of the ordinary five senses. 
Information gained about an inanimate object or 
event without the use of the five senses. 
Information about a person or event in the past 
(retrocognition), or future (precognition) without 
the use of the ordinary five senses. 
Al three types of ESP involve anomalous communication. The information is 
obtained either from another person, as in the case of telepathy, or from an object, 
as in the case of clairvoyance. Precognition and retrocognition are both time-
displaced instances of either telepathy or clairvoyance, I refer mainly to 
precognition in this thesis as it is this form of psi-displaced psi that features more 
prominently in the literature. There are also more sophisticated discussions of the 
nature of ESP and its subsidiary categories differentiate between anomalous 
cognition and anomalous interaction (Braude 1979). It is also difficult to 
differentiate instances of telepathy and clairvoyance experimentaly, which has 
caused:one theorist, J.B. Rhine, to encourage the use of the term GESP (standing 
for General ESP) in order to account for general anomalous information 
acquisition. Specific examples of al three categories of ESP wil be given in more 
detail in Chapter 2. 
Psi researchers 
The descriptions of people who are actively involved in psi research are also 
specific to the psi literature, so it is worth noting how they wil be used in this 
thesis. In psi-oriented literature, proponents of the 'fraud hypothesis' (sometimes 
also referred to as the 'Nul hypothesis') are referred to as 'skeptics'. Academics 
who actively research psi are often caled 'parapsychologists'. However, because 
some academics who study psi are not psychologists and because some 
commentators on psi research are not academics and may include skeptics, I prefer 
the term 'psi researcher' to describe a person who has undertaken informed 
research into psi, regardless of their view. 
Parapsychologists are usualy not skeptics (why would anyone study a 
phenomena that they didn't believe existed?) and skeptics rarely undertake 
Introduction: Beyond Beliefs 	 4 
scientific investigation of psi (for a similar reason), but skeptical parapsychologists 
do exist. They are sometimes caled 'debunkers' as they often undertake to 
publicly critique the work of non-skeptical parapsychologists. In such fortuns 
sometimes these commentators are divided into 'believers' and 'skeptics'. 
Debunkers belong in the later category and those that continue to research psi as a 
genuinely anomalous phenomena the former. Invective between the two 
approaches can sometimes be fierce and the terms 'believer' and 'skeptic' or 
'debunker' have taken on a certain negative connotation depending on one's point 
of view.2 Although overal I prefer to use the term psi researcher (or if the writer is 
not a researcher as such then 'psi commentator') sometimes context requires a 
diferentiation between the various approaches to psi. In such instances I prefer the 
terms pro-psi and anti-psi to differentiate these points of view rather than 
'believer' or 'skeptic' which can contain insinuations that are not intended in this 
thesis. 
0.2 Use of the word psi 
The word psi encounters some usage problems. It is an abstract word which is not 
wel-known outside of the psi literature. Nor is it readily easy to pronounce 
without knowledge about its etymology. For instance, some people mistakenly 
pronounce it pea-ess-eye when they first encounter the word. Confusingly it is 
sometimes capitalised (PSI) and can be mistaken for pounds per square inch or 
quantum theory references to PSI. However, there does not seem to be any reason 
to revert back to the older terms for anomalous events and the word psi is certainly 
shorter and less cumbersome in comparison to more archaic terminology. I 
therefore continue with the tradition of using psi as an unassuming term to 
represent the notion that an experiment or experience has registered an anomalous 
event indicative of ESP or PK that apparently cannot be explained through normal 
means. 
2 I have been witness to such invective between the 'believers' and 'debunkers' of high academic 
status when I was a participant in an international parapsychology email discussion list. The list 
eventualy devolved due to the list host's fears of libel charges (PRF 1998). 
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The word 'psi' is not new, it is the first leter of the word 'psyche' in Greek. 
However, its use to describe what was once caled psychic phenomena is relatively 
recent. 'Psi' was proposed for use in the area of psychical research by B.P. 
Wiesner and R.H. Thouless in 1942 to replace words such as 'psychic' or 'psychic 
functioning'. It was coined in order to avoid assumptions about what psi might be 
when litle is actualy known about its exact nature, or if it exists at al. It was 
hoped that, being more semanticaly neutral than previous terminology, any 
assumptions regarding the nature of the anomalous phenomena would be avoided. 
Thus, further unbiased investigation of the phenomena could then take place 
(Thouless 1972, p2; Thalbourne 1982, p56-57). 
As a part of speech, the word 'psi' can be used by itself as a noun which 
refers to the apparent evidence for the anomalous phenomena previously described 
as 'psychic phenomena', 'psychic functioning' and 'psychic abilities'. Psi can also 
In used as an adjective to describes the anomalous nature of the apparent events or 
effects that are displayed when anomalous communication or anomalous action at 
- a distance is thought to have occurred (Braude 2003, pxv). I adhere to the 
conventional use of the word in this thesis. 
0.3 Status of apparent psi events 
This thesis assumes that there is litle familiarity with the body of evidence for psi 
in mainstream philosophy. The evidence is therefore outlined in some detail in 
Chapter 2 where it is shown that the body of evidence for psi is convincing enough 
to warrant examination. The phenomena are not easily explained away in normal 
terms, however, there is no dominant theory that has successfuly accounted for 
the events. Accordingly the events can be best described as ostensibly paranormal. 
That is, they are curently unexplained, but not necessarily unexplainable (Braude 
1979, p244). It wil therefore be assumed for the purposes of this thesis that there 
is a putative body of evidence for psi which is comprised of evidence for what are 
most appropriately caled apparent psi efects or apparent psi events. In order to 
keep the ensuing discussion of psi as semanticaly clean as possible I wil not 
append 'ostensible' or 'putative' or 'apparent' before each mention of psi, psi 
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event or psi efect. These qualifications should be understood as implicit when psi 
is discussed in this thesis. 
0.4 The psi debate 
The psi debate is the main concern of this thesis and is its starting point. A smal 
but persistent community of researchers think that the evidence for psi is worth 
investigating and that some kind of new, as yet undiscovered, explanation is 
required for the anomalous phenomena. This contrasts with the mainstream 
understanding of psi, which is to explain the evidence as either fraudulent, 
produced through flukes of coincidence, flaky experimental methodology 
or the product of self-deluded scientists. Curently the debate is at a deadlock. 
Discussion between wel-informed interested parties has not resolved the 
issue. This is evidenced by a 2003 publication of a special edition of the Journal 
for Consciousness Studies entitled 'Psi Wars'. In this issue various anti and pro psi 
proponents make clear their contemporary assessment of the state of play of the 
' evidence for psi phenomena. In the paper 'Give the nul hypothesis a chance' 
James E. Alcock, a skeptical parapsychologist, concludes that 
Thus, the search for psi wil go on for a long time to come, for I can think of nothing that 
would ever persuade those who pursue it that the Nul hypothesis is probably true. Yet, as 
this search goes on, those of us who are sceptics should applaud and support the approach 
taken by parapsychologists who have contributed to this Special Issue—not because we 
agree with their conclusions, for we shal continue to scrutinize and, when appropriate, 
find fault with their methodology and chalenge their interpretationsbut because they 
'share our belief in the power of the scientific method to reveal truth in nature. I do marvel 
at their tenacity, however, for they labour in search of psi despite a lack of the evidentiary 
and other rewards that are earned by mainstream scientists in their research.. I continue 
to believe that parapsychology is, at botom, motivated by belief in search of data, rather 
than data in search of explanation. It is the belief in the larger view of human personality 
and existence than is accorded to human beings by modern science that keeps 
parapsychology engaged in their search. Because of this belief, parapsychologists never 
realy give the Nul hypothesis a chance. (Alcock 2003, p49) 
In contrast, another paper in the same issue by Simon Sherwood and Chris A. Roe 
entitled 'A review of dream ESP studies conducted since the Maimonides dream 
ESP programme' concludes that: 
Our review has shown that dream ESP remains a promising, if somewhat neglected, 
area for parapsychological research. Combined efect sizes for both Maimonides and 
post-Maimonides studies suggest that judges may be able to corectly identify target 
materials more often than would be expected by chance using dream mentation. 
There is evidence of conceptual replication within both sets of studies, although this 
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seems to be concentrated within certain research teams... We hope that this review 
will help re-awaken interest in this neglected but promising paradigm. 
(Sherwood and Roe 2003, p106) 
There is obviously apparently little agreement amongst those who debate the topic 
within the parapsychology literature. The question that concerns me is: how can 
there be two such disparate views regarding the same body of evidence? There 
appears to be an unbreachable divide between those who consider the evidence for 
psi plausibly indicates a genuinely anomalous phenomenon and those who 
maintain that these people are self-deluded or mistaken. Reasoned discussion 
between the two parties, as represented in joint publications such as those quoted 
above, does not appear to be able to resolve the differences one way or the other. 
In general there seems to be a resignation that the various proponents must 
just 'agree to disagree' as to what to make of the evidence. However, I think the 
lack of resolution to the dispute is harmful to both parties. If anti-psi proponents 
are correct then psi researchers are wasting time and money investigating a 
phenomenon that doesn't exist; if the pro-psi proponents are correct then 
mainstream science and philosophy is missing out on investigating new 
phenomena that are intriguing and, though anomalous, have the potential to impact 
significantly on contemporary theories of mind, time and causation. 
The situation in the philosophical literature mirrors the debate in 
parapsychology. For instance Stephen E. Braude, a philosopher who has made a 
significant contribution to psi research, argues convincingly for the legitimacy of 
the evidence for psi in two of his earlier books: ESP and Psychokinesis: A 
Philosophical Examination (1979) and The Limits of Influence: Psychokinesis and 
the Philosophy of Science (1986). And he has more recently published another 
book Immortal Remains (2003) in which he draws on his earlier work to maintain 
that in response to the question "Do human beings have psychic (psi) abilities 
(ESP or PK)?...we can confidently answer "yes" (Braude 2003, p2). He goes on 
to justify this answer and comments that it did not come easily, rather: 
...researchers faced imposing and interesting problems concerning the nature and 
reliability of human testimony, and subtle and technical puzzles about randomness 
and probability. They've also had to confront a recalcitrant and incredibly annoying 
problem: namely, that if psychic abilities exist, then by their very nature they could 
elude all conventional experimental controls. (Braude 2003, p2) 
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The account he gives of the state of psi research is informed and reasonable. 
According to Braude it is apparent that, though difficult to come to terms with, the 
evidence (both anecdotal and to a less degree experimental) is convincing. The 
philosophical issues that are raised by the evidence have the potential to impact on 
theories of mind, causation, time and survivalist research. However, as I show in 
much more detail in the first chapter, the mainstream philosophical understanding 
of psi continues to propound that there is nothing to discuss because, it is asserted, 
fraud can reasonably account for the phenomena. The inspiration for this thesis 
stems from the desire to understand how to resolve the apparently unbridgeable 
gap between the mainstream view and the psi-oriented philosophical literature, 
which advocates that the body of evidence for psi is reasonably indicative of 
evidence for genuine anomalous events. 
I think that it is more than a mater of an epistemic assessment of the body 
of evidence for psi. If the debate were so easily resolved the issue would not 
continue to be problematic today. Instead I maintain that the situation wil remain 
unresolved until the background issues that inform the various stances are 
examined. I am therefore concerned with both the representation of psi in 
mainstream philosophy as wel as the work that has been undertaken in the psi-
oriented literature. I draw on both during the course of this thesis to come to a 
beter understanding of how to close the gap between these disparate views. 
0.5 Structure of Beyond Beliefs 
In this thesis the initial assessment is grounded in philosophy by starting with an 
analysis of the dominant philosophical arguments regarding psi. In Chapter 1 the 
arguments are outlined and critiqued. It is shown that conservative explanatory 
considerations ilicitly inform the arguments; the arguments are also shown to be 
pre-emptive inferences to the best explanation. 
A case is made for a three-stage re-analysis in the form of a revised 
Inference to the Best Explanation, which is subsequently undertaken in the 
remainder of the thesis. The folowing chart indicates the stages in the thesis 
where the re-evaluation take place: 
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IBE stage 	 Section 	 Brief content summary 
of thesis 
Stage 1 - E Evidence 
Stage 2 - {H1 ,..,H} Compilation 
	
2.2 	 Outline of evidence and theory, 
discuss issue of testimony 
2.6 	 Compile the hypotheses based 
on cunent psi theory and 
comparison to the hard pioblem 
of consciousness 




Discuss background beliefs, 
present the historic account 
Discuss competing hypotheses 
Discuss dominant hypothesis 
Compare remaining hypotheses 
In more detail, the content of the chapters flows as folows: 
Part I — Chapters 1-3 
Part I sets the scene for the discussion in Part II and grounds the topic in 
philosophy. 
Ch. 1 Terra Incognita 
Ch 2 Evidence and Theory 
Ch 3 Shifting Sands 
The mainstream philosophy arguments are analysed and 
critiqued. It is shown that the arguments are informed by 
explanatory assumptions. The result is that 'unknown 
territory' is opened up because the evidence for psi cannot 
now be automaticaly ascribed to fraud. An argument is 
made for a 3-stage re-analysis of the situation. 
The evidence and theory are presented. 
The hypotheses are compiled and the psi debate is 
recouched as the 'psi hypotheses discussion. 
The history of the explanation of psi is examined, 
the historic account is presented and an argument is made 
against the Supernatural hypothesis. 
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Part II — Chapters 4-6 
Part II continues the discussion of psi using contemporary issues in philosophy of 
science to help understand how to develop the discourse between the remaining 
competing hypotheses (the Skeptic hypothesis and the two psi realist hypotheses). 
Ch 4 Boundless Sea 
Ch 5 Explanation 
Ch 6 Terra Firma 
The remaining hypotheses are examined using a 
contemporary example — the analysis reveals that 
competing research traditions inform the contemporary 
discussion. 
Explanation issues that inform the research traditions are 
examined and a case is made that an out-moded explanation 
theory (the covering law model) stil informs the 
mainstream assessment of psi. 
The psi explananda are recast and the competing 
hypotheses examined using relevant issues in contemporary 
explanation theory. The new territory is sketched out using 
contemporary explanation theory. The thesis concludes 
leaving the philosophical discussion regarding psi on firmer 
explanatory ground. 
A more detailed summary of Part I folows before Chapter 1 commences a critique 
of the mainstream arguments for psi. 3  
3 I have appended a glossary of terms especialy relevant to this thesis. It includes definitions for 
psi phenomena and related issues that have been covered in this chapter. 
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Part I: Chapters 1-3 
Oh, you should never ever doubt what nobody is sure about. 
Wily Wonka 
The main aim of Part I is to set the scene for a discussion of psi hypotheses in Part I 
in relation to explanatory issues in philosophy of science. The conceit that runs 
through the thesis is to take the reader on a journey from the Terra Incognita in 
Chapter 1—the unknown explanatory teritory that is revealed after a critique of the 
mainstream assessment of psi—to the more grounded Terra Firma in Chapter 6. The 
chapters in between explore the explanatory issues that are relevant to psi as new 
explanatory territory is mapped out. 
Chapter 1 commences with a critique of the philosophical arguments for psi 
which I show are problematic on a number of counts: failure to consider the evidence; 
inappropriate invocation of explanatory conservatism; and failure to acknowledge 
relevant background beliefs. I also show that there has been a failure to recognise the 
structure and logic of the arguments as Inferences to the Best Explanation. I use the 
later point to argue that if an assessment of psi is to be a legitimate Inference to the 
Best Explanation, then the outline of the evidence, the compilation of hypotheses and 
process by which the 'loveliest' is selected require re-analysis. 
The first two of these tasks are undertaken in Chapter 2 in which I outline the 
three types of evidence for psi. Theories that have been proposed to account for the 
phenomena are also summarised. I then re-analyse the psi debate in terms of a similar 
discussion in philosophy: the hard problem of consciousness. Four psi hypotheses are 
identified: the skeptic hypothesis, the supernatural hypotheses; and two realist 
accounts. The psi debate is thus recouched as a 'psi hypotheses discussion', which 
alows for more productive philosophical discussion of psi and related explanatory 
issues. 
In Chapter 3, I examine some of the background beliefs that have informed the 
mainstream assessment of psi. In particular I show how changing explanatory 
schemes have historicaly accounted for psi phenomena as supernatural. I make a case 
against the supernatural hypothesis on the basis that most of the phenomena exhibited 
are mundane. 
4,1  
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By the end of Part I there are therefore three competing hypotheses: the 
skeptic hypothesis; and two psi realist hypotheses. The competing stances form the 
focus for the discusion in Part I of the thesis where further explanatory isues are 
dealt with in more detail. 
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Chapter 1: Terra incognita 
Faced, accordingly, with a paucity of solid fact-let alone laws- in parapsychology, 
one who tries to discuss its philosophical implications cannot help feeling that he is 
standing on spongy ground. Perhaps it/s most appropriate to regard those implications 
neither as philosophical truths or probabilities nor as philosophical proposals, but as 
philosophical questions. 
James M.O. Wheatley 
This chapter examines the dominant arguments in philosophy which deal with psi 
phenomena. These are the Explanation by Fraud Argument (EFA) and the Humean-
based Modern Miracle Argument (MMA). The former focuses on the Australian 
philosopher Keith Campbel's version and the later on the case made by George Price 
in 1955. The arguments represent the most comprehensive examples of philosophical 
assessment of psi in relatively contemporary mainstream philosophy. Their impact on 
the mainstream philosophical assessment of psi has been profound and yet there is 
litle discussion about the arguments themselves in that forum. 
Firstly, I critique the arguments separately: I detail issues about explanatory 
conservatism that inform the Explanation by Fraud Argument; and I show the Modern 
Miracle Argument is problematic and requires an update. Secondly, the two forms of 
argument are considered together in a generic form, and an argument is made that the 
argument for psi as best explained by fraud fals to an overarching criticism: it is an 
ilegitimate, Pre-emptive Inference to the Best Explanation (PIBE). The term PIBE is 
subsequently defined and described. 
Two conclusions are drawn from the analysis of the mainstream psi 
arguments: firstly it is concluded that a more complex approach to understanding psi 
is waranted; and secondly the analysis is used to flag the issues of explanation and 
background belief, that are important to the development of a more sophisticated 
analysis of psi phenomena. Chapter 1 thus sets the Scene for the analysis of psi and 
related explanation issues, which is then undertaken during the course of the thesis. 
The exploration of explanatory issues that ensues in folowing chapters helps 
to resolve the tension between the apparent body of evidence for psi and the curent 
lack of a tenable explanation for the phenomena, which is at the core of the psi debate 
and therefore of central concern to this thesis. 
Chapter 1: Terra incognita 	 14 
1.1 Psi arguments in mainstream philosophy 
Arguments about psi phenomena are rarely made explicit in contemporary 
philosophy. Instead, it is assumed that although potentialy relevant to philosophical 
issues, there is no evidence for psi and accordingly, further discussion of psi should 
not be undertaken4. As a result psi is often invisible in mainstream philosophical 
discourse. I show in Chapter 2 that there is a significant body of evidence for psi that 
does require an assessment. It is curious how the gap between the mainstream 
assessment of psi and body of evidence has occurred, hence it is important to analyse 
the mainstream arguments in philosophy that have given rise to the notion that there is 
no evidence for the phenomena. I suggest that behind the assertion lie two main 
arguments which show how this conclusion was reached. They are important because 
they are the dominant arguments in philosophy and have had an ongoing effect on the 
mainstream assessment of psi phenomena. I show both the Explanation by Fraud 
(EFA) and Modern Miracle Argument (MMA) suffer from similar problems due to 
assumptions about the explanation of psi. I critique the structure, set up and 
conclusions of both the arguments separately starting with the Explanation by Fraud 
Argument (EFA) in the subsection below. 
1.1.1 Explanation by fraud (EFA) argument 
The EFA asserts that psi phenomena are most rationaly explained as the product of 
deliberate fraud or self-delusion. The argument has been most clearly put forward by 
the Australian philosopher Keith Campbel, who is concerned with the evidence for 
psi as part of a discussion of the mind/body problem published in his book Body and 
Mind. He writes: 
the Mind-Body problem requires for its solution a judgement on parapsychology, and 
that in turn raises general questions in philosophy, and in particular epistemology 
(Campbel 1984, p95) 
4 For instance, the folowing quote is taken from a general text book on philosophy of mind: 
..If there were such Ipsil phenomena, then existing physical theory would certainly appear to be 
inadequate. But there is no evidence of such phenomena (or so most curent philosophers of mind 
assume). Moreover, even if there were, it is unclear how it would bear upon the explanation of vast 
amounts of perfectly normal human and animal behaviour when such evidence seems even less likely 
to arise. (Rey, 1997, p72) 
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He then goes on to say that: 
We must confront the problem of how evidence can have weight, and this raises the 
question of fraud. The problem of fraud is that we know men can, and do, cheat and 
dissemble, but we do not know that they have paranormal capacities. On the contrary, 
the great weight of our fuly atested knowledge of man's origin and constitution makes 
paranormal capacities extremely unlikely. So for any result in psychical research which 
can be explained either by appeal to paranormal powers or by the hypothesis of fraud, 
the explanation by fraud is the more rational one. 
(Campbel 1984, pp94-95) 
And finaly that: 
Only repeatability can eliminate the hypothesis of fraud. If the subject can repeat, or 
nearly repeat, his paranormal feat for anybody, at any suitable time, in any suitable 
place, under conditions which any independent experimenter is free to vary at wil, with 
assistants whom the experimenter can choose, then fraud can be excluded as an 
explanation of the events. (Campbel 1984, p96) 







When presented with the evidence for psi 
'we must confront the problem of how evidence can have 
weight.' 
'we know that people can and do cheat and dissemble.' 
'we do not know that they have paranormal capacities' (in fact 
paranormal capacities are extremely unlikely). 
the 'explanation by fraud is the more rational one.' 
unless the repeatability problem is addressed. 
I have caled Campbel's argument the Explanation by Fraud Argument (EFA) 
because of its concluding statement: 'the explanation by fraud is the more rational 
one'. At first glance, it is reminiscent of Hume's miracle argument. That is, one must 
choose between something that is thought to contravene the laws of nature (highly 
improbable or unlikely) and something that one knows for sure (that people tel lies) 
and therefore one should question the source of the improbable events rather than 
believe the former occurred. At this stage of the analysis I treat Campbel's version as 
a standalone argument because he does not make any reference to Hume's work5. In 
5 As the other argument I focus on in this chapter, George Price's Modern Miracle Argument, 
specificaly references the Humean argument I wil deal with issues of concern regarding the modern 
rendition of Hume's argument in the next section. 
Chapter 1: Terra incognita 	 16 
the folowing analysis of the EFA I show that there are important issues about 
explanatory conservatism that guide the set up and structure of the EFA argument 
which warant further investigation of psi phenomena in relation to explanatory 
issues. 
The EFA premises 
It is hard to quibble with either of the premises. We definitely know that people do lie 
and cheat and can be deluded unwitingly from our own personal experience. It is also 
easy to confirm that psi is considered unlikely by mainstream science. Mainstream 
dictionaries and encyclopaedias define psi as anomalous in the strictest sense, and 
hence paranormal (Mautner 1996, p310, Blackburn 1994, p277)6. Therefore neither of 
the premises of the EFA argument are controversial statements. Instead it is the set up 
and structure of the argument which I wil focus on in this critique. 
The EFA set up • 
It is the set up to the premises that gives the first clue as to the hidden explanatory 
concerns that might be informing the argument. Campbel says 'We must confront the 
problem of how evidence can have weight' (Campbel 1984, pp94) which indicates 
that he believes that the evidence is significant enough to warrant examination. But 
directly after this statement he introduces the premise which states that we know 
people cheat and dissemble. Such a manoeuvre is problematic because it suggests that 
between the set up and the first premise lie certain assumptions about the evidence 
itself. The statement in the first premise is not an assessment of the actual weight of 
the evidence as promised in the set up of the argument. I suggest that there are other 
questions that could be asked and should be answered prior to the introduction of the 
fraud premises. For instance Campbel could ask: 
6 In fact one such definition from the Penguin Dictionary of Psychology starts of with a rather acerbic 
comment on parapsychology which they defined as a 'more or less (with the emphasis on the less) 
accepted branch of psychology concerned with paranormal phenomena..' (Reber 1985, p5I7). The 
definition finishes up by advising want-to-be psi researchers to fund their research by using psychics 
to help them win at casinos and the race track—an absurd proposition. 
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What evidence is there for psi? 
or, 
Does the evidence for psi conform to current scientific standards? 
There are also more complex questions that could reasonably be posed regarding the 
weighing up of probabilities in regard to fraud: 
When does the evidence for an anomalous phenomenon such as psi outweigh 
the improbability of it? 
How do we make an empirical judgement on what is considered anomalous 
phenomena? 
How much cheating and dissembling can we reasonably postulate in order to 
explain the evidence in such a manner? 
Campbel does not give any reason why he introduces the cheating and dissembling 
premise upfront without addressing any of the issues regarding fraud and psi 
explicitly. The introduction of the first premise without discussion is therefore 
presumably based on assumptions regarding the nature of the evidence for psi as• 
anomalous. The EFA is then a circular argument based on the formaly defined nature 
of the phenomena rather than an assessment of it per se. 
It is important to realise the gravity of what is being proposed when it is 
suggested that fraud can account as a blanket explanation for the entire body of 
evidence for psi. The issue of fraud as an explanation for psi is wel covered in psi 
literature. Some 14 years prior to the first publication of Campbel's book in 1970 it 
was noted that for fraud to be a reasonable hypothesis to account for the evidence one 
must 'believe that al parapsychologists are liars and montebanks but such a 
charge..' even if applied 'to the dozens of university and other scientists involved, is 
not likely to be taken seriously.' (Rhine 1956, pl) There is a body of evidence for 
psi7 which, although controversial, can be analysed in terms of scientific validity as 
any other evidence is in science. A genuine weighting of the evidence for psi indicates 
that the situation is more complex than that which is assumed by proponents of the 
Explanation by Fraud Argument. 
7 Once again I remind that if the reader is unfamiliar with what constitutes the body of evidence for psi 
it is set out in some detail at the beginning of Chapter 2. 
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Psi has been studied using appropriate scientific methods that are acceptable to 
mainstream scientific processes8. The results are controversial because overal the 
experiments indicate that psi effects occur in the lives of regular people and they are 
confirmed to a certain extent in smal scale replications in laboratories. I suggest that 
it is unreasonable to ascribe fraud as an explanation for the phenomena without taking 
into account how much fraud must be required in order to provide a satisfactory 
explanation for the phenomena.-The fraud hypothesis becomes absurd (not to mention 
potentialy libelous) once it is considered just how much fraud or lying or cheating or 
dissembling must take place in order for it to be a reasonable assessment of the case 
in hand. It is because arguments such as the EFA assume fraud without explicit 
assessment of the evidence that I think there is a deeper undercurrent informing the 
argument. 
To underscore this point further, I wil now review a similar contemporary 
example where there is debate and discussion regarding evidence. Global warming 
has been the topic of much debate amongst the scientific community and philosophers 
in recent years. It is similar to the psi debate because there are two sides to the debate: 
those that believe some scientific data indicates human activity is causing global 
warming and those who disagree with this statement and yet draw on the same body 
of evidence regarding the climate. The later are often referred to as 'global warming 
skeptics' which is also indicative of a similarity to the psi debate. 
The discussion regarding climate change has been the subject of philosophical 
investigation. For instance, in a paper caled 'Scientific basis for the greenhouse 
effect' Wiliam R. Cline outlines the scientific evidence and analyses the data taking 
into account the views of scientists who propose various interpretations of the 
ultimate cause of the current fluctuation of the earth's temperature. In the end he 
concludes that 'it should be clear from this review that many scientific uncertainties 
remain about the greenhouse effect. However, uncertainty is not necessarily grounds 
for policy inaction' (Cline 1991,p916). The paper is indicative that a thorough 
assessment of the state of the global warming debate has been undertaken: the author 
performs an evaluation of the evidence available from scientific journals; and the 
8 Assessments of psi in relation to scientific method have been performed on an ongoing basis since 
the controversy regarding modern day experiments first commenced. I mention some specific details 
in Chapter 5. For a recent summation of the history of the scientific study of psi and the status of the 
evidence can be found, for instance, in Adrian Parker's article 'Does psi exist?' in the Journal of 
Consciousness Studies' special issue on psi: Psi Wars. 
Chapter 1: Terra incognita 	 19 
article then goes on to compare the different interpretations of evidence; and finaly, 
provides a summation of the situation. The weighing up of the evidence of the global 
warming debate is based on an analysis of issues relevant to philosophy of science, 
such as the problems of weighing up and the problematic nature of interpreting data in 
relation to theory development. 
The examination of the global warming debate is in sharp contrast to the EFA 
argument, which also requires a weighing up of disputed evidence in a field of 
scientific inquiry. It is hard to imagine that a philosophical assessment of the climate 
change debate would, instead, mount a similar argument to the EFA. For instance, it 
would be considered rather absurd to contend that 'we know that people cheat and 
dissemble' and 'we are unsure if there is global warming' so therefore 'there is no 
global warming.' And yet that is exactly what the Explanation by Fraud Argument 
proposes is a reasonable response regarding the evidential issues that the body of 
evidence for psi raises. According to the EFA there need.be no discussion of the 
pertinent issues in philosophy pertaining to an evaluation of the evidence for psi. 
Despite this problem the Explanation by Fraud Argument has remained 
dominant and accepted by mainstream philosophy as the most rational response when 
it is required to make a decision about the body of evidence for psi9. But is it? I 
suggest that it is not. No, there are beliefs that inform the set up of the premises of the 
argument regarding psi that are specific to the phenomena and which are not reflected 
in other philosophical investigations of contentious debates in science. I explore these 
beliefs further in the section below. 
Conservative explanatory concerns - En and E, 
I argue that that the set up of the premises of the Explanation by Fraud Argument is 
informed by a predisposition to a conservative approach to explanation in the sciences 
which is problematic. To ilustrate this I suggest that when mainstream philosophers 
consider psi, they are realy making an assessment which chooses one of two possible 
outcomes: 
9 Cotemporary mainstream philosophers often re-iterate that 'there is no evidence for psi' even if they 
don't reference the EFA specificaly. I make more specific mention of some statements in philosophy 
of mind that maintain this stance later in the thesis. 
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either 
- psi cannot be explained curently as a natural phenomenon therefore the 
fraud hypothesis is the most rational 
or 
- psi does not fit into curent scientific theory, but, given the apparent 
evidence, some kind of explanation is required regardless of the ontological 
outcome 
The Explanation by Fraud Argument assumes the former, which is indicative of a 
conservative explanatory approach to psi phenomena.powever, I showed that 
philosophical discussion of the climate change debate used curent theory in 
philosophy of science to make an assessment of the relevant issues. I contend that psi 
is just as worthy of considered analysis as any other discussion regarding evidence in 
the sciences. The evidence should be examined and weighed in relation to curent 
issues of-explanation and measurement and broader issues of scientific process and 
progress as part of the analysis. 
It is not possible at this stage to determine whether E. or Eq, is the most rational 
assessment of psi. If, just say, E,, is true then the conservative explanatory approach is 
not appropriate and therefore less reasonable than if E. were true. I argue therefore 
that an assessment of the phenomena should be made when the comparison between 
the fraud hypothesis and other explanatory options are taken into consideration. 
EFA conclusion 
To sum up, there is a greater puzzle regarding the anomalous nature of a phenomenon 
for which there is substantial (if controversial) evidence. We do want to be able to 
differentiate between the truly impossible (that the moon is made of green cheese for 
example) without writing of the possible existence of ostensibly paranormal 
phenomena in the face of reasonable epistemic plausibility. 
I argue then that rather than invoke the fraud hypothesis up front we should . 
consider: When is it realy more rational to believe that fraud can account for the body 
of evidence for psi rather than accept the possibility that the evidence might be 
indicative of another, as yet unaccepted, method of interaction between humans and 
the world? At this point in time the psi debate indicates that there are various 
alternatives to the E„ outcome. The Explanation by Fraud Argument must therefore be 
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considered as only one of other equaly plausible assessments, which al require 
further refinement and discussion before it can become clear which is realy the most 
reasonable. I explore and examine this issue further in the folowing chapters: The 
theories that have been developed to explain psi are explored in Chapter 2; and the 
anomalous nature of psi is explored in an historic context in Chapter 3. Finaly an 
analysis of the Explanation by Fraud Argument, renamed the skeptic hypothesis, is 
compared to other possible hypotheses and is assessed in relation to issues in 
contemporary explanation theory in Chapter 6. 
I have shown that conservative explanatory assumptions have guided the set 
up of the EFA. Next I wil discuss the other form of argument which is dominant in 
the literature, the Modern Miracle Argument (MMA). Then I wil show that both the 
EFA and the MMA suffer from more explanatory problems regarding Inference to the 
Best Explanation. 
1.1.2 Modern Miracle Arguments (MMA) 
As I mentioned earlier, Keith Campbel's Explanation by Fraud Argument is 
reminiscent of Hume's miracle argument. Therefore it is not surprising that 
philosophers have made a similar argument, but in direct reference back to the 
Humean form of the argument. I have caled these the Modern Miracle Arguments 
(WA). 
, The first Modern Miracle Argument was presented by. George Price and 
published in Science in 1955. Another version was published 25 years after this by 
Anthony Flew in 'Parapsychology: Science or pseudoscience?'. Price himself 
acknowledges that the argument form is not new and long predates even Hume's 
famous miracle version. He references a similar argument to the Greek writer Lucian 
(Price 1955, p360). Price's version is more comprehensive than Flew's, so it wil be 
used as the basis for the analysis of Humean-style miracle arguments.1° 
1° I make mention of Price's article later in the thesis when, in Chapter 5, I show that the timing of the 
publication of Price's MMA argument coincides with the time the covering law model of explanation 
became dominant in philosophy of science. 
Chapter 1: Terra incognita 	 22 
George Price's Modern Miracle Argument 
In a paper caled 'Science and the supernatural' I  George Price states that after 
reading Hume's 'miracle argument' he 'converted' from being an avid believer in ESP 
to a non-believer, or radical skeptic (Price 1955, p360). George Price wrote that it is 
his: 
opinion concerning the findings of the parapsychologists that many of them are 
dependent on clerical and statistical erors and unintentional use of sensory clues, and 
that al extra chance results not so explicable are dependent on deliberate fraud or mildly 
abnormal mental conditions. (Price 1955, p360) 
Further to this, Price formulates his argument in the light of Hume's miracle argument 
(more on this shortly) and adopts a similar position with regarding psi phenomena. He 
shows that psi is incompatible with curent scientific theory by accepting an analysis 
by the philosopher C.D. Broad. He cites a paper first published in 1949 in which 
Broad showed that the evidence for psi, if accepted as real, conflicts with Basic 
Limiting Principles (BLPs) which are fundamental to scientific concepts of mind, 
space, time and causality (Price 1955, p360). To further support this assertion George 
Price also quotes J.B. Rhine (a psi researcher from the 1920s who famously brought 
the study of psi into universities in the USA) as saying that even those who are 
actively researching psi phenomena believe that 'Nothing in al the history of human 
thiought—heliocentrism, evolution, relativity—has been more truly revolutionary or 
radicaly contradictory to contemporary thought than the results of the investigation of 
precognitive psi' (Rhine in Price 1955, p361). 
Price accepts these analyses and consequently argues that parapsychology and 
'modem science' are incompatible. In Humean style he whitles his choices down to 
either believing in something 'truly revolutionary' and 'radicaly contradictory to 
contemporary thought' on the one hand and on the other, believing in the occurrence 
of fraud and self-delusion. He opts for the later because 'al our experience suggests 
that it wil be more profitable for us to assume that the old generalizations are stil 
valid, and that the findings of the parapsychologists are to be explained on the old, 
familiar basis of human error' (Price 1955, p361). 
H The use of supernatural rather than paranormal in the title is interesting and indicative of lack of 
agreement in the literature regarding psi's explanatory status. Ideal with this issue when I present the 
historic account in Chapter 3. 
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So, in point form, for George Price: 
PROBLEM 	 When presented with the evidence for psi, which looks at first 
glance convincing, we must remember that: 
SET UP 	 Psi effects are incompatible with the nine 'basic 
limiting principles' (supported by Broad's discussion 
of psi and BLPs and Soal's and Rhine's work). 
PREMISE 1 	 We must choose between believing something 'truly 
revolutionary' or that fraud and self-delusion occur. 
PREMISE 2 	 Know for certain that fraud and self-delusion do 
OCCUL 
CONCLUSION Therefore there is nothing concrete to the evidence—
even if it appears as if there is (as it initialy did to 
him). 
This stance has become known as the 'Hume= Skeptic' position due to the Humean 
foundation of a modern argument which advocates skepticism regarding psi 
phenomena. The MMA wil now be discussed and the issues pertinent to the psi 
debate teased out. Price's argument wil be compared to Hume's original miracle 
argument. Then the response to Price's argument put forward by Paul Meehl and 
Michael Scriven is discussed. Finaly, I show that some of Broad's Basic Limiting 
Principles do not currently hold and it is argued that the use of unchanging certainties 
in order to formulate a response to psi is problematic.' 
The MMA and Hume 's miracle argument 
In this section I compare Hume's miracle argument with Price's modern version. I 
show that because they involved different forms of testimony, psi cannot be 
substituted for miracles and that it is problematic to rely on a list of unchanging 
certainties. 
In the original miracle argument Hume states that 'a miracle is a violation of 
the laws of nature, and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these 
laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any 
argument from experience can possibly be imagined' (Hume 1817, p114). He uses 
this reasoning to develop the 'general maxim': 'No testimony is sufficient to establish 
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a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more 
miraculous than the fact which it endeavours to establish; and even in that case there 
is a mutual destruction' (Hume 1817, p115). So for Hume, when confronted with 
events that appear to contravene the laws of nature (so-caled miracles) it is sensible 
to believe they are the product of fraud or delusion rather than entertain the possibility 
that a genuine supernatural event occurred. Hume goes on to give us an example of 
how his 'everlasting check' for should be employed, Hume warns 
when anyone tels me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider 
with myself, whether it be more probably, that this person should either deceive or be 
deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should realy have happened. I weigh the one 
miracle against the other; and according to the superiority, which I discover, I pronounce 
my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony 
would be more miraculous, than the event which he relates; then, and not til then, can 
he pretend to command my belief or opinion .(Hume 1817, pp115-116) 
The power of this argument is substantial, for it makes a case that no mater what 
testimony one is provided with it is forever doubtful that a miracle did actualy occur. 
In George Price's rendition of the argument, psi is substituted for miracles, 
Basic Limiting Principles for laws of nature, and a similar conclusion is drawn when 
faced with the choice between the perceived certainty of the Basic Limiting Principles 
and the unknown nature of psi. It is evident that the formulation of Price's argument 
adheres strictly to the original Hiunean miracle argument. 
I do not want to delve into the controversy surrounding the assessment of 
Hume's original miracle argument, as a review of this literature is far beyond the 
scope of this thesis, but I wil mention briefly the analysis performed by the 
philosopher Terence Penelhum who is both a Humean expert and, unusualy, aware of 
the modern renditions of the argument pertinent to psi. Penelhum maintains that: 
Parapsychological evidence chalenges firmly entrenched assumptions. Those who 
doubt these assumptions may welcome this evidence, and choose to ignore the power of 
Hume's argument that al the experience that has caused us to make them weighs against 
the testimony on which the evidence rests. I think this is an irresponsible atitude. But 
those on the other side who are unwiling to entertain the possibility that there are more 
things in heaven and earth than our assumptions permit us to believe in, have to stare 
down the high quality of some of the testimony, and insist it must always be due to error 
or fraud. I think this looks like foolishness also. (Penelhum 2003, online) 
Penelhum advocates an open-minded approach to parapsychological evidence, one 
that alows for the possibility that the evidence has been fraudulently produced but 
one which also questions whether or not science is able to deal with the apparent 
phenomena indicative of psi effects. He concludes that: 
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A rational mind (Hume's wise person) should not move to resolve the conflict too 
hastily. It is essential in the first place to be sure that the quality of the testimony meets 
the highest standards possible. It is also necessary to consider very carefuly whether the 
scientific knowledge we already have may perhaps show that even if the phenomena are 
genuine, they can be accommodated within the laws of nature as we understand them. If 
they cannot, the pressure to uncover fraud or error in the testimony wil grow, and 
although this pressure is often ofensive and due to inertia or bigotry, it is stil healthy. 
(Penelhum 2003, online) 
He bases his conclusion on an analysis of the Humean version of the argument as he 
accepts that because miracles and psi both contravene laws of nature and require 
testimonial evidence the modern version is legitimate. Penelhum thinks that Hume's 
'general argument requires us to recognise that there might be situations in which a 
'proof from prior experience colides with a 'proof from impeccable testimony' 
(Penelhum 2003, online). And in the case of psi this state is potentialy obtainable, 
whereas in the case of miracles it is theoretical only. 
However, I think that there is a stronger case to be made against the modern 
interpretation of the Humean-style argument and that substituting psi for miracles is 
problematic because the strength of the testimony is different. I wil focus now on 
Price's argument and the use of the miracle argument as a template for his psi version 
of the argument. I start the analysis by questioning whether or not this is a legitimate 
manoeuvre. 
Miracles and psi are not interchangeable 
As noted briefly before, Hume limited his discussion to weighing tip testimonial 
evidence and more pertinently testimonial evidence that was reported by witnesses of 
events that had happened either in the past (such as biblical miracles) or in far off 
places (Penelhum 2003, online). The evidence for psi, even in George Price's time, is 
more complex and involves more than historical human testimonial evidence. There is 
historical testimony for evidence for psi, but there are also both laboratory evidence, 
which is a body of experiments that have yielded smal but significant results, along 
with continued reports of spontaneous psi on a larger scale that have been colected 
into catalogues of anecdotes (examples of which wil be presented in Chapter 2). 
Al forms of evidence can be considered 'testimonial' in some sense, but there 
is a difference between the type of testimonial evidence that Hume referred to and the 
body of scientific evidence for psi. Compare, for instance, the testimony of a friend 
who relates they experienced ESP with their twin sister when a young child to that of 
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a psychological study which undertakes analysis of ESP between twins. The first is 
based on personal experience and recolection of that experience. The memory could 
be faulty or faded or perhaps the initial assessment of the situation, from a child's 
perspective, too credulous. In contrast, a psychological study of ESP between twins 
would be undertaken within the bounds of accepted psychology methodology and 
scientific practice. The paper that provided the details of the experiments would also 
be evaluated and discussed in scientific peer-reviewed journals. 
Price does not diferentiate between the diferent forms of evidence that the 
body of psi literature contain (historic, anecdotal as wel as experimental). And 
although al forms of evidence are testimonial to some degree there are significant 
diferences between historic testimony and scientific testimony that should be taken 
into account when analysing the body of evidence for psi. I therefore argue that unless 
Price is to limit his assessment of psi to historical testimony of evidence then psi 
cannot be automaticaly substituted for miracles in his revised modem version of 
Hume's miracle argument. (I discuss further the difference between scientific, 
anecdotal and historic testimony in Chapter 2). 
The Meehl and Scriven chalenge 
Price's 1955 paper elicited a response from prominent psi researchers and theorists. I 
wil cover these responses in more detail later in the thesis as I want to focus on the 
structure of the argument in this early chapter where I am. laying,the foundations for 
the discussion that folows. I wil therefore concentrate on a reply regarding the 
philosophical content of the argument which is most pertinent to the analysis at this 
stage of the thesis. It was writen by Paul Meehl and the philosopher Michael Scriven 
who were mentioned in Price's initial paper. 
Meehl and Scriven claim that to maintain Price's argument there are two 
points that must hold: that psi is incompatible with modern science; and that modern 
science is complete and corect. If either of these cannot be upheld, they maintain, 
then the argument is left without a basis for the conclusion that al evidence for psi 
must have been obtained through fraudulent or mistaken means (Meehl & Scriven 
1956, p 14). There are not many (if any) people who would be prepared to contend 
that modern science is complete and corect. Therefore, they believed, that they had 
invalidated Price's argument by refuting at least one of the premises. 'In our view' 
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they contend 'both of Price's hypotheses are untenable. Whatever one may think 
about the comprehensiveness and finality of modem physics, it would surely be rash 
to insist that we can reject out of hand any claims of revolutionary discoveries in the 
field of psychology' (Meehl & Scriven 1956, p14). I agree that Price cannot assume 
that the Basic Limiting Principles that he relies on wil be maintained ad infinitum 
and I wil take up this point further in the next section; for now, I suggest that the 
Meehl and Scriven counter argument does not do justice to Price's original argument. 
There is no need to maintain something as controversial as 'science is 
complete and correct' in order to validate Price's argument. Although it is never seen 
speled out as such (since it may be implicit in the argument), it appears that Price 
need only maintain that science is complete and correct enough, in order to uphold 
that the possibility of something like psi existing is nil — or as close to nil as makes no 
difference. However, this forced concession also reveals a smal chink in the armour 
through which can be pursued an argument against Price. Namely, that if the evidence 
for psi ever becomes persuasive enough to warrant atention then it should be further 
investigated. 
The conclusion I come to on this basis is similar to Penelhum's. It is sensible 
to keep an eye on the evidence with the fraud hypotheses in mind, but also to alow 
for the possibility that the evidence is indeed legitimate. Price's argument is then 
weakened so that it is not so much an 'everlasting' check as an immediate check that 
should be reviewed over time. 
CD. Broad's Basic Limiting Principles 
In the set up to his argument Price refers to an analysis by the philosopher C.D. Broad 
which he uses to support his contention that psi is incompatible with modem science. 
Price argues that the evidence for psi is incompatible with Broad's list of Basic 
Limiting Principles (BLPs) and it is on this analysis that his ultimate conclusion rests. 
He then uses the structure of the Humean miracle argument to bring about his final 
conclusion. Price makes the claim that 'psi contravenes BLPs' in the same way as 
Hume maintains that 'miracles are violations of the laws of nature'. This is 
problematic because the BLPs have not been upheld as Broad anticipated. 
Broad's analysis of psi and Basic Limiting Principles is one of the most 
commonly cited assessments of the anomalous nature of psi by a philosopher. And as 
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I have shown it is used as the foundation for one of the main arguments involving psi, 
it is worthwhile going back to the original work done by Broad to make a more 
contemporary assessment of the analysis. 
Broad defined a paranormal phenomenon, such as a psi event, as one that 
defied one of at least nine Basic Limiting Principles. His work was instrumental in 
seting out the ways in which psi defied the commonly accepted limitations of time, 
space and causal laws which, according to him, physics determined were unchanging. 
For Broad, Basic Limiting Principles (BLPs) were precisely what the name indicates: 
they define the limits of what is considered possible in science. These are principles 
that are stronger than a natural law in the sense that it is commonly believed that 
something is impossible rather than that they could be contravened. According to 
Broad, BLPs are: 
..prior to and more fundamental than any named laws of physics: they are and have 
been accepted as items of basic common sense by many who have never benefited from 
any contact with systematic science. Like those named laws of physics, and like al other 
true laws of nature, these BLPs assert: not only that there in fact have been, are, and wil 
be no occurences incompatible with their own truth; but also, and more strongly, that 
such incompatible occurences have been, are, and wil be impossible. (Broad 1953, p7) 
There are nine principles in total but I wil focus on the main four for the purposes of 
this discussion. The remaining five are subcategories of the four, so the same 
criticisms apply as to the overarching four main BLPs. The four main basic limiting 
principles that, according to Broad, psi contravenes are: 
1.General Principles of Causation. It is self-evidently impossible that an event 
should begin to have any effects before it has happened. 
2.Limitations on the Action of Mind on Mater. It is impossible for an event in 
a person's mind to produce directly any change in the material world except 
certain changes in his own brain. 
3.Dependence of Mind on Brain. A necessary, even if not a sufficient, 
immediate condition of any mental event is an event in the brain of a living 
body. 
4.Limitations on Ways of Acquiring Knowledge. It is impossible for a person 
to perceive a physical event or material thing except by means of sensations 
which that event or thing produces in his mind. 
(Broad 1953, pp9-10) 
At first glance it is clear that the principles are far from being 'certainties' 
in the context of curent day science and philosophy. The principles divide into two , .	 • — 
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types: One and three are examples of statements that are no longer credible in terns 
of curent theory; and principles two and four are statements based on the 
anomalous nature of psi. Both types of statement are problematic and are discussed 
separately below. 
First and third BLPs 
Broad's first and third Basic Limiting Principles involve statements about causation 
and mind theory that would not be considered certainties according to curent mind 
and causation theory. These principles may have been considered certainties to Broad 
at the time he defined the term BLP. However, subsequent development of mind, time 
and causation theories have shown that his statements are outdated and other theories 
now vie for dominance in the teritory. 
For instance, Broad states that' it is self-evidently impossible that an event 
should begin to have any effects before it has happened' (Broad 1953, p9). However, 
this statement is certainly not taken as self evident in contemporary theoretical 
physics and philosophy of time and causation There are current theories that deal with 
the notion of backwards causation that speculate 'we in fact do not live in a world in 
which there are three dimensions of space, but in one in which there are four, time 
being the fourth spatial dimension.' (Brier 1976, p53) There is no theoretical reason to 
discount backwards causation. 
More recently Huw Price discusses the problem of apparent time symmetry - 
why does a vase break and smash into pieces rather than `unbreak' from pieces to a 
vase? He maintains that although the `unbreaking' of a vase is not conceivable at the 
intuitive level of everyday experience, at the high-level of physical theory if 'a given 
physical process is permited by physical laws, so too is the reverse process' (Price 
1996, p18). This alows—conceptualy at least—for cause and efect to occur both 
forwards and backwards in time. Huw Price suggests that 'the best strategy is.. to 
study the more familiar arows of time in physics as if there were no exceptions to the 
principles that the underlying laws are time-symmetric.' (Price 1996, p18) So it would 
seem there is contemporary assessment that alows for the plausibility of backward 
causation, which is counter to Broad's statement in principle one. 
Broad's analysis appears to assume a dualistic mind/body framework which is 
currently out of favour in contemporary mind theory. There are, of course, 
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contemporary dualists such as David Chalmers (1996). And psi theorists also count 
dualists amongst their number, for instance, John Beloff (1990) argues for a dualist 
ontology on the basis of acceptance of psi as real. However, there are current theories 
of mind that do not maintain, contrary to Broad's assessment, that 'a necessary, even 
if not a sufficient, immediate condition of any mental event is an event in the brain of 
a living body' (Broad 1949, p41). Functionalism, for instance, accounts for mental 
states (what Broad would refer to as 'the mind') by ascribing to them a 'complex 
causal network anchored to the external world at various points' (Kim 2003, p123). 
According to this explanation of mind our beliefs and desires are constituted by their 
causal relations to sensory inputs and outputs, rather than more traditional notions of 
mind/brain mental states. Of course functionalism is but one of many other competing 
theories of mind which do hold, as Broad does, that the mind is dependant on the 
brain. But that functionalism is stil part of current discussion in mind theory indicates 
that Broad's notion of a set-in-stone Basic Limiting Principle that denies this 
possibility is a flawed foundation to work from. 
The examples discussed above show that far from being scientific and 
theoretical certainties, Broad's list of BLPs has not stood the test of time. Presumably, 
when Broad constructed the list, it represented the dominant theories of his time (or 
the ones he believed were considered the unchangeable certainties). However, it is 
apparent that the statements are no longer applicable as a benchmark to which any 
phenomenon, anomalous or not, should be assessed. I therefore argue that the 
anomalous nature of psi and how it should be dealt with by science and philosophy 
should be updated and reassessed as the body of scientific knowledge changes and 
adapts to new theories and discoveries. 
Second and fourth BLPs 
I turn now to the second and fourth principles in which Broad states that 'it is 
impossible for an event in a person's mind to produce directly any change in the 
material world except certain changes in his own brain' (Broad 1953, p9). And also 
that 'it is impossible for a person to perceive a physical event or material thing except 
by means of sensations which that event or thing produces in his mind' (Broad 1953, 
p10). These statements are similar as they are both based on the anomalous nature of 
psi. However, psi is defined negatively; a psi event is only determined as such if there 
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are no normal explanations immediately apparent. I believe that there is much more 
than semantics being played out here. There are two issues involved which I wil flag 
here and deal with in more detail during the course of the thesis. 
The first is the circular argument which is apparent when a phenomenon is 
defined by virtue of its anomalousness. It is not enough to define something as 
anomalous and then to use this very definition against its possible existence. 
Principles two and four are statements adopted from the definition of what psi is when 
divided into the two main categories ESP and PK. Rather than merely reiterating that 
they are anomalous, I claim that it is necessary instead to make an assessment of the 
apparent anomalous nature of the phenomena and try to understand how best to 
approach the explanatory issues involved. I undertake such an analysis later in the 
thesis when, in Chapter 3, I commence an investigation into the explanatory history of 
the phenomena. Further discussion is caried out in Part I of the thesis when the 
explanatory issues are explored in more detail and placed in a contemporary context. 
The second is that anomalous phenomena have been shown to be important in 
the development of new theories in science. Though anomalous phenomena pose 
special problems to science it is often through the investigation of such phenomena 
that science progresses. The history and philosophy of science literature is replete 
with examples. For instance, in a paper on the response of scientists to anomalous 
data Wiliam Brewer and Clark Chinn mention that 'the history of science suggests 
that theory change often requires a series of empirical anomalies, which colectively 
appear to be beter explained by an alternate theory' (Brewer & Chinn 1994, p310). 
And they go on to give an example regarding the discovery of X-Rays which were 
'met with some initial disbelief, but within a month the scientific community was 
convinced, as the basic phenomena were quickly and easily replicated' (Brewer & 
Chinn 1994, p310). The anomalous nature of psi is not as easily resolved, however, 
the fact that anomalous phenomena are sometimes subsequently subsumed into 
science and actualy help to develop theories in science is a reason to ensure that the 
phenomena are not dismissed solely on the basis that they are not currently 
explainable by science. 
It cannot be assumed that lists of Basic Limiting Principles, such as Broad's, 
wil hold over time. It is therefore problematic to rely on them, as George Price does, 
in order to formulate a modern version of Hume's miracle argument. I argue therefore 
that Price's argument is flawed because of its reliance on Broad's list. This raises the 
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problematic nature of anomalous phenomena in regard to science and especialy to the 
problem of laws. I address these issues in chapters 5 and 6 when I look at the psi 
hypotheses in relation to covering law theory. For the moment I hope that I have 
shown that the notion of an 'everlasting check' for psi is not plausible because of the 
difficulties in assessing what scientific certainties wil absolutely, definitely hold over 
time. And that this is especialy problematic in relation to anomalous phenomena, 
which are defined by the fact that science is unable to account for the production of 
the apparently anomalous events. 
The use of outdated lists such as Broad's, in order to make a philosophical 
assessment of psi, indicate that the background beliefs and explanatory considerations 
regarding analysis of the phenomena require a contemporary update. 
1.1.3 Summary'— explanatory issues & questionable certainties 
So far I have analysed representatives of the two main philosophical arguments that 
assess psi phenomena. I have shown that both are problematic. It is evident that 
certain assumptions regarding explanation of anomalous phenomena such as psi are 
guiding the set up and construction of these arguments, which have remained the 
dominant understanding of psi in mainstream philosophy to this day. 
In short, the Explanation by Fraud Argument (EFA) is flawed because it 
assumes an unwarranted conservative explanatory approach to the phenomena which 
does not take into consideration the body of evidence for psi. And the Modern 
Miracle Argument (MMA) fals short for two reasons: firstly, because the psi cannot 
be legitimately substituted for miracles unless the argument is limited to historic 
testimony of psi events; and -secondly, because it relies on a list of outdated basic 
limiting principles. 
The next section continues to explore problems with the arguments using a 
generic form of argument devised from both the EFA and MMA forms. I argue that in 
generic form, there is failure to recognise the structure and logic of the arguments as 
inferences to the best explanation. I introduce a new term 'Pre-emptive Inference to 
the Best Explanation' to explain the problem in more detail. I introduce this new term 
in the section below. 
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1.2 Psi arguments as pre-emptive inferences to the best 
explanation (PIBE) 
I have devised the term 'Pre-emptive Inference to the Best Explanation' to describe 
inferences that are made without making a thorough assessment of the situation that 
requires explanation. First I outline what an Inference to the Best Explanation (ISE) is 
and I outline why they must be used cautiously. I then define Pre-emptive Inference to 
the Best Explanation and indicate how to determine instances of Pre-emptive 
Inference to the Best Explanation. I show that both the Modem Miracle Argument 
(MMA) and the Explanation by Fraud Argument (EFA) are cases of Pre-emptive 
Inference to the Best Explanation (PIBE). I then use this analysis to tease out the 
explanatory issues that require updating and indicate how they wil form the structure 
of the folowing chapters of the thesis. 
1:2.1 Inference to the Best Explanation 
An Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) is the process used in order to choose the 
best hypothesis that explains the evidence for any given situation. In everyday life this 
is easy to comprehend and apply. For instance one evening I am happily reading a 
book in my living room and as it starts to get dark outside, I switch on a lamp so that I 
can continue to enjoy reading. At that moment I hear a sharp snapping sound and see 
a brief flash of light. However, the usual warm glow does not emanate from the bulb. 
I conclude that the bulb needs replacing. I am about to do this when my flatmate—
let's cal him Spooky—who is also siting in the living room at that time says that 
changing the bulb wil not fix the problem, because a ghost in the socket of the light 
has temporarily shorted out the bulb. Spooky asks "Didn't you see the flash of astral 
energy and hear the snap of the ghost de-materialising?" 
Now we have a situation whereby two competing hypotheses have been 
postulated to explain the same event. Both apparently explain the events 
experienced— the cracking noise, the flash of light and the curent lack of light. 
However, most reasonable people would think that my explanation was beter than 
Spoolcy's. But why is that so? 
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Inference to the Best Explanation theories of explanation addres two 
important issues about making such inferences. First, they assess the relationship 
between such inferences and approximation to 'truth' or 'knowledge' and second they 
delve into the explanatory issues involved during the selection process of one 
hypothesis as 'best' given a set of competing hypotheses that could be used to explain 
the same data. 
Gilbert Harman coined the term Inference to the Best Explanation in a paPer 
published in 1965. Harman was concerned to make a distinction between enumerative 
induction (if al observed As are Bs then one may infer that al As are Bs) as 
waranted non-deductive inference and to make a case that 'where it appears that a 
waranted inference is an instance of enumerative induction, the inference should be 
described as a special case of another sort of inference, which I shal cal "the 
inference to the best explanation." (Harman 1965, p88) Inference to the Best 
Explanation then, according to Harman, is how we make a distinction between a 
waranted inference and one that is not. He explains the process of making an IBE as 
- folows: 
In making this inference one infers, from the fact that a certain hypothesis would explain 
the evidence, to the truth of that hypothesis. In general, there wil be several hypotheses 
which might explain the evidence, so one must be able to reject al such alternative 
hypotheses before one is waranted in making the inference. Thus one infers, from the 
premise that a given hypothesis would provide a "beter" explanation for the evidence 
than would any other hypothesis, to the conclusion that the given hypothesis is true. 
(Harman 1965, p89) 
So, in its most simple form, an IBE is as folows—there are the three stages: 
The evidence, data or phenomenon that requires explanation 
is examined. 
(111,..H.) A group of possible hypotheses is compiled that explain 
the evidence. 
The best hypothesis is chosen from the group. 
Analysis of IBE involves discussion about how the group of possible hypotheses is 
compiled, how it is that one is chosen and how strong the final hypothesis is in 
relation to obtaining a 'truthful' assessment of the situation. Harman, for instance, 
argued that the proces of Inference to the Best Explanation had considerable import. 
However, as the notion of truth became less strong, claims that the final explanation 
was an approximation of truth became accepted. 
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A more recent analysis of Inference to the Best Explanation by the 
philosopher Peter Lipton fleshes out these issues. He adds complexity to the process 
by arguing that, rather than inferring the 'best' explanation, when we make an 
Inference to the Best Explanation 'we do not infer the best actual explanation; rather 
we infer that the best of the available potential explanations is an actual explanation' 
(Lipton 1991, p60). So the competing explanatory considerations that vie for atention 
are acknowledged up front. For instance my hypothesis that the bulb needs changing 
might be considered a favourable hypothesis because it does not require an ontology 
in which immaterial ghosts have an effect on the electric circuitry of the home, thus it 
is neater and less complex. However, Lipton also alows for the fact that background 
beliefs play an important role when making an Inference to the Best Explanation: 
Given our data and our background beliefs we infer what would, if true, provide the best 
of the competing explanations we can generate of those data (so long as the best is good 
enough for us to make any inference at al). (Lipton 1991, p58) 
The explanatory issues, informed by background beliefs, guide both the compilation 
of the group of possible hypotheses and the selection of one as the 'best'. So, there 
might be a case for my flatmate's scenario after al. Maybe it was a ghost that caused 
the light to short out and if so, then my flatmate's explanation would be beter than 
my more prosaic one. However, at some stage we need to make a decision: should I 
change the globe or should I get my flatmate to perform an exorcism on the light 
socket? 
We must therefore weigh up the hypotheses in relation to each other. Lipton 
gives an indication of what the guiding factors are when one hypothesis is selected 
over another. Lipton makes a case that IBE is more effective at obtaining 
approximation of truthful inference if the process is understood as 'inference to the 
loveliest potential explanation', rather than 'best'. He comes to this conclusion by 
comparing likeliest explanations (ones that seem most likely but don't tel us very 
much) versus loveliest explanations (ones that are more comprehensive). For Lipton: 
An Inference to the Best Explanation is not simply an inference to what seems the 
likeliest explanation, but rather the inference that what would be the loveliest 
explanation is likeliest. (Lipton 1991, p169) 
Discussions regarding likeliest and loveliest hypotheses involve explanatory issues 
therefore these are also important when considering the process by which one 
hypothesis is chosen over the other. So it is important to be able to assess when 
enough appropriate competing explanations have been compiled in order to be sure 
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that the selection of the 'best' potential explanation is legitimate. My understanding of 
the IBE process, taking into account Lipton's additional points regarding the 
compilation and selection of hypotheses, is as folows: in this version there are also 
three stages: 
The evidence, data or phenomenon that requires explanation is 
examined. 
{111,..H.} A group of possible hypotheses is compiled which is guided by 
background beliefs and explanatory considerations that should be 
made explicit 
11 	 The loveliest hypothesis is chosen from the group of hypotheses 
such that it has the greatest subjective probability of being true of 
the group. 
Lipton's theory of Inference to the Best Explanation shows how we go about 
choosing one hypothesis over another, but also making sure that we have the most 
comprehensive selection of hypotheses to choose from. 
We can return to the light in the living room example: just say I decide to try 
changing the light bulb first rather than geting my flatmate to perform an exorcism 
on the light socket. I choose to try out my theory first because I deemed it the 
loveliest on the basis that it fited with my prior experience of light bulb blow outs 
and what I know about the workings of light sockets and light bulbs. It was also 
ontologicaly more simple—it was not based on additional entities such as ghosts. 
However, if I changed the light globe and it didn't work and I tried another 
one and stil the light was not functioning, I would have to reassess the prckess by 
which I had concluded that mine was the 'loveliest' explanation. I must then go back 
and reassess the hypotheses and compile another list (taking out the one that I 
mistakenly thought was the 'best') and select another. 
Maybe this time I get my flatmate to perform an exorcism on the light socket, 
but then again I am more likely to ring an electrician to check the wiring. My new 
assessment is also based on my background belief that faulty wiring, rather than 
poltergeists are more likely to be responsible for the faulty light socket. Only perhaps 
as a last resort when everything else had failed I might humour my flatmate and ask 
that he perform an exorcism on the light socket. If it worked I would be surprised. 
The process of making an Inference to the Best Explanation is then to select 
one hypothesis then to test it and if the initial assessment proves to be faulty, to go 
back and revise the compilation of the hypotheses and select another. There are two. 
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points that I emphasise here: the first is that during al of these steps our background 
beliefs and our experience and knowledge wil be guiding what we consider the best 
hypothesis to explain the data; and the second is that the process is reviewed and can 
be undertaken again if the first hypothesis proves to be unworkable. 
The light bulb example is intended to show that IBEs make intuitive sense 
when applied to such a smal domestic concern and to ilustrate the process by which 
they are made. The IBE process is, however, more complex when employed to 
understand the machinations of explanation in the sciences. Lipton's analysis makes it 
clear that the relationship between inference and explanation is subtle and complex 
and involves background beliefs and explanatory concerns as wel as the need to test 
and update the hypotheses as required. And even the light bulb example showed that 
experience and belief systems play a role in determining the compilation and selection 
of the hypotheses. 
Therefore, the IBE process must be used cautiously, only when we can be 
fairly certain that a reasonable assessment of the evidential situation has been 
obtained and that we are in a relatively knowledgeable position to alow us to select 
one hypothesis over others. It is always possible that, despite our best intentions, we 
are wrong and if the hypothesis selected does not accord with future predictions then 
we should go back and take a look at how we made that initial assessment and 
whether it was justified or not. 
1.2.2 Pre-emptive Inference to the Best Explanation 
There are concerns about the IBE process that should be kept in mind: How do we 
know we are actualy inferring the best explanation when explanatory considerations 
' are already potentialy guiding that very inference? What happens when we are 
oblivious to potential hypotheses because they do not accord with our current belief 
system? How do we know we are making a reasonable comparison between 
competing hypotheses? How strongly should we maintain that any selection is the 
'best', let alone approximately truthful? 
Inferences to the Best Explanation can lead to what are ultimately thought to 
be incorect explanations. Some of the reasons the initial assessment is later found to 
be faulty is that background beliefs are ilicitly guiding the compilation of the initial 
set of hypotheses, or perhaps some hypotheses were missed when the process was 
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first undertaken. It might be that one hypothesis was selected over others because of 
beliefs about explanation that should be updated, or too much was assumed at the 
time that has subsequently come to light. When the process is clearly not thorough or 
contains hidden presumptions, an IBE is not a legitimate assessment.I2 I cal an 
instance of this kind a 'Pre-emptive Inference to the Best Explanation' or PIBE. As 
the name suggests, they are inferences to an explanation that are made without taking 
into consideration assumptions regarding the initial assessment of evidence and 
compilation of hypotheses. 
How to detect a PIBE 
If my charges that the fraud hypothesis is a Pre-emptive Inference to the Best 
Explanation are to hold, then I must show how to differentiate between a PIBE and a 
legitimate IBE. Here are the three warning signs that one is dealing with a PIBE 
rather than a legitimate IBE: 
1)The assessment of the evidence was flawed 
2)The initial compilation of the hypotheses was not thorough 
3)The selection of the 'best' explanation is shown to be unwarranted 
To exemplify, take an everyday example. I turn on my computer and the digital 
display doesn't appear as per usual. If I cry 'Oh no, someone's broken my computer 
either that or those gremlins in the keyboard somehow got into the hard drive and 
wrecked it', and subsequently conclude 'Someone must have broken into my home in 
the middle of the night and broken my computer,' I would be guilty of making an 
PIBE. As I leave my desk and go to exit the room in order to cal the police and report 
a burglary, out of the corner of my eye I see that the plug is lying on the floor. I plug 
it in and sit back down, red-faced and feeling foolish that I hadn't thought of this 
before. I forgot that I had unplugged the computer yesterday as there was a storm 
when I was closing down my computer and I was worried about power surges. I 
determine not to make such an error again and go through my thought processes at the 
12 In Chapter 6 I deal briefly with the argument that inference to the best explanation cannot be 
considered a legitimate explanation. I argue that this point does not diminish my argument that a re-
analysis of psi is warranted as I could make a case for re-analysis of psi in a contemporary context on 
the basis of the critique of the arguments earlier in the chapter when I showed that both the EFA and 
the MMA are peOblematic. 
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time. I realise that I was guilty of making the three mistakes (aside from being 
forgetful) that correlate to the ones above: 
1)I didn't look at al the evidence available 
A quick check of the whole computer would have ascertained that it was not plugged 
in. 
2)I only thought of the two dramatic scenarios to explain why the screen didn't 
work 
I didn't think to add the hypothesis that the power supply was temporarily cut from 
my computer into the list of possible explanations which would have enabled me to 
select a more appropriate explanation. 
3)I selected the most unlikely of the already limited wrong batch of scenarios. 
My earlier mistakes ruled out the possibility that I select the best explanation for my 
computer screen not working. So I realy had no chance to recti.B, the situation at this 
stage. It was just lucky I saw the plug as I left the room. 
My experience with the computer makes me resolve to be more thorough when 
making explanatory assessments in the future. It is important to make sure that the 
initial assessment of the evidence is as comprehensive as possible, to compile the 
hypotheses as thoroughly as possible and to make a selection based on considered 
explanatory issues. Otherwise one risks making a pre-emptive IBE.I3 
The process must be performed at the same time as acknowledging that 
background beliefs wil play a role in each stage of this process - maybe I was 
paranoid about burglars at that time having recently been burgled three times. 
Explanatory considerations (unfounded or not) wil also be lurking behind the scenes. 
It is important that al issues that could be guiding the assessment should be brought 
into the open so that they can be addressed and analysed. Caution must be taken with 
13 Unfortunately making a Pre-emptive Inference to the Best Explanation in everyday life can have a 
tragic result. In a story reported in the newspapers earlier this year a mother who was jogging with 
her child in a pusher stopped to take a mobile phone cal and turned briefly to write a number down 
on her leg. When she turned back around the pusher was gone. She assumed that someone had stolen 
the baby and ran to the nearest road to get help. By the time they returned to the site and realised that 
the pram had roled down the bank into the river the baby was not able to be revived. 
(Kyriacou, `e.r Doherty 2006, online) 
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any IBE-like assessment of a given evidential situation and the more upfront these 
issues are the more likely it is that the appropriate hypothesis is selected. 
1.2.3 MMA and EFA and PIBE 
I wil now use a generic form of the argument in order to analyse the mainstream 
assessment of psi in relation to issues of Inference to the Best Explanation. 
Both the EFA and MMA claim to make an assessment of the body of evidence 
for psi and they both run a similar argument, which in its most simple form it can be 
formulated as folows: 
There is some evidence for which there is no explanation that indicate people 
can move things without touching them and obtain information without the use 
of the regular five sensory channels. 
We know that people cheat 
We know that psi is unlikely 
Therefore we should explain al apparent instances of psi as produced by fraud. 
When recouched in this form it is apparent that it contains al the elements of an , 
inference to the best explanation. There is a phenomena that requires explanation 
(psi), two hypotheses (fraud or telepathy and psychokinesis) and the selection of one 
(fraud) that is chosen over the other (belief in the veracity of evidence for telepathy 
and psychokinesis). To make this clearer I'l put it in the form of Lipton's IBE which 
was outlined in the previous section. So we have: 
The evidence: 
body of evidence of apparent psi events 
Then the compilation of the hypotheses based on the premises above: 
{111,..H.} {evidence is produced by fraud; evidence is produced by psi} 
Then a selection takes place and it is concluded that the 'best' explanation for the 
evidence is that: 
Evidence for psi is produced by fraud 
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Each version of the argument has a diferent reason why the fraud hypothesis was 
chosen over the telepathy/psychokinesis hypothesis; Price uses the Broad list of BLPs 
and Campbel the repeatability problem. However, essentialy they are both 
performing the same type of assessment of psi phenomena and favouring one 
hypothesis (that the evidence is produced by fraud) over another (that the evidence is 
produced by an anomalous and unexplained phenomena). 
I have suggested that an IBE is pre-emptive, and therefore explanatorily 
ilegitimate, if: 1) The assessment of the evidence was flawed; 2) the initial 
compilation of the hypotheses was not thorough; and 3) the selection of the 'best' 
explanation is shown to be unwaranted. I now argue that the generic argument that 
advocates that fraud is the best explanation is a Pre-emptive Inference to the Best 
Explanation because it fails on the first two counts: it does not take into consideration 
the body of evidence and show how fraud can account for the phenomena; and it has 
not considered other plausible explanations for the phenomena that are available in 
the psi literature. As in the computer example, the final 'selection of hypothesis' was 
consequently ilegitimately limited to two hypotheses that were not appropriately; 
compiled given the initial scenario. 
1.2.4 Summary of critique of mainstream psi arguments 
Below I summarise the main criticisms that I have made against the mainstream psi 
arguments. I mention where I go on to address the issues later in the thesis. 
Failure to recognise the structure and logic of the arguments as IBEs 
As I argued for in the above section, there has been a general failure in to 
understand that the EFA and MMA arguments are pre-emptive inferences to the best 
explanation. Hidden assumptions regarding explanation issues are behind these 
assessments of psi. It appears, therefore, that assumptions about the potential to 
explain the phenomena as fraudulent, without further evaluation, are unrealistic and 
founded on an assessment which fails to take into consideration the body of evidence. 
Nor do the arguments deal with other potential hypotheses that could be employed to 
explain the phenomena, but which are available in the psi literature. The assessment 
of the evidence and the compilation of potential hypotheses is therefore lacking in 
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rigour. I address this issue by using the IBE structure to carry out a reassessment of 
psi in three stages. 
Failure to consider the body of evidence for psi 
A related point is that the conclusion of both the EPA and MMA that the evidence for 
psi is most reasonably atributed to fraud, fails to consider the amount of fraud that is 
required if the evidence is to be explained by such an hypothesis. Whether it be fraud 
or unwiting self-delusion that is proposed, an examination of what evidence there is 
and how it could be explained by such activities and behaviour is warranted, just as it 
would be in other similar circumstances when a 'weighing' of the evidence is required 
to resolve a dispute. The fraud hypothesis, as argued for by the EFA and MMA, is 
maintained at a cost because they exclude other plausible hypotheses from entering 
the explanatory scene. This situation is redressed in Chapter 2 where I outline the 
evidence for psi as wel as some of the psi realist theories that have been proposed as 
explanation for the phenomena. 
Misapplied explanatory conservatism 
Once again, the point above is related to the assumptions that lie behind the fraud 
hypothesis. The fraud hypothesis is maintained because the arguments are founded on 
an unwarranted conservative estimation of the explanatory situation. The arguments 
are not an epistemic assessment of the weighing up of the evidence for psi. Instead 
they have chosen one explanatory option over another: 
En - psi cannot be explained curently as a natural phenomenon therefore the 
fraud hypothesis is the most rational 
over 
Eq, - psi does not fit into curent scientific theory, but, given the apparent 
evidence, some kind of explanation is required regardless of the ontological 
outcome 
The EPA and MMA propose that only E„ is plausible. It is thus biased towards the 
conservative solution. The arguments do not make a case for choosing En over Ey , 
except on the basis of psi's apparent anomalous nature. However, I have shown that it 
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is a circular argument to eliminate the plausibility of a phenomena on the basis of its 
anomalousness when it is defined as such. At this stage a more comprehensive 
argument would be required in order to justify the choice of En over Ey and this does 
not appear explicitly in the literature. I deal further with issues regarding explanatory 
conservatism in relation to anomalous phenomena in much more detail in Part II of 
the thesis. I also undertake a re-analysis of the psi explananda in Chapter 6 that 
atempts to avoid the problem of explanatory prejudice for anomalous phenomena 
when constructing explanatory statements. 
Failure to acknowledge background beliefs 
Background beliefs inform explanatory considerations. It is important that these 
beliefs are explicit. Curent beliefs about psi are determined by hidden beliefs about 
the explanatory status of the phenomena. These are evident when assumptions are 
made about the potential to explain the phenomena in relation to perceived scientific 
certainties. However, I argue that these beliefs should be examined and brought 
upfront. Further assessment of the background beliefs that inform the discussion is 
made in Chapter 3 when I present the historic account. 
A way forward 
I have highlighted the importance of understanding the background beliefs and 
explanatory considerations that inform the dominant analysis of psi in mainstream 
philosophy, which I have shown to be lacking. A review of the psi and related 
explanatory issues is therefore warranted. 
I suggest that it is more prudent to make an assessment of the phenomena by 
outlining the evidence that requires explanation, compiling the hypotheses thoroughly 
and al the while explicitly acknowledging the background beliefs that have 
previously informed the mainstream assessment of psi. Al of these steps wil be 
undertaken during the course of the thesis. 
I commence the analysis in Chapter 2 where I show how the argument must be 
fleshed out in order to avoid the criticism that it is a Pre-emptive Inference to the Best 
Explanation. I then outline the evidence for psi and recouch the psi debate as a 
discussion between competing hypotheses. 
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Chapter 2 - Evidence 
las a capital mistake to theorise before one has data. Insensibly one begins to twist 
facts to suit theories instead of theories to suit facts. 
Sherlock Holmes 
The last chapter countered the main arguments in mainstream philosophy pertaining 
to psi. I maintained that the Explanation by Fraud Argument and the Modem Miracle 
Argument are problematic. Furthermore, an analysis of the arguments showed that 
both sufered from the same problem, that they a Pre-emptive Inference to the Best 
Explanation. I outlined the four major concerns that arose from the discussion. 
In this chapter I commence the process of re-analysis. First of al I use the 
three-stage IBE model as a basis to outline how the process of re-evaluation wil take 
place. Then I outline the body of evidence for psi as wel as the psi realist theories. 
I show that the psi hypotheses are similar in approach to the various philosophical 
assessments regarding the hard problem of consciousness: eliminativist; direct realist; 
reductive realist; and supernatural. I subsequently create a list of possible responses to 
the evidence for psi based on similar division of appropriate responses to a 
philosophical problem. By the end of the chapter the psi debate is recast as a 'psi 
hypotheses discussion'. Further examination of the possible responses is subsequently 
undertaken in the rest of the thesis. 
2.1 Three-stage re-analysis of psi 
In the last chapter, the second section made a case that in their most generic form both 
of the main arguments that deal with psi can be seen as cases of Inference to the Best 
Explanation. I noted that Inferences to the Best Explanation, if they are to be used as 
an explanatory tool, must be made cautiously and are waranted only when one can be 
as sure as possible that the evidence, the competing hypotheses and means of 
choosing the 'best' hypothesis have been thorough. 
A main concern was that the proponents of the EFA and MMA were pre-
emptive in their assessment of the body of evidence for psi. The problem arose 
because unwaranted conservative explanatory considerations informed the epistemic 
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assessment of psi and too few hypotheses were generated as a result. Consequently 
the conclusion that fraud was the most likely explanation for the body of evidence foi 
psi was flawed and pre-emptive. I wil redress this problem by undertaking a new 
analysis of the situation. 
When I critiqued the arguments separately I also flagged that there are 
explanatory considerations and background beliefs which inform the analysis at al 
stages and these should be made explicit in order to make an assessment of the 
situation when, as in the case of the psi debate, there appear to be two positions that 
are at loggerheads regarding the assessment of a body of evidence for an anomalous 
phenomenon. I wil keep these positions in mind as I undertake the re-analysis of psi. 
The analysis wil be presented in three stages which are informed by Lipton's 
account of IBE as discussed in Chapter 1 and re-iterated below: 
Stage 1 E 
Stage 2 (1-1,..%) 
Stage 3 11, 
The evidence, data or phenomenon that requires 
explanation is examined. 
A group of possible hypotheses is compiled which 
is guided by background beliefs and explanatory 
considerations that should be made explicit. 
The loveliest hypothesis is chosen from the group 
of hypotheses such that it has the greatest 
subjective probability of being true of the group. 
I now explain the steps that wil be undertaken to make the re-analysis that accord 
with the three IBE stages. 
Stage 1 - Section 2.2 Body of evidence 
The body of evidence for psi is outlined in this section. I outline three main types of 
evidence: historic, anecdotal and laboratory, and I discuss each in relation to 
philosophical issues of 'testimony'. This provides a basis to discuss the nature of 
evidence and what theories have been developed (aside from the fraud hypothesis) 
that atempt to account for the evidence. These become important as they inform the 
compilation of hypotheses. 
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Stage 2- Section 2.4 & 2.5 - Compilation of hypotheses 
In the last chapter I showed that the compilation of the hypotheses is crucial to the 
process of IBE. I argued that the hypotheses selected in the MMA and EFA (the 
choice between explanation by fraud or belief in telepathy and psychokinesis) require 
a more thorough analysis because unacknowledged beliefs about the phenomena in 
relation to explanation and laws of nature have limited the discussion of available 
hypotheses. A new mode of compilation wil be undertaken in sections 2.4 and 2.5 in 
which I compare the body of evidence for psi to another similar type of philosophical 
problem (the hard problem of consciousness) and use it to introduce a more complete 
set of possible explanatory hypotheses for psi, based on the theories curently 
proposed in the psi literature. 
Stage 3— Chapters 3-6 Examination of hypotheses 
Peter Lipton's analysis of Inference to the Best Explanation advocated the view that 
the best explanation should be considered the loveliest potential explanation. He also 
acknowledged that background beliefs are important when considering the selection 
of the 'best' explanation. The discussion of the competing hypotheses is complex and 
takes up the rest of the thesis. First I discuss the issues of background beliefs and 
present an account of the explanatory history of psi in Chapter 3. I continue the psi 
hypotheses discussion in PART I of the thesis Where I look at the hypotheses in 
relation to theory development and explanation theory in contemporary philosophy of 
science. Below is a chart that outlines the three stages and indicates where and what 
issues are dealt with during the course of the thesis: 
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IBE stage 
Stage -1 - E Evidence 
Stage 2 - {H1 ,..,H} Compilation 
Stage 3 - H. Process of selection 
Section 	 Brief content summary 
of thesis 
2.2 	 Outline of evidence and theory: 
discuss issue of testimony 
2.6 	 Compile the hypotheses based 
on curent psi theory and 
comparison to the hard problem 
of consciousness 
Chapter 3 	 Discuss background beliefs; 
present the historic account 
Chapter 4 	 Discuss competing hypotheses 
Chapter 5 	 Discuss dominant hypothesis 
Chapter 6 	 Compare remaining hypotheses 
The re-analysis wil cover both my initial criticisms of the EFA and MMA arguments: , 	. that the EVA was based on unwaranted conservative explanatory considerations; and 
that the NIMA was unable to substitute psi for miracles unless it was restricted to 
historic testimony of psi events and that it relied on an outdated fist of scientific 
certainties. The three-stage analysis also rectifies the two further problems when the 
arguments were shown to be pre-emptive in their assessment of the situation: that the 
body of evidence hadn't been examined; and that the compilation of the hypotheses 
was incomplete. In this way the problems with the main psi arguments that I outlined 
in the first chapter wil be taken into account and reworked. During the process, the 
unresolved psi debate and consequent tension between the pro and anti psi stances is 
transformed into a contemporary philosophical discussion between competing 
hypotheses. I commence with an outline of the body of evidence section below. 
2.2 Body of evidence 
Before a description of the body of evidence is undertaken it is probably pertinent to 
highlight, once more, that this thesis does not atempt to make an epistemic defence of 
the evidence". The analysis of the main philosophical stances undertaken in the first 
chapter regarding the phenomena indicate that the reasons the evidence is 
14 The background information regarding the evidence for psi is drawn, in smal part, on some work 
undertaken previously for a Master of Arts thesis in which I also presented an outline of the body of 
evidence for psi. The thesis was caled Psi Possibilities and was awarded in April 2004 by the 
University of New South Wales. 
Chapter 2: Evidence 	 48 
controversial is because of ingrained ontological beliefs about the evidence rather 
than epistemological problems. Analyses of the evidence in reference to curent 
scientific methodology find that the curent laboratory evidence compares favourably 
to similar types of scientific investigation and spontaneous occurences of aleged psi 
phenomena continue to be compiled. 
This status of the evidence is re-iterated in much of the informed literature 
(see for instance the various articles in the `Psi Wars' volume of the Journal of 
Consciousness Studies edited by James E. Alcock or the summary by Douglas Stokes 
in his 2002 article 'A history of the relationship between statistics and 
parapsychology'). The upshot is that there appears to be some evidence for apparent 
psi events. The debate about psi is exacerbated by this state of afairs because if there 
were clearly absolutely no evidence for psi (say, for instance, if every single atempt 
to produce above chance telepathic guesses came in as chance expectation or if every 
single poltergeist incident was readily explainable as produced fraudulentlyby 
mischievous atention seekers) there would be no debate about what the efects entail. 
Instead:there is debate about what at least appears to be apparent psi efects as I 
detailed in the introduction. This has led me to believe that it is not an assessment of 
the evidence itself that is relevant to resolving the psi debate, rather it is the beliefs 
about the evidence which hold the key to unraveling the psi puzzle. That is the reason 
why this thesis focuses on theory and explanation of the anomalous phenomena. But 
first I shal outline what there is to develop theory about. 
The body of evidence for psi raises questions about testimony which are 
important when making a catalogue of any evidence, but which are especialy 
pertinent when the phenomenon of concern is considered anomalous. I mentioned in 
the last chapter that the MMA's substitution of psi for miracles was a problematic 
manoeuvre on the basis that Hume's argument referred to historic testimony of 
miraculous events, whereas there were other forms of evidence for psi, not least that 
which has passed the test of adherence to what is curently considered appropriate 
scientific method. I flagged that scientific evidence was also a form of testimony 
though with more strictures and checks and balances than some other forms of 
testimony such as historic accounts for psi. However, at that stage I eschewed the 
problem that is sometimes raised in philosophy regarding whether or not we can ever 
consider any type of testimony a reasonable base for the assessment of any 
phenomena, even that which passes the supposed test of scientific proof. 
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To ilustrate this problem think, for instance, of the commonly asserted notion 
that fluoride in the water makes people's teeth stronger and less likely to decay. If 
asked on what foundation they can make this statement most people wil answer: 
because science says this is the case. But when pressed many wil acknowledge that 
they are realy founding this belief on a prominent advertisement on television for 
toothpaste that they saw when young. In this ad a character caled Mrs Marsh dips a 
piece of chalk into a glass of bluish water, as she snaps the chalk in half she makes the 
connection between fluoride soaking into teeth, just as the blue coloured water was 
absorbed into the chalk. The ad emphasises the protective power of fluoride in its 
toothpaste. It is common knowledge that fluoride is put into the water supply in 
Australia. The two combined is realy the source of people's 'evidence' that fluoride 
in the water protects teeth from tooth decay. This is obviously not a very solid 
foundation on which to base the answer to the initial question about tooth decay and 
fluoride. The example shows how readily we make assumptions about how we know 
things about the world. 
I might react to this mistaken claim to scientific authority and decide to take 
the mater further and ask a scientist to undertake an analysis, of the water. However, 
this poses problems too. Given I am not a scientist I decide to take a sample of water 
to a local lab and ask the scientists there to analyse the contents. I give over the 
sample and receive back a piece of paper with the breakdown of what the scientists 
say they had found in the water. If I see the leter 'F' I can look up a chemical table 
and then surmise that there was, indeed, fluoride in the water. If I want to be certain I 
could corner the scientist and ply them with questions about their procedure of 
analysis and interpretation of results on the slip of paper I have been given. However, 
even then, if I were of a certain cautious nature, I might have some doubts. I know for 
sure that I got the water from the tap in my kitchen, but what if the scientists 
accidentaly or deliberately swapped samples once I had given it over to the lab? 
What if their analysing procedure was lax and they just took a guess at what might be 
in the water? What if their equipment was faulty? Even if! were to accompany the 
water into the lab and watch the scientist take the sample from the container and drop 
it into the test tube for analysis I would stil have to question the veracity of the tests 
that the scientist performed on the water. (I wil stop there though as I do not want to 
wade into the brain-in-the-vat type of scepticism in philosophical speculation). Is 
there a point at which I can alay my concerns and trust the testimony that I am 
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presented with by the scientist? Society has had to make a decision that at same stage 
what scientific evidence is counted as valid. 
An example of how society makes this assessment is exemplified by an 
interesting recent case where two school girls in New Zealand decided to test the 
vitamin C content of Ribena for a school project. It was reported that the 'students 
Anna Devathasan and Jenny Suo tested the blackcurrant cordial against rival brands 
to test their hypothesis that cheaper brands were less healthy. Instead, their tests found 
that the Ribena contained a tiny amount of vitamin C, while another brand's orange 
juice drink contained almost four times more.' (Vasagar 2007, online) This was 
compared to the Ribena commercial which claimed that Ribena drinks contain four 
times as much vitamin C as their orange juice competitors. The students made a case 
that the company was responsible for false advertising and chalenged them to 
account for the statements in the advertisement. The company's first port of cal was 
to question the scientific testimony of the school children, however, subsequent tests 
, confirmed the students' results and Ribena was fined for false advertising. At some 
.,:point society makes a determination that evidence has been obtained despite problems 
of testimony; how legitimate a step this is, fal to the realm of philosophical 
speculation regarding the nature of testimony. 
The philosophical problems regarding testimony are tied up with those of 
belief, the essential question being: when do we have enough testimonial evidence to 
warrant belief (be it the domain legal, scientific, historic, eyewitness etc.)? The 
situation is even more problematic when it is testimony regarding the anomalous that 
is of concern, as is the case of psi. An oft-cited phrase in relation to psi evidence is 
'extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof' and this sort of notion is 
entrenched in issues regarding what is considered acceptable testimony for a 
phenomenon when that phenomenon is at odds with what is expected to occur by the 
status quo. C.A.J. Coady, in his book Testimony, refers specificaly to the problem of 
testimony in regard to anomalous phenomena and makes the point that: 
it has been thought relevant to the credibility of certain records of telekinetic 
phenomena that the aleged witnesses were initialy very sceptical about the possibility 
of what they later recorded as happening. (Coady 1992, p185) 
Diferent types of evidence require variously diferent types of testimony and these 
wil be determined by a number of factors. Coady goes on to point out further that: 
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Clearly, when some piece of testimony is in doubt or under chalenge we wil want to 
know what we can about the circumstances of its deliverance and production, such as 
the integrity and psychological stability of the witness, his capacities, the observational 
conditions at the time, his interests and beliefs insofar as they are relevant to the issue, 
whether there were other witnesses, and so on. (Coady 1992, p185-186). 
What is regarded as acceptable testimony, as far as we can be certain of anything, 
requires substantial consideration regarding the nature of the person involved in 
providing us with it. I wil keep this in mind as I outline the body of evidence 
for psi below. 
As mentioned previously, there are various types of testimony: legal, 
scientific, historic, or evidence of events witnessed first hand. In this thesis I deal 
with three types of evidence for psi and related issues of acceptable testimony 




A broad-stroke picture of the evidence for psi starts first with historic accounts 
(writen and oral) of phenomena that fit the definition of psi events in current 
terminology, but which at the time were considered supernatural in origin. Then, at 
the end of the 18th century, atempts were made to investigate such phenomena with 
the view to explaining them as natural, rather than supernatural. Some experiments 
were carried out in this era, but the main contribution that early researchers made to 
the study of psi was to colate colections of anecdotes of psi events in ordinary 
people's lives. 
These anecdotes were gathered and verified to the best ability of the 
researchers and out of these accounts came theories and nomenclature to describe 
the anomalous events that are stil with us today. They also informed the types of 
early experiments in which atempts were made to replicate psi in laboratories under 
controled conditions which, due to long runs and careful colection of data, could 
be analysed to give statistical analysis regarding chance expectation. I wil now 
take each category in turn and present a brief account of the evidence that is 
considered relevant. 
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2.2.1 Historic 
Overal, the historic account of psi-like events is similar across cultures. However, the 
description of the events and the people who are able to perform the psi feats are 
different. Historicaly, psi events are atributed to supernatural causes and although 
the events themselves are similar, the explanation changes between religions. The 
history of psi as described as such is stil relevant today because many people in the 
world, across al cultures, stil ascribe a supernatural interpretation to psi-like events 
and people who apparently perform such feats sometimes hold positions of authority 
in their particular religious belief system. This holds for both mono-theistic religions 
and pantheistic traditions as wel as animist belief systems. 
One of the earliest accounts of an investigation into the veracity of psi 
phenomena is related by Herodotus in his Histories (Book 1.48). The story involves 
oracles and is thought to have occurred around 550BC. At this time, the leader of 
Lydia, King Croesus, wanted to obtain some precognitive advice on whether or not to 
engage in a war with a neighbouring kingdom. However, there were many competing 
oracles and he wanted to ensure that he received advice from a genuine source (one 
can imagine the political uses that perceived oracle advice could be used for"). He 
therefore decided to test the prominent oracles of his day and he designed an 
experiment to test their powers. Accordingly he sent out messengers to the various 
oracles and asked them to send back word with the messengers, having used their 
apparent psi abilities to ascertain what he was doing on a designated day. On that day 
in question he performed an unusual activity and cooked up some lamb and turtle in a 
copper pot. The only ones to send back a message to that effect were the Delphic 
Oracles. He consequently asked them advice on his proposed invasion of a 
neighbouring teritory; they sent back word which he interpreted as an indication that, 
should he invade, he would be successful. When he did, he lost the war. Regardless of 
this outcome or the problematic nature of assessing the advice of the oracles, it is 
interesting that this is perhaps the first ever recorded psi experiment. 
Of course this is an account from a long time ago regarding the assessment of 
a psi phenomena that may or may not have been legitimate. However, the pertinent 
point for this thesis is that for milennia there have been reports of human belief in 
15 To put this in a modern day context think of the potential power of the astrologist who Nancy 
Reagan famously consulted during the time of Ronald Reagan's presidency in the USA. 
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and use of psi-like abilities. Reports such as the story of King Croesus suggest that 
from early on the validity of the information obtained through non-normal means has 
been questioned and assessed. 
The Bible is also an historical source of psi-like events which in this context 
are explained as miracles. Events that could in current terminology be described as 
PK and ESP events are represented in biblical stories as Jonathon Harrison points out: 
A large number of miracles appear to consist in some privileged person exercising 
control over some physical occurrence, usualy outside his body, without producing this 
occurrence in any of the usual ways. For example, Christ changed water into wine, 
which was outside his body without expanding or contracting his muscles, moving his 
limbs, finding grape concentrate and adding it to the water. Telekinesis consists in just 
this control, by the 'agent', of things (usualy, though not necessarily, outside the 
confines of his body) without his fist manipulating his muscles in any usual way. 
(Harrison, 1976, p98) 
Other anomalous events recorded in religious literature include reports of saints 
levitating usualy during intense prayer sessions (Harvey-Wilson, 2006, p21), 
as wel as knowledge obtained from disembodied voices and premonition in dreams. 
(Rush, 1986a, p11). In short, the historic accounts of psi phenomena in pagan and 
monotheistic religions represent the ful gamut of what are now considered 
psi effects, some of which have become the focus of laboratory investigation in more 
recent times. 
Other cultures also contain both writen and oral accounts of psi-phenomena. 
The accounts are similar and comparisons have been made between shamanistic 
practices and those of the saints of Christian religions (Harvey-Wilson, 2006). 
Shamans exist in African, Asian, South and North American Aboriginal, Australian 
Aboriginal and Russian Aboriginal cultures. They are thought to be able to heal the 
sick through anomalous means, perform rituals so that their awareness leaves their 
bodies (or they transform into animal spirit) and gain information of the past and 
future in regions sometimes some distance away. Some shamans also claim to be able 
to control the weather. Other non-Judeo Christian belief systems, such as Tibetan 
Buddhism, also have figures who are able to access knowledge through non-normal 
means and, like shamans, maintain that they can leave their bodies, be present in two 
places at once and gain access to information in the future and past that they should 
otherwise not know other than through anomalous means. These events, if real, are 
similar to that which is currently considered indicative of psi. They involve 
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anomalous communication as wel as the ability to influence the physical world 
through non-normal means. 
Strikingly, the historic accounts of psi-like events are similar across cultures; 
it is the explanation based on whatever supernatural belief is considered appropriate 
in that time and place that change. The problem with this type of testimony is that it is 
reliant on reports that are unable to be verified in person. The recolection of the event 
is obviously open to interpretation, re-interpretation and accidental or intentional bias. 
The element which makes such testimony plausible is that humans continue to report 
similar occurrences, across time and cultures, that accord with these historic accounts. 
This is what gives the historic testimony an extra epistemological edge. 
Psi events have continued to occur regardless of the explanation ascribed to 
them; thus anecdotal catalogues of psi phenomena have atempted to provide another, 
if similar, form of testimony for psi. 
21.2 Anecdotal 
A change occurred in Western Society in the 18th  century and inquiries commenced 
into the possibility that psi events, previously considered of supernatural origin, were 
in fact natural even if the mechanisms that accounted for them were as yet 
undiscovered. Among the most commonly cited causes mentioned as responsible for 
the change in approach are: the debates regarding Anton Mesmer' s theories of animal 
magnetism; the effects of the publication of Darwin's Origin of Species on religious 
authority; and the questioning of previously strongly held religious tenets. The advent 
of the industrial revolution and the ensuing 'scientific age', where science became the 
dominant mode through which the world was to be understood and explored, is also 
credited as informing the new, naturalistic approach to psi investigation (Haynes 
1982, pp 1-2). It is also thought that the initial investigations were driven by the rise of 
spiritualism in Europe and North America and the consequent concern over 
mediumistic-related phenomena (much, but not al, of which was exposed as 
fraudulent by investigators); but the scientific investigation of anomalous phenomena 
by famous psychics of the day also led to the development of now familiar terms such 
as ESP, clairvoyance and precognition (Thouless 1972, p7). 
A significant date in the change of focus for the understanding of psi was the 
creation of The Society for Psychical Research which was founded in 1882 by a 
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group of Cambridge academics whose aim was 'to investigate that large body of 
debatable phenomena designated by such terms as mesmeric, psychical and 
spiritualistic without prejudice or prepossession of any kind, and in the same spirit of 
exact and unimpassioned inquiry which has enabled science to solve so many 
problems, once not less obscure nor less hotly debated' (Haynes 1982, xii). 
The first project commissioned by the Society's new president, the moral 
philosopher Henry Sidgwick16, was for three of its members (Edmund Gurney, 
Frederic W.H. Myers and Frank Podmore) to compile a comprehensive and wel-
researched and verified colection of the experience of what is now caled 'telepathy' 
in the general public at the time. The book was caled Phantasms of the Living and it 
provided the first colection of anecdotes of a psi event in everyday people's lives 
which was approached with natural explanation in mind. 
Phantasms of the Living — ESP theory 
Other publications of paranormal phenomena had been produced in the previous 
century. For instance the foreword to the 1970 edition of the Phantasms of the Living 
notes that colections of ghost stories and apparitions had been produced as early as 
1706 and that discussion regarding the veracity of mediumistic phenomena had taken 
place in books such as The Night Side of Nature by Catherine Crowe (Gurney, 
Podmore 84 Myers, 1886/1970 p.ix). 
However, what made the Phantasms colection of anecdotes unique was its 
rigorous approach to validating the experiences reported as wel as the assumption 
that if something anomalous is found to be occurring then it wil require a natural 
explanation. Hopes were high at the time that such explanations would be 
forthcoming quite quickly after the initial evidence for the anomalous phenomena had 
been gathered. The treatment of the subject mater as the target for scientific 
investigation was novel and much of the work in categorising and discussing the 
phenomena prepared the ground for the laboratory experiments detailed in the 
next section. 
16 Sidgwick is one in a line of philosophers who have held the position of president of the Society for 
Psychical Research (1882-84, 1888-92). The list also includes Wiliam James (1894-1895), Henri 
Bergson (1913), F.C.S. Schiler (1914), C.D. Broad (1935-36, 1958-60), H.H. Price (1939-41, 1960- 
61) and C.W.K. Mundle (1971-74). (from Haynes 1982). 
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The catalogue is a colection of anomalous communication experienced by the 
general populace. The title, Phantasms of the Living, may sound a litle archaic to 
contemporary ears, but terms that are now used to describe psi (the word psi itself did 
not enter the vocabulary until 1942) were not yet determined and in these two 
volumes the seeds were sown not just for the scientific/naturalised approach to the 
phenomena but classification and definition of the phenomena itself as wel as words 
and theories and concepts that would be developed slowly over the next few decades. 
The word telepathy, for instance, was coined by one of the authors of these volumes 
(F.W.H. Myers) so in this sense the volumes represent the first atempts to come to 
terms with the phenomena of anomalous communication. Seen in this light, the 
Phantasms of the Living volumes provide a remarkable foundation for the exploration 
of psi phenomena which is carried on in parapsychology today. 
Volume I of Phantasms sets out clearly the process the authors have decided 
to adopt and how they deal with the problem of making a differentiation between 
genuine anomalous occurrences from mistaken or fraudulently produced occurrences 
of the phenomena. Their overal aim was: 
To deal with al classes of cases where there is reason to suppose that the mind of one 
human being has afected the mind of another, without speech utered, or word writen, 
or sign made; has afected it, that is to say, by other means than through the recognised 
channels of the sense. 
To such transmission of thoughts or feelings we have elsewhere given the name of 
telepathy; and the records of an experimental proof of the reality of telepathy wil form 
a part of the present work. (Gurney, Myers & Podmore 1886 1970 p2) 
And so the phenomena involving anomalous communication that is now covered 
under the umbrela word psi were first teased out of the even more confounding body 
of evidence for ghosts, apparitions (of the living and dead), magical influence and 
spiritualist occult phenomena. 
Not surprisingly, the authors of Phantasms of the Living encountered criticism 
about their approach because of the connection between the psi phenomena they 
investigated with both spiritualism and the religious literature which proclaimed the 
miraculous nature of some of the very same phenomena. They summarise the 
accusations made against their approach as folows: 
Sometimes we are told that we are inviting the old theological spirit to encroach once 
more on the domain of science; sometimes that we are endeavouring to lay the impious 
hands of Science upon the mysteries of Religion. Sometimes we are informed that 
competent savants have already fuly explored the field which we propose for our 
investigation; sometimes that no respectable man of science would condescend to 
meddle with such a reeking mass of fraud and hysteria. Sometimes we 'a're pitied as 
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laborious triflers who proved some infinitely smal matter with mighty trouble and 
pains; sometimes we are derided as attempting the solution of gigantic problems by 
slight and superficial means. (Gurney, Myers & Podmore 1886 1970, pp.xxxvii-xxxix) 
Gurney and the others were quite wel aware that they were breaking new ground and 
would be treading a fine line between critics from both the religious and scientific 
disciplines. Therefore they realised therefore the necessity to verify and back up the 
anecdotes and to ensure that their analysis of the anomalous phenomena in their work 
was sound from both a practical and theoretical point of view. The later is perhaps a 
greater legacy than the former because it is from this type of examination of the 
phenomena that later develops into experimental parapsychology. Catalogues of the 
phenomena can be made at any point in time, but the realisation that the phenomena 
require a new response and explanation occurred during this time and is evident in 
these volumes. 
The volumes analyse the anomalous communication phenomena by dividing 
the phenomena into diferent. categories: Thought transference, spontaneous telepathy; 
dream telepathy, halucinations, and apparitions. More importantly however there are 
chapters that deal with how to differentiate regular dream information from telepathic 
dream information. The books provide both the anecdotal evidence, the back up they 
procured to verify the evidence, as wel as transparent atempts to determine the 
validity of the evidence in order not to be taken in by fraud or self-delusion. Here is 
one example from Phantasms of the Living of a case of apparent telepathy between a 
husband and wife. The story is recounted from the perspective of the wife: 
I woke up with a start, feeling I had had a hard blow on my mouth, and with a distinct 
sense that I had been cut, and was bleeding under my upper lip, and seized my pocket- 
handkerchief, and held it (in a little pushed lump) to the part, as I sat up in bed, and after 
a few seconds, when I removed it, I was astonished not to see any blood, and only then 
realised it was impossible anything could have struck me there, as I lay fast asleep in 
bed, and so I thought it was only a dream! — but! looked at my watch and saw it was 
seven and finding Arthur (my husband) was not in the room, I concluded (rightly) that 
he must have gone out on the lake for an early sail, as it was so fine. 
I then fel asleep. At breakfast (half-past nine), Arthur came in rather late, and every 
now and then put his pocket-handkerchief furtively up to his lip, in the very way I had 
done. I said 'Arthur, why are you doing that?' and added a little anxiously, 'I know you 
have hurt yourself'. But I'l tel you why afterwards.' He said, 'Wel, when I was sailing, 
a sudden squal came, throwing the tiler suddenly round, and it struck me a bad blow in 
the mouth, under the upper lip, and it has been bleeding a good deal and won't stop.' I 
then said, 'Have you any idea what o'clock it was when it happened?' and he answered, 
'It must have been about seven.' 
I then told what had happened to me, much to his surprise, and al who were with us at 
breakfast..' (Gurney, Myers & Podmore, 1970 1886 p 1 88) 
Chapter 2: Evidence 	 58 
The case serves as a fairly ilustrative example of the type of anecdotal evidence 
colected in the works. A more recent colection was made by Louisa E. Rhine and I 
present details of her work below. 
Hidden Channels of the Mind — ESP and precognition 
Another notable colection is the work of Louisa E. Rhine who was concerned with 
colecting anecdotal evidence at the same time that her husband, J.B. Rhine, was 
examining evidence for psi in long-run trials at Duke University (more on this 
shortly). She believed that the anecdotal evidence could provide avenues to explore 
for the more sophisticated (in terms of ability to control the sensory leakage problem 
and replication) experimental evidence. She maintains that aims to find 'proof for psi 
in anecdotal colections alone are futile because 'in none of them did the evidence 
prove sufficiently convincing for a final decision. It was impossible to so substantiate 
and verify this kind of material that it would give final proof of anything' (Rhine 
1967, p5). However, she sees that they are important because 'even, so, the study of 
actual experience today can have a value for the student of ESP, because of the other 
line of study already mentioned, that of experimentation' (Rhine 1967, p5). So the 
colection of the anecdotal evidence served a similar purpose to the original aims of 
the authors of Phantasms of the Living. 
As the Duke University's fame as a research institute for psi spread, Louisa E. 
Rhine had a remarkable source of anecdotal stories. People would write to her 
unprompted because she was associated with the experimental laboratories. Rhine 
was not as concerned as the Phantasm researchers with making further verification of 
the material. Her belief was that the anecdotal evidence would serve to encourage 
future experiments and was in the later where the real 'proof for ESP would lie. Her 
method was as folows; 
In studying the mass of material that was available., the first thing was to separate 
those experiences that could have involved ESP from those that could not. Possible ESP 
experiences were taken to be those that bring concrete information not supplied either 
directly or indirectly by the senses. The accounts must therefore state explicitly what the 
experience was like, and also, just as clearly, the real happening and atendant 
circumstances. With these items to evaluate, one had a basis for deciding the likelihood 
that new information had been acquired and whether or not a sensory channel could 
have operated. The information however, could be a complete idea, or only a fragment 
of one. (Rhine 1967, p10) 
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Here is one particularly interesting example because it involves a precognition of an 
event that was acted upon and resulted in saving a baby from harm: 
In Washington State a young woman was so upset by a terifying dream one night that 
she had to wake her husband and tel him about it. She had dreamed that a large 
ornamental chandelier which hung over their baby's bed in the next room had falen 
into the crib and crushed the baby to death. In the dream she could see herself and her 
husband standing amid the wreckage. The clock on the baby's dresser said 4:35. 
In the distance she could hear the rain on the windowpane blowing outside. 
But her husband just laughed at her. He said it was a sily dream, to forget it and go 
back to sleep; and in a mater of moments he did just that himself. But she could 
not sleep. 
Finaly, stil frightened, she got out of bed and went to the baby's room, got her and 
brought her back. On the way she stopped to look out the window, and saw a ful moon, 
the weather calm and quite unlike the dream. Then, though feeling a litle foolish, she 
got back into bed with the baby. 
About two hours later they were wakened by a resounding crash. She jumped up, 
folowed by her husband, and ran to the nursery. There, where the baby would have 
been lying, was the chandelier in the crib. They looked at each other and then at the 
clock. It stood at 4:35. Stil a litle skeptical they listened to the sound of rain on the 
windowpane and wind howling outside. (Rhine 1967, p198-199). 
This is a striking account of apparent anomalous knowledge of a future event. 
If this is a genuine case of a precognitive dream then it makes for a very interesting 
theoretical investigation because action was taken to avert a disaster which, 
apparently, would have befalen the family. However, accounts in catalogues of 
anecdotal evidence like this raise many questions about the strength of personal 
testimony: was the dream and the time and action confabulated after a stressful event? 
Was this merely a case of coincidence? And memory can be faulty after traumatic 
events. However, certain elements of the story are verifiable by a second witness as 
the husband can confirm that his wife told him the details before the event and the 
fact remains that the chandelier did fal and the baby was not in the cot underneath. 
But we must also question whether his memory of the events was corect. Then there 
is always the case that they might be prone to delusional belief or, are tricksters and 
we must have trust that the editor of the colection of stories has been faithful to the 
initial rendition of the story. I wil take up this issue further in regard to anecdotal 
evidence at the end of this section. 
The colations of both the Phantasms of the Living and the Hidden Channels 
of the Mind focussed in the main on ESP and precognition. They indicate that the 
experience of acquiring information without the use of the regular five senses is 
reported at a significant rate amongst the general population in both the British Isles 
and the USA. Similar accounts continue to be reported by people and are more often 
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than not in these times colected either by sociologists or anthropologists as part of 
academic assessments of the experience of psi. What to make of them is another 
question al together. Concerns about how to judge whether the apparent psi events 
were perhaps due to coincidence or the result of faulty memories have inspired some 
researchers to atempt replication of the phenomena in more controled setings. I wil 
outline these experiments shortly. But first I wil examine the anecdotal evidence for 
the other type of apparent psi - psychokinesis. 
W.G. Rol — PK 
I turn now to a colection that extends over time involving the phenomena anomalous 
action at a distance associated with poltergeists incidents. I note briefly that in the psi-
oriented literature the PK displayed by mediums is also cited and examined (such as 
the discussion of the PK feats of D.D. Home and Eusapia Paladino—amongst many 
others— in the work of the philosophers David Ray Griffin and Stephen E. Braude). 
However, in this ,thesis I do not wish to include the mediumistic evidence that is often 
discussed in the survivalist psi literature. The evidential, ontological and 
philosophical complexities are worthy of a study to themselves and are beyond the 
scope of this thesis.I7 
A comprehensive compilation of poltergeists occurrences from 1612 to 1974 
was undertaken by W.G. Rol and published in the book Handbook of 
Parapsychology in 1977. Rol had also investigated some modern poltergeists 
incidences himself and his added first-hand testimony to some apparently 
unexplainable events is strengthens the presentation of the evidence. The scope of the 
survey was quite large and included 116 cases with representations from Britain, 
America, Europe and a smaler number from Asia, as wel as one from Mauritius. It 
commonly occurred (in 92 cases) that one person appeared to be the focal point. The 
median age of this person was 13 for both males and females, although there were 
two people aged over 70 (one male and one female). The folowing is an example of a 
typical incident reported by Rol who had undertaken the investigation himself: 
17 The survivalist literature has recently been covered by the philosopher Stephen E. Braude (2003) in 
his book Immortal Remains, which is an examination of the evidence for survival and is a thorough 
analysis of the nul, super-psi and survival hypotheses. 
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Several objects had moved when Roger, a 12-year-old boy was near, but it had 
happened out of my sight. This was in his home in Kentucky, December, 1968. I 
therefore stayed as close to Roger as I could. One time he went out to the kitchen while 
I folowed a few feet behind. When he came to the area between the sink and the 
kitchen table he turned around facing me. At that moment the table jumped into the air, 
rotated about 45 degrees, and came down on the backs of the four chairs that stood 
around it, its four legs of the floor. No one else was in the area, and I was unable to 
discover any ordinary explanation of the event. (Rol 1977, p387) 
Rol then analyses other similar occurences of objects moving in a seemingly 
deliberate way (that is, by objects hovering, flutering, revolving or turning corners) 
which were reported in 43 of the 105 instances in which movement of objects was 
recorded. Sounds accompanied 63 of the cases. In 10 of the cases the phenomena 
included light flashes. Other occurences were the showering of stones on the roof, 
the appearance of water and, probably the most bizare of al and most chalenging to 
explain by non-fraudulent explanations, the teleportation of objects. An investigator 
in the famous Rosenheim case witnessed such an event. After being told that objects 
that had disappeared from the house had been seen faling outside, 'he put botles 
containing perfume and tablets on the kitchen table, asked the inhabitants of the house 
to go outside, closed al the windows and doors and then left himself.After a short 
time, the perfume botle appeared in the air outside the house, and a bit later on, the 
botle of tablets appeared in the air at the height of the roof and fel to the ground in a 
zigzag manner.' (Rol 1977, p391) 
To increase the strength of testimony to such anomalous events, Rol focuses 
on investigations by qualified and aware people. He reports events that are wel 
documented and often witnessed by many people including police oficers (who are 
sometimes caled in to investigate before the paranormal nature of the event becomes 
apparent), clergy (who are also caled in if the family of the apparent target of the 
phenomena ascribe a supernatural explanation for the phenomena) as wel as 
professional investigators (such as parapsychologists or other field researchers). If the 
studies of these cases are to be believed, the field of PK anecdotal studies may hold 
some information particularly pertinent WM( in general. The only trouble is that the 
occurence is not produced on demand and seems to be uncontroled by the person 
who appears to be the instigator of the PK effects, the cause of which remains a 
mystery, as are the mechanisms which might be responsible for the physical efects 
that have been witnessed. 
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Summary of anecdotal evidence 
The testimonial issues involving anecdotal evidence are debated in the psi literature. 
Despite the best intentions of the people who have colated the anecdotal evidence for 
psi into catalogues, people are left to wonder if what the people thought occurred 
realy did occur, especialy when the nature of the evidence is so counter to what 
current science leads us to expect as possible. It might be a case of seeing is believing, 
but even then one can doubt one's own senses and investigative skils. Also, for the 
purposes of further theoretical and experimental investigation, the spontaneous cases 
prove problematic, although poltergeist cases provide an opportunity for controled 
conditions as the anomalous events sometimes span months. 
Furthermore, in cases of ESP, there is always the question of chance being 
accountable for the correlation between the apparent acquisition of anomalous 
information and the event to which it pertains. For instance, at any one time there are 
people dying in the world, there are also loved ones thinking of their family or 
friends, so how could the chance expectation ever be calculated acburately in order to 
assess whether the phenomena is anything more than a coincidenc'e? Problems such as 
these have lead to the development of laboratory controled experiments, a discussion 
of which is set out in the section below. 
Al of these possibilities must be taken into consideration when one is dealing 
with anecdotal evidence for an account of psi. Stephen E. Braude makes mention of 
the problem when he makes a case for the importance of anecdotal evidence: 
One notorious problem with evaluating the semi-experimental and anecdotal evidence 
of parapsychology —especialy the more bizare reports — is that many cases have falen 
victim to the gnawing tooth of time. We can no longer interrogate witnesses or study the 
ostensible psi agents for ourselves. We cannot determine first-hand that al reasonable 
precautions were taken against trickery on the part of mediums, or see for ourselves 
whether investigators of poltergeist disturbances overlooked some means of 
fraudulently (or unwitingly) producing the phenomena. We are forced to rely on 
eyewitness accounts at best (some writen considerably after the event) and folow-up 
investigations at worst— not to mention numerous assumptions concerning the integrity 
and reliability of those whose depositions serve as evidence. .Can there realy be 
anything here for the serious researcher to sink his teeth into? (Braude 1986, p25) 
The answer to the question Braude poses is important and involves issues regarding 
the strength and legitimacy of human, eye-witness testimony and issues of memory. 
Braude makes a case that testimonial evidence for spontaneous psi events in the form 
of anecdotes should be considered legitimate evidence for apparent psi events. He 
differentiates between authentic and evidential evidence as folows: 
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(D1) A report of an ostensibly paranormal event is authentic if and only if the 
reliability of the testimony is such that the event probably occured as reported. 
(D2) A report of an ostensibly paranormal event is evidential if and only if the report 
is authentic and the event is plausibly interpreted as paranormal. 
(Braude 1986, p26) 
I take this to mean that anecdotal evidence for psi must first be as verifiable as 
possible and also al normal means of explaining the occurence of the phenomena 
must have been analysed and investigated thoroughly. There are some ways of 
ensuring that what one is dealing with is testimony that fulfils the first definition, for 
instance if more than one reliable witness experienced the event first and if witnesses 
concur on the essential elements of the apparent psi event. Testimony can be 
considered further strengthened by looking at the reporting mode of the event (reports 
made closer to the time the event was experienced would be less likely to have 
sufered from confabulation or memory distortion) and physical evidence such as 
photographs or film of events can provide back up to the personal testimony of the 
anecdotal evidence. 
Further strength is added to the spontaneous cases by the use of the anecdotal 
evideneC as a basis on which to atempt replication of the phenomena in controled 
laboratory setings; a brief overview is given below. I turn now to the experimental 
evidence for psi. 
2.2.3 Controled experimental evidence 
This section wil outline the laboratory experiments that have developed since the 
1920s and which, to others, are where evidential proof for ESP and PK are to be 
beter explored. 
I recounted before that as early as 550BC there is record of a King who 
atempts to ascertain the veracity of psi. And as Louisa E. Rhine points out, 
experimental evidence for anomalous phenomena stems back prior to the founding of 
the Society for Psychical Research in the form of Mesmeric-inspired parlour games as 
wel as more formal experiments some of which are detailed in Phantasms of the 
Living. The inspiration for the early experiments came from the realisation that some 
patients under hypnosis or who were 'mesmerized' showed the ability to perceive 
information that they should not otherwise know (Forest 1999, p96) Deliberate 
atempts to produce the anomalous acquisition of information were forthcoming both 
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in staged shows as wel as by investigators who would set up experiments by sealing a 
picture in an envelope and asking the subject to replicate a drawing of it. 
However, it is not until the early decades of the 19th century that experimental 
psi research became the main means by which evidence for psi was explored. Joseph 
Rush comments in Parapsychology: a historical perspective that: 
Lighting, the aurora, even sunlight are al electromagnetic phenomena. Yet 
electromagnetic science grew from investigations, not of these marvels, but of strange 
forces exerted by the lodestone (a natural magnet) and by rubbed amber. These 
phenomena were weak and apparently trivial, but they could be subjected to controled 
experiments. Similarly, the predominant concern of psychical research has shifted 
gradualy from unmanageable marvels to relatively minor but more controlable 
phenomena. (Rush 1986a, p25) 
Experiments were consequently developed that ensured that there was no sensory 
leakage in the case of ESP, or possible regular forces used in the case of PK. Memory 
failure or confabulation of a story after the event could therefore also be ruled out. 
One of the biggest questions regarding anecdotal evidence for telepathy is how to take 
into consideration the possibility that instances of telepathy are not occurring by 
chance. Hence many of the early experiments involved forced choice experiments in 
which the participants of the experiment had limited optiOns to choose from (a deck 
Of cards for instance) so that statistical analysis could Work out above (or below) 
chance expectations for the results. Below I briefly summarise the development of 
experiments for ESP, PK and a smal section on time-displaced psi. 
Early ESP experiments 
Although both Stanford University and Harvard University can lay claim as hosts of 
early 19th  century ESP experiments, it is not until the 1920s that more permanent 
laboratories were designated the task of atempting to replicate telepathy under 
controled conditions. J.B. Rhine (considered as the 'father' of modern 
parapsychology) was responsible for overseeing these early experiments and 
developing the methodology of long-run experiments with multiple trials in order to 
accrue enough data that could then be used to ascertain if there was an overal psi-
effect apparent. 
Early telepathy experiments conducted by J.B. Rhine consisted of runs of 
experiments using a pack of 25 cards (5 sets of 5 cards, with the paterns of a circle, 
square, cross, star and waves in each set). These had been created by Dr. K.E. Zener, 
a coleague of Rhine's in the 1930s (Rhine J.B. 1964, p47). The subject would make a 
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guess as to which card was the target. The results were recorded and statistical 
analyses undertaken. Many trials were undertaken with the same cards as targets. By 
1934 when he published his now famous monograph, Extra-sensory Perception, 
Rhine had over 90,000 trials to perform analyses on (Rhine J.B. 1964, p46). 
The publication raised interest in the phenomena and other laboratories 
atempted replication. Some were successful and others not so. It also initiated the 
ongoing discussions between those outside of parapsychology who remained skeptical 
about the phenomena and methodology. Discussions were often productive and 
resulted in changes to parapsychological experimental methodology. Theories about 
the production of ESP developed and now the main source of ESP experimental data 
comes from what is known as the `Ganzfeld' experiments. 
Ganzfeld experiments 
In 1994 Daryl Bem and Charles Honorton published an article in the 
Psychological Buletin, in which they maintained that:. 
We believe that the replication rates and effect sizes achieved by one particular 
experimental method, the ganzfeld procedure, are now suficient to warant bringing 
this body of data to the atention of the wider psychological community. 
(Bern & Honorton 1994, p4) 
In this article they detail the ganzfeld series of experiments which commenced in the 
mid 1970s almost simultaneously by three diferent researchers: Wiliam Braud 
(University of Houston), Adrian Parker (University of Edinburgh) and Charles 
Honorton, the co-author of the article. 
Ganzfeld is a word first used in the 1930s in experimental psychology to 'test 
propositions derived from gestalt theory' (Bern & Honorton 1994, p5). The procedure 
was developed for parapsychology on the supposition that previous ESP experiments 
(such as those run by J.B. Rhine at Duke University involving long runs of forced-
choice experiments) were not conducive to psi as it would be found in more natural 
circumstances outside the laboratory. The three original researchers who developed, 
this technique were also inspired by the idea that psi was often associated with altered 
states of consciousness, particularly ones in which the regular senses were duled and 
the focus was on internal imagery such as dream or meditative states (Bern & 
Honorton 1994, p5). Psi, they thought, might be filtered out by other senses in 
ordinary situations and accordingly the ganzfeld procedure developed as folows. 
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The subject is placed in a soundproof room in a comfortable reclining chair. 
Halved ping-pong bals are taped over the eyes and the light shining through is red. 
White noise plays on headphones. The subject is asked to perform some relaxation 
exercises. This technique of creating a blanket of unobtrusive sensory experience 
which is unstimulating to the senses is what gives the ganzfeld its name ('whole field' 
in German). The hope was that if telepathy was occurring it would be more likely to 
be recognised by the subject whose regular sensory input is numbed to a certain 
degree by the red light and white noise (Rao 1984, p197). In another room, the sender 
is given the target which has been randomly selected from a large pool of pictures or 
short videos (or in some earlier experiments View-Master slides). The sender 
concentrates on the target at a designated time while the subject in the reclining chair 
is asked to verbaly describe any images, feelings or thoughts out loud. These are 
taped (or in the early days transcribed). After 30 minutes (usualy), the subject is 
shown four randomly selected pictures (or video clips, or View-Master slides) which 
include the target and asked to rate them according to how strongly each of them 
correlates to the thoughts and images previously recorded and experienced. The 
experimenter carrying out this part of the experiment is not aware what the target is 
either, so there is no chance of the subject being discreetly lead to a correct hit. A 'hit' 
is scored if the subject correctly identifies the target as the highest rating. Independent 
judging can also be carried out by giving the judge the four possible stimuli and the 
tape record of images from the half-hour 'sending' period (Bem & Honorton 1994, 
pp5-6). 
An early ganzfeld experiment performed by Charles Honorton and published 
in 1976 was undertaken at the Maimonides Medical Center (Terry & Honorton 1976). 
The subjects were undergraduate students divided into six teams. Each team had three 
members designated as a 'sender', 'receiver' or 'monitor'. The targets were View-
Master reels with pictures on each reel similar in content. After the session was over 
the 'receiver' was asked to rank a possible four reels according to how strongly they 
corresponded to the images gained during the ganzfeld period. 
The results were promising: 'A hit was defined as a correct first or second 
choice out of a packet of four slide reels.. Overal, the five supervised teams 
obtained a scoring rate of 78%, with 21 hits in 27 sessions' (Terry & Honorton 1976, 
p210). Pure chance would expect a hit rate of 50%. The success of these early 
experiments encouraged other laboratories to undertake their own ganzfeld studies. 
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In 1982 Charles Honorton presented a paper in which he concluded that 'the 
experiments at that time provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of 
psi in the ganzfeld' (Radin 1997, p78). 
By 1985 `ganzfeld experiments had appeared in thirty-four published reports 
by ten diferent researchers. These reports described a total of forty-two separate 
experiments. Of these, twenty-eight reported the actual hit rates that were obtained. 
The other studies simply declared the experiments successful or unsuccessful' (Radin 
1997, p78). These 28 studies which did provide the hit rate were used by Honorton 
and Ray Hyman, a psychologist who was vocaly sceptical about the existence of psi, 
to independently perform two meta-analyses on the data at hand. The results they 
obtained indicated that the chances of the hits being coincidental were ten bilion to 
one (Radin 1997, p'79). These results were published in the Journal of 
Parapsychology during 1985 and 1986. They included the original meta-analyses as 
wel as ongoing communication and rejoinders by the individuals involved as wel as 
by outside observers (Hyman 1985). In a joint communiqué Hyman and Honorton 
stated that: 
We agree that there is an overal significant effect in this data base that cannot 
reasonably be explained by selective reporting or multiple analysis. We continue to 
difer over the degree to which the efect constitutes evidence for psi, but we agree that 
the fmal verdict awaits the outcome of future experiments conducted by a broader range 
of investigators and according to more stringent standards. 
(quoted in Bern and Honorton 1994, p9) 
Accordingly, the ganzfeld procedure was refined to accommodate the 'more stringent' 
requirements which were detailed in this same communiqué. These included more 
secure protection against sensory leakage, not only when the participants were in the 
ganzfeld but also afterwards when the 'receiver' was shown the four targets to rank. It 
was pointed out that when the same target was used by the `sender the possibility of 
sensory clues such as finger prints or smudge marks could indicate which picture had 
been the target picture. Other requirements involved the 'documentation of 
randomisation methods .. statistical correction for multiple analysis, advance 
specification of the status of the experiment (e.g., pilot study or confirmatory 
experiment)' (Bem & Honorton 1994, p9). 
Subsequent to this publication, a new series of experiments was devised which 
were christened `autoganzfeld' experiments. In order to ensure that no sensory cues 
were to be given and to ensure randomisation of the target pictures, a computer was 
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used to select and present the target pictures or videotapes. The randomisation and 
presentation of the targets was now fuly automated. The verbal exchanges between 
the participants were colected on audiotape (Bern & Honorton 1994, p10). A 
subsequent meta-analyses of these experiments was undertaken and a 32% hit rate 
recorded where chance would expect a 25% hit rate (since the subject chose one from 
four possible targets) (Bern & Honorton 1994, p10-11). Although more laboratories 
would need to perform similar experiments to confirm these findings, it appeared 
promising that at last parapsychology had found an experimental procedure that 
consistently produced positive results (Radin 1997, p87). In 1996, other laboratories 
stil undertaking autoganzfeld-like experiments were the University of Amsterdam, 
the University of Edinburgh, Gothenburg University in Sweden, and, in the United 
States, Cornel University and the Rhine Research Center in Durham, North Carolina 
(Bern 1996, online). Today the situation remains similar. 
The results of the ganzfeld experiments continue to be colated and have 
created discussion amongst the parapsychology community. A relatively recent meta-
analysis by Julie Milton and Richard Wiseman was published in the Psychological 
Buletin (Milton & Wiseman 1999) which provided a 'folow-up meta-analysis of 30 
additional ganzfeld studies that had been conducted from 1987 through 1997. They 
concluded that these studies did not yield an overal significant efect, thereby caling 
into question the replicability of the ganzfeld procedure' (Bern, Palmer & Broughton 
2001, p208). Folowing the publication of this article much debate ensured as to the 
validity of the Milton and Wiseman meta-analysis, on the grounds that it used-
ganzfeld experiments that differed significantly in procedure to the original 
experiments used in the Bern and Honorton (1994) meta-analysis. 
A paper published in 2001 by Daryl Bern, John Palmer and Richard 
Broughton, 'Updating the ganzfeld database: A victim of its own success?', addressed 
the issue. In this paper they argued that the insignificant result of the meta-analysis 
performed by Milton and Wiseman was due to two major considerations. The first 
was that 10 new 'studies that were published shortly after the Milton and Wiseman 
paper was published were not included in the meta-analysis. A subsequent meta-
analysis, reported in the paper, including these studies did produce a significant resu!. 
They concluded: 'The 10 new ganzfeld studies yield an overal hit rate of 36.7%.. 
Al 40 replication studies combined yield an overal hit rate of 30.1%. This later set 
of figures thus represents the curent status of ganzfeld studies published after those 
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summarised in Bern and Honorton (1994)' (Bern, Palmer & Broughton 2001, p214). 
The subjectivity of the meta-analysis as a method for evaluating large amounts 
of data was brought to the fore in the discussions. Meta-analysis involves 
specification of which experiments wil or wil not be included in the analysis. The 
seting of the criteria and the subsequent selection of which experiments fit the criteria 
is a subjective process and it can be seen from these two different meta-analyses that 
two very different scores have been obtained. This sort of dispute indicates to some 
observers that this approach to procuring testable evidence for psi might not be the 
best method. (This wil be discussed further in the next section.) 
Despite this dispute, the ganzfeld and autoganzfeld experiments are generaly 
considered the strongest series of studies that have atempted to replicate psi (either 
telepathy or clairvoyance) under controled conditions in laboratories and to have 
produced wel documented data that is analysable in terms of current statistical and 
probability theory. They are, however, stil the subject of debate and ongoing analysis 
and there is no consensus even from within the parapsychological community as to 
the strength of the overal data. 
Remote viewing 
The modern series of remote viewing experiments were initialy created and carried 
out by two physicists, Russel Targ and Hal Puthoff at the Electronics and 
Bioengineering Laboratory of the Stanford Research Institute (Targ & Puthof, 1977). 
In the remote viewing experiments the procedure generaly consists of 'having an 
experimenter visit a randomly selected target site and having the subject, sensorialy 
unaware of the location, describe to a second experimenter the place which the first 
experimenter is visiting during the same time' (Rao 1984, p225). However, 
sometimes the subject of the experiment was only given latitude and longitude 
coordinates of a site and they were asked describe what was to be found there. 
Judging was usualy performed by geting an independent judge to Match the pictures 
or transcripts of the descriptions made by the subject with the a pool of pictures, one 
of which was the correct target known as 'the target pool' (Uts 1996, p8). 
Similar experiments had been carried out before. For example, one series of 
such experiments was writen about by the novelist Upton Sinclair in a book 
published in 1930 caled Mental Radio: Does it Work and How? In it Sinclair details a 
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series of telepathic experiments that his wife, Mary Sinclair, had taken part in. For 
example, she would relax on her couch while at a distant location a 'sender' (in this 
instance, Upton Sinclair's brother-in-law) would draw a picture at an assigned time. 
She would then make a note of the image that appeared to her and they would later 
compare the two. At one stage he drew a fork and she wrote: 'See a table fork. 
Nothing else.' (Sinclair 1930, p13). Targ and Puthoff were aware of such anecdotes 
but their contribution to the field was to oversee such experiments being performed in 
a respectable laboratory under controled conditions, by physicists who were able to 
publish their findings in peer-reviewed journals. 
The series of experiments that were performed in remote viewing by the 
Stanford Research Institute became known as the 'SRI experiments'. They were 
carried out by Targ and Puthoff at the SRI from 1973 until 1988, at which time an 
analysis was undertaken by Edwin May. This involved 'al 154 experiments 
conducted during that era, consisting of over 26,000 individual trials. Of these 20,000 
were forced choice and over a thousand were laboratory remote viewings.' (Uts 
1996, p8). The early work by Puthof and Targ had been criticised for methodological 
flaws in the target pool selection and presentation of the material for judging. The 
main concerns were primarily to do with the judging procedure and the availability of 
extra information in the transcripts (such as dates and times) that could possibly be 
used to match the targets (Marks 1986, p113). However, the results were significant 
and wel accepted enough for further experiments to take place. Edwin May became .„ 
the principal investigator of another series of experiments based on the SRI 
experiments and overseen by a commitee of academics from a variety of disciplines 
including 'statistics, psychology, neuroscience and astronomy' (Radin 1997, p101). 
These became known as the SAIC experiments as they were undertaken by the 
Science Applications International Corporation. 
Once again the results of the experiments created controversy. Both the SRI 
experiments and the SAIC experiments were reviewed by independent researchers in 
papers commissioned by the CIA. Ray Hyman (a psychologist with Oregon 
University) and Jessica Uts (a statistician with University of California, Davis) were 
chosen for the task. They came to different conclusions. Uts concluded: 
It is clear to this author that anomalous cognition is possible and has been demonstrated. 
This conclusion is not based on belief, but rather on commonly accepted scientific 
criteria, The phenomenon has been replicated in a number of forms across laboratories 
and cultures. The various experiments in which it has been observed have been different 
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enough that if some subtle methodological problems can explain the results, then there 
would have to be a diferent explanation for each type of experiment, yet the impact 
would have to be similar across experiments and laboratories. If fraud were responsible, 
similarly, it would require an equivalent amount of fraud on the part of a large number 
of experimenters on an even larger number of subjects 
What is not so clear is that we have progressed very far in understanding the mechanism 
for anomalous cognition. Senders do not appear to be necessary at al; feedback of the 
corect answer may or may not be necessary. Distance in time and space do not seem to 
be an impediment. Beyond those conclusions, we know very litle. (Uts 1996, p16) 
Hyman on the other hand states: 
My report argues that Professor Uts' conclusion is premature, to say the least. The 
reports of the SAIC experiments have become accessible for public scrutiny too recently 
for adequate evaluation. Moreover, their findings have yet to be independently 
replicated. My report also argues that the apparent consistencies between the SAIC 
results and those of other parapsychological experiments may be ilusory. Many 
important inconsistencies are emphasized. Even if the observed effects can be 
independently replicated, much more theoretical and empirical investigation would be 
needed before one could legitimately claim the existence of paranormal functioning. 
(Hyman 1996, online) 
The conclusions drawn are once again disputed by those who are actively working 
in the field. However, because one of the findings in the CIA-commissioned report 
was positive about the results, as wel as the fact that Targ and Puthof actively 
encouraged skeptics to take part in their remote viewing experiments, the remote 
viewing series of experiments and the subsequent SAIC experiments are often 
listed in support of evidence for psi. Remote viewing experiments are stil 
undertaken today. 
PK experiments 
Early PK experiments performed in the laboratories of J.B. Rhine were usualy in the 
form of dice-roling. Once again, many long runs were performed in the anticipation 
that results would show above-chance findings that could not be explained by fluky 
runs without statistical significance. These early experiments in which subjects were 
asked to hand-throw dice and atempt to 'wil' a desired outcome produced results 
'significantly above chance, with a probability of over a bilion to one.' (Reinsel 
1990, p192). Early methodological concerns were addressed by the introduction of a 
mechanical dice thrower and the random selection of targets were introduced. There 
was stil the possibility that the dice themselves were not as random as they could be, 
because (for instance) on the sides of a regular die, the dots that represent numbers 
(F have a smal scoop out of them. This would mean that the figure 	 on the die would 
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show more often than the expected one out of six times over long runs because it 
would be lighter than the other sides of the die; consequently this discrepancy could 
skew the data in favour of hits. However, a meta-analyses performed by Dean Radin 
and Diane Ferrari in 1989 concluded that even after taking out studies where this was 
a problem, 'there was stil highly significant evidence for mind-mater interaction, 
with odds against chance of greater than a trilion to one' (Radin 1997, p137). 
The means of testing for PK was refined when Helmut Schmidt developed a 
random number generator (usualy referred to as an RNG) in 1960s. This type of 
machine is used in both ESP and PK experiments today as the best means of 
achieving a random selection of targets and as a target for PK interaction itself. The 
machines 'operate by generating random binary electrical pulses that serve as targets, 
in the manner of an electronic coin flipper.' (Reinsel 1990, p197). They are generated 
by either 'electronic noise or radioactive decay times. Both of these are physical 
sources that, through proper circuit design, provide electronic spikes at unpredictable. 
times' (Radin 1997, p138). These spikes interrupt a clock which is in a one of two 
possible states (usualy represented by the binary numerals 1' or '0'). As each 
numeral has a 50% chance of appearing, a run of the RNG is be expected over time to 
produce the same number of each, just as in a coin tossing experiment, but more 
accurate. The information is often displayed on a computer, or in the early days in 
terms of light bulbs glowing on or off. I note that not al RNGs are binary, however 
this example serves to indicate the basic experimental procedure. 
A hypothetical experiment based on real ones might consist of the subject 
atempting to make one light bulb of a possible two light bulbs light up more often 
than the other one. The lights are being turned on and of by the results of the RNG 
but if PK is possible, and intention can produce a desired result at a distance, then the 
results can be analysed according to the amount of times the intended light turned on 
compared to what would be expected by chance alone (50%). Once again, many runs 
of experiments would need to take place and the data analysed in order to show that a 
successful run was not the result of a once-of coincidence. The advantage of an RNG 
PK test is that, like the autoganzfeld procedure, the randomisation and data colection 
is performed without human intervention, thus limiting the possibility of normal 
means afecting the experimental data or experimental eror in transcribing the data 
(Radin 1997, p139; Reinsel 1990, p197). 
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Precognitive/retrocognitive experiments 
The remaining psi category is that of time-displaced psi—more specificaly, 
precognition and retrocognition. Because precognition is viewed as a possibility 
through the use of ESP or even potentialy PK, experimental evidence for 
precognition is usualy carried out using the same experimental procedure as the 
above experiments in ganzfeld, remote viewing and PK. For instance, in the cited 
remote viewing experiments, precognitive ESP was tested by selecting the target 
place after the remote viewing was performed. Earlier experiments also tested for 
precognition—for instance, a subject would be asked to guess the series of cards in a 
pack of cards yet to be shufled, the guesses were recorded, the cards then shufled 
and the results analysed. Schmidt used his RNGs to test for precognition and in a trial 
with three subjects selected because of their apparent success in previous trials: 'Over 
a total of 63,066 responses, the results form these three subjects were highly 
significant, with odds of 2000 milion to 1 against chance.' (Reinsel 1990, p198). 
Precognition is one of the most interesting and baffling of psi phenomena but, 
because it involves ESP or PK, it is tested for under the same experimental conditions 
as those discussed above so I wil not go into great detail here. A similar situation 
obtains for retrocognition, which has tended to dominate the literature less, but which 
is no less intriguing. I focus on precognition in this thesis. 
Scientific evidence as testimonial evidence 
Further to the discussion regarding testimony that occurred in the last chapter, I wil 
note here that scientific evidence is itself a type of testimonial evidence. However, as 
I mentioned in the discussion of the Modern Miracle Argument, it is of a different 
kind than that of historic testimony. It would be impossible for one person (such as 
the interested philosopher) to atend and personaly atest to every single scientific 
experiment ever performed on psi. At some point we must rely on the publication of 
the a scientist's data and theory represented in journals, books and conference 
presentations. As with anecdotal or historic evidence, scientific testimony can be 
vulnerable to human error, fraud, sloppy experimental procedure and ignorance. 
Scientists hold views that wil inform their assessment of data and theory and these 
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could be guiding the interpretation of results or set up of investigative methodology 
(Brewer & Cline 1994, pp309-310). 
As I suggested in the earlier account of the Ribena investigation, there is a 
point at which we, as a society, determine when valid testimony has been procured, 
just as there is a point at which we rely on eyewitness testimony in a court of law. It is 
not a perfect system but it is the best guess at any one time. With special atention to 
experimental procedure and method a consensus can be reached regarding results. 
There are also checks and balances in the scientific process and recourse to analysis 
data with regard to such concepts as repeatability and replication of results in other 
laboratories. 
I suggest that the experimental evidence for psi is reasonably solid on these 
grounds. This is based on length of time that psi experiments have been carried out 
(almost a century); and that studies have been undertaken and repeated in various 
laboratories to such an extent meta-analyses can be undertaken. The results have been 
published in peer-reviewed journals and discussed in professional forums. Questions . -
raised about how strong evidence must be in order to be accepted by the scientific 
establishment are also relevant. It can be shown that the overal meta-analysis 
significance rates are equal to or higher than those accepted by mainstream science. 
(Radin 1997, p55-56). 
It should also be borne in mind that any discussion regarding the testimony of 
scientific evidence and consequent suggestion that psi experiments are questionable in 
their methodology or use of statistics must also be applied more widely to the 
scientific method in general and epistemological issues in science in particular. I 
discuss some psi-specific issues later in Chapter 5 when I discuss the article in Nature 
by which chalenges the use of statistics in psi experiments. 
Contemporary research projects 
The sections above detail the three types of evidence that together comprise the 
experimental body of evidence for psi: historic, anecdotal and laboratory. 
Contemporary summaries of the state of play for psi research indicate that al three 
are stil being compiled. There is stil interest in the historical representation of psi-
like phenomena, anecdotal evidence and spontaneous psi occurrences are stil 
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reported and investigated, however, it is the results from the controled laboratory 
experiments that are most often discussed in parapsychology journal. 
Currently there are at least 19 laboratories or research institutes associated 
with high-level (academic) research into psi phenomena. These are either research 
laboratories within already established mainstream disciplines within universities 
(such as the Koestler Research Unit) or institutes in their own right. The main 
ones are: 
Abteilung fir Psychologie und Grenzgebiete der Psychologie (A.P.G.P.) 
University of Freiburg, Germany 
Cavendish Laboratory and the Mind-Mater Unification Project of B. D. Josephson 
Cambridge Univ., UK 
Cognitive Sciences Laboratory and the STARGATE program 
Palo Alto, CA, US.A. 
International Consciousness Research Laboratories 
Princeton, US.A. 
Institut fir Grenzgebiete der Psychologie und Psychohygiene 
University of Freiburg, Germany 
Koestler Parapsychology Unit at the Department of Psychology 
University of Edinburgh, Scotland, UK 
Perrot-Warrick Research Unit at the Psychology Department 
University of Herordshire, Hatfield, UK 
As an indication regarding the research content of psi-oriented laboratories and units, 
the Institut Fur Grenzgebiete der Psychologie und Psychohygiene at Freiburg 
University reports the folowing summary of their activities in their Biennial Report 
2002/2003: 
The activities of the new Institute focus on interdisciplinary exploration of anomalous 
phenomena, such as extrasensory perception, psychokinesis, altered states of 
consciousness, extraordinary experiences, and the crossing of frontiers. The common 
denominator of current research centres on an improved understanding of 
psychophysical interactions from the perspectives of the natural sciences, social 
sciences and the humanities. (Vaitl 2004, p3) 
Other institutes tackle a specific phenomenon, such as the PK RetroPsychoKinesis 
Project (R.P.K.P.) at the University of Kent, Canterbury, U.K. or some study psi 
within an interdisciplinary environment such as in'departments of consciousness or 
cognitive studies. There is one anomalous research unit in Australia which is atached 
to Adelaide University. It is caled the Anomalistic Psychology Research Unit and is 
run by the psychologists Dr Michael Thalbourne and Dr Lance Storm. (Unfortunately, 
as I write this I have been informed that the unit wil most likely be dissolved next 
year). 
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There is a lively, if smal, international research culture that investigates psi 
phenomena and which produces peer-reviewed journals in which parapsychological 
research is published. The main journals are the Journal of the Society of Psychical 
Research, The Journal of Parapsychology and the European Journal of 
Parapsychology. There is one Australian journal which is produced by the 
Australasian Institute of Parapsychological Research, caled the Australian Journal 
of Parapsychology. 
The study of psi is ongoing and it is through these non-mainstream research 
laboratories and institutes that the bulk of the research is caried out. Below I show 
that the evidence requires a response. 
2.3 Response to the evidence 
I have shown that there is a compeling and comprehensive body of evidence to draw 
on, one that has been gathered throughout history and continues to be examined and 
gathered in both laboratories as wel as in the form of anecdotal colections. 
Firstly, the historic body of evidence indicates that the phenomena has been 
experienced and variously explained in both oral and writen cultures for as far back 
as we can ascertain. The phenomena is similar across cultures, even if the explanation 
for the phenomena difers. The phenomena associated with these accounts therefore 
require a contemporary understanding. 
Secondly, the anecdotal accounts indicate that the phenomena is not some 
kind of historic anomaly due to human misunderstanding in pre science-dominated 
times. As the outline of the body of evidence for psi shows, the phenomena stil occur 
to people across cultures and there is a prevalent belief in the phenomena which is 
studied by psychology, sociology and anthropology. Anecdotal compilations of 
paranormal experience are stil being compiled — reports of the phenomena have not 
diminished as one would expect of a fad or episode of cultural-driven hysteria. 
Finaly, the laboratory evidence appears to confirm on a smal scale similar 
phenomena to that which is reported in everyday life. This further indicates that the 
phenomena is something actual rather than imaginary or mistaken. The anomalous 
nature of the phenomena produced in the laboratories and its potential to impact on 
theories of mind, time and causation also indicates that the body of evidence for psi 
requires a response. 
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What response is most appropriate is not always clear cut. In his discussion of 
testimony of 'astonishing reports' Coady concludes that .. lack of suitable 
explanation of reports, other than their truth, is a consideration against rejecting them, 
but it is only one consideration and it is defeasible in various ways. The explanatory 
requirement is an ingredient in the overal verdict, along with the internal and external 
circumstances..' (Coady 1992, p198). So an apparent lack of a normal explanation 
should not automaticaly count against the veracity of the testimony. I hope that my 
brief overview of the historic, anecdotal and experimental testimony that constitute 
the body of evidence for psi shows that there is a substantial amount of evidence for 
the anomalous phenomena and it requires some kind of assessment. I agree with 
Coady that fraud or self-delusion is one possible explanation for anomalous 
CC phenomena. But I hope that I have shown that the body of evidence is substantial and 
a significant amount of investigators have atempted to replicate the phenomena. 
Stringent adherence to scientific methodology is also apparent, which reduces that '— changes that fraud has occurred in the production of the results. Any potential charges 
of such an ascription to explain the data also requires further analysis as an 	 0 
explanation for the phenomena. Fraud, as a blanket explanation for psi, should not be 
employed without some justification as to how they appropriately explain the body of 
evidence for psi. I suggest that accounts for the evidence should be compared to other 	 >4. 
atempts to explain the anomalous phenomena associated with apparent psi events. I 
consequently now turn the atention to the theories that support the hypotheses which 
have been put forward to account for psi. 
2.4 Compilation of hypotheses 
This section commences the second stage of the three-state IBE re-analysis; the 
compilation of hypotheses stage is reviewed and re-compiled. Before I recouch the psi 
debate as a psi hypotheses discussion, I wil explain why it is important to alow for 
the comparison of hypotheses that explain psi. Both the MMA and the EFA contend 
that there are two possible hypothesis that can explain the evidence for psi: 
1)that the evidence is produced by fraudulent means 
or 
2)that the evidence is produced by psi. 
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In the last chapter I criticised this response as being insuficient because it did not 
take into consideration other hypotheses that have been proposed. I wil now outline 
in more detail the theories that support other possible explanations for psi. I 
subsequently use the theories to compile a more thorough list of hypotheses. 
Because my concern is to securely ground the discussion of psi in philosophy, 
I wil perform this analysis by comparing problem of compilation of psi hypotheses to 
another similar philosophical problem, that of the hard problem of consciousness. I 
wil then use the various philosophical approaches as a template in order to compile 
the psi hypotheses. 
2.4.1 The hard problem of consciousness - a similar 
philosophical problem 
The problem of consciousness as it is understood in curent philosophy is that humans 
have an experience of consciousness, that is we believe we exist, think we think, 
interpret our surrounds etc. and conceive of ourselves as a unique 'I' with our own 
history, beliefs, desires, moods and personalities. The hard pfoblem of consciousness 
is, according David Chalmers who is credited with re-introduces the problem into 
contemporary philosophical discussion, 'the problem of experience. When we think 
and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective 
aspect' (Chalmers 1995, online). The problem is summed up as a modern version of 
the old mind/body problem and is now known as 'the hard problem' of consciousness. 
In its simple form it is 'the difficulty of understanding how physical processes in the 
brain can possibly give rise to subjective experiences.' (Blackmore 2005, p3) 
A solution to the hard problem of consciousness has remained unresolved. 
Under the dominant curent materialist view of mind, consciousness poses a problem 
because although there is general consensus that consciousness has something to do 
with the brain, empirical atempts have failed to ascertain what processes account for 
the experience of consciousness, nor do they reveal how the brain alows for 
subjective experience of the world. 
Phrased in these terms, the problem of consciousness can be seen to be similar 
to the psi debate. As with psi, there is a human experience of an event, thought also to 
have something to do with the brain, that is unable to be explained in terms of curent 
science. In curent consciousness theory there are various approaches that compete for 
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dominance, but no theory has resolutely solved the problem of consciousness. 
Responses to the problem are debated widely in current literature on consciousness 
and certain approaches are evident. 
The eliminativist position is strong. In regard to contemporary thought on 
consciousness, John Searle points out 'the most common move is to insist that 
materialism must be right and that we must eliminate consciousness by reducing it to 
something else. (Searle 1997, pxi-xii). The eliminativist denies that there is a 
problem—there is nothing to solve because there is no such thing as consciousness, it 
just happens that it appears as if there is. 
On the other end of the spectrum, the direct realist approach introduces 
another ontology in order to solve the problem of consciousness. Dualist theories, 
would be an example of such an approach to mind theory. David Chalmers, for 
instance, argues that consciousness is unable to be explained in physical terms: 'The 
existence of consciousness wil always be a further fact relative to structural and 
dynamic facts, and so wil always be unexplained by a physical account. For an 
explanation of consciousness, then, we must look elsewhere. We certainly need not 
give up on,explanation; we need only give up on reductive explanation' (Chalmers 
1996, pp121-122) . 
The reductive realist approach, on the other hand, does not eliminate the 
problem of consciousness, nor introduce other ontological categories, instead 
proponents maintain that the problem is best addressed using theories derived from 
current scientific knowledge. Quantum-based theories of mind, such as those of Roger 
Penrose, are representative of theorists in this category. For instance, when addressing 
the hard problem of consciousness, Penrose maintains that in order to find 'where 
subjective experience might find a physical home.. we must look to phenomenon of 
quantum-state reduction to see where our present picture of physical reality must 
indeed be fundamentaly changed' (Penrose 1995, p406). Although radical, Penrose 
does not argue for a new ontology as such, more a revision of concepts using existing 
scientific theory. 
I wil shortly outline the main tenets of the proponents for each of these 
responses with specific reference to psi theory, but first I wil make clear the 
connection between the status of psi theory and current work in consciousness theory. 
There is no agreement as to how to solve the hard problem of consciousness, 
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however, there are at least three distinct approaches related which address the 
problem: 
1)The eliminativist — denies the problem 
2)The Direct realist — introduces a new ontology to solve the problem 
3)The reductive realist — reduces the problem using curent scientific theory 
I show in the sections that folow that the curent state of psi theory mirors the 
various approaches to the hard problem of consciousness. My aim in this thesis is 
to provide a platform for constructive dialogue between the competing hypotheses 
that deal with psi phenomena in philosophy, so I wil therefore use the philosophical 
approaches to the hard problem of consciousness as a guide to compiling the new set 
to psi hypotheses. 
2.4.2 Psi theory 
I have already shown that there is a substantial body of evidence for apparent psi 
efects and in this section I wil show that there has been a lively discussion of psi 
theory in the psi literature as wel as atempts to test the theory. 
There have been numerous atempts made to explain psi. I do not discuss the 
various merits of the actual theories themselves. Rather, I want to give an overal 
brush stroke summation of the types of theories that are curently proposed for psi. 
The aim is to show that: 
1) there is rich literature on psi theory, and 
2) that they compare in approach to theories that atempt to address the 
problem of consciousness. 
I wil summarise the theories as general theories that explain psi, rather than break psi 
down into its three components (ESP, PK and time-displaced psi). This is because the 
presentation of theories here is to indicate that there is an array of theories that 
atempt to explain psi in general, rather than an analysis of the theories in relation to 
specifics of the phenomena in particular. I wil deal with the skeptic theories in a 
separate section. 
An overview of psi theories 
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Dean Radin, a parapsychologists and psi theorist, summarises the broad range 
of psi theories that have been developed. Psi theories, he says: 
Range from serious speculations in physics about the possibility of "advanced" 
electromagnetic waves carying precognitive information, to how enhancements to 
quantum mechanics would alow an observer to mentaly alter the physical probabilities 
of events. There are psychological speculations about how some aspects of the world 
may be driven by mental concepts like goals and purpose. There are theories based on 
Eastern philosophical concepts in which the world is primarily composed of Mind, 
which gives rise to mater. 
And there are dozens of other theories, including ideas based on the evolutionary value 
of psi, on teleological (purpose-driven) concepts, and on metaphysical, occult, religious, 
mystical, holographic, and other ideas. (Radin 1997, p278) 
There is a wide range of theories that have been postulated to explain psi. Sometimes 
they are part of other ontological or belief systems, such as those that fal into the 
supernatural category. Others are based on scientific theory, some of which are new 
and speculative, others extend existing scientific theory to explain psi. Metaphysical 
theories based on non-western philosophy belief systems, such as Buddhist idealism 
also feature. 
In an atempt to make the categorisation of the theories less unwieldy, I wil 
separate the scientific theories from the supernatural theories. The supernatural 
theories need not be outlined separately as they al propose the same basic theory, 
namely, that psi is explained by supernatural entities and that some kind of 
otherworldly or divine agent is caled for. For the purposes of this thesis it is not 
significant which particular supernatural entity is used. I treat the dominant skeptic 
theory as a separate category because this approach does not require further 
explanation of psi in either scientific or religious terms. 
I wil not include theories based on eastern philosophical belief systems as 
they are beyond the scope of this thesis. As are phenomological theories, such as 
those that use 'alternate realities' to account for psi (such as those of Lawrence 
LeShan or Charles Tart). These theories are interesting, but involve a philosophical 
tradition that is too complex to be contained in this thesis. 
The supernatural and skeptical theories are both prominent in non-psi 
literature. This is because the skeptical theories are the dominant mainstream theories 
in philosophy and science; and the supernatural theories are the dominant popular 
explanation for psi. Furthermore, both the supernatural and skeptical theories are dealt 
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with in some detail in other sections of the thesisl8. Therefore I wil focus most of my 
atention in this section on outlining other theories that are proposed to explain psi. In 
the main these theories are found in the psi-oriented literature and thus are less wel 
known. 
Psi theories 
The psi theories can be broadly divided into the folowing categories: physical, and 
non-physical. I wil briefly outline representatives of each below. 
Signal theories have long been proposed as a means by which the psi signal is 
caried. Electromagnetic theories have dominated this realm of theory development 
and in recent times the theorist Michael Persinger has proposed that 'psi signals are 
carried by extremely low frequency [ELF] radiation' (Stokes 1989, p114). According 
to this theory, in cases of ESP, the psi signal is caried on an ELF wave to the 
percipient where the 'brains of the agent and percipient would resonate with an 
existing geophysical wave, producing a similar state in both (Stokes 1989, p114). 
Many signal theories, such as Persinger's, use already known forces to explain 
psi as a signal, but there are other theorists who have proposed new cariers or forces 
in order to explain psi. These are variously caled psi fields, psychical waves, 
psychical fields, biogravity, bioplasma, orgone energy and, going even further back in 
history, animal magnetism (Stokes 1989, p119). Some cary ontological implications 
or pose ontological problems that are yet to be resolved, such as: what is the 
ontological status of a 'psychical wave'? How is it measured? What is it comprised 
of? These theories tend to be problematic as a result. 
Another category of physical theories are those that tie psi into quantum 
mechanics, especialy into the problem of non-locality. A major curent proponent for 
this type of theory in parapsychology is Dean Radin who outlines his theory in a 
recent book Entangled Minds. He writes that there are five major psi theories that 
have been developed using quantum theory. These are: the observational theory, the 
model of pragmatic information, weak quantum theory, Bohm's implicate/explicate 
order theory and the Stapp-von Neaumann theory (Radin 2006, pp250-260). Radin 
explains his theory in relation to ESP as folows: 
18 The supernatural hypothesis is covered in more detail in Chapter 3, when a case is made against it, 
and the skeptic hypothesis features prominently in Chapters 4 & 5. 
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The brain, like al other objects, is part of the entangled fabric of reality. As such, brain 
functioning is not just ruled by classical physics and biochemistry, but also participates 
in events distributed throughout space and time. Events may be thought of as ripples 
reverberating throughout an immense pool, and the brain as an object bobbing along the 
surface like a cork. Nonsensory perceptions are occasionaly evoked in the brain 
because, as an exquisitely sensitive patern recognizer, it responds to ripples resembling 
similar undulations associated with previous events. So similar memories arise. If the 
unconscious mind deems those memories to be sufficiently interesting, then information 
wil arise to awareness in the form of imagination of fleeting thoughts. 
(Raclin 2006, p266) 
Theories such as Radin's are controversial in the same way that Penrose's theories are 
in mainstream mind theory. In Chapter 4 an examination of a similar quantum-based 
theory is undertaken in relation to the skeptical hypothesis, so I won't go into more 
details in this section. I note that it is evident that if the problems regarding the use of 
quantum theory in general mind theory are resolved then there is prospect that at least 
one of the physical theories currently proposed to explain psi would perhaps become 
more acceptable to mainstream science. 
The main theory that has been proposed to explain psi that involves a non-
physical ontology is dualist in nature. John Beloff, the psychologist responsible for 
seting up the Koestler Parapsychology Unit at Edinburgh University, thought that 
acceptance of psi entailed a dualist explanation for psi. He claims psi events 'mark the 
boundary conditions beyond which we can no longer treat the individual as a psycho-
physical atom.' (Beloff 1963, p365). Explanations for psi wil, in his view, be weaker 
than the physical explanations of the harder sciences; and theory development for psi 
wil therefore entail 'essentialy to conceive of it, not as an isolated fact, but in terms 
of some broader perspective' (Beloff 1963, p366). It is the psi data that have lead 
Beloff into proposing a dualist ontology in order to account for the phenomena. Other 
• non-physical theories are Thouless and Wiesner's 'Shin theory' which is an 'internal 
psi" model of mind-brain interaction' in which 'the mind becomes aware of brain 
events by "clairvoyantly" monitoring neural states. Volitional activity is 
accomplished through the "psychokinetic" influence of neural events. Psi phenomena 
such as ESP and PK are simply rare, externalised forms of the mind's normal internal 
interactions with the brain.' (Stokes 1989, p 171). Psi theories that require another 
ontological category are wel-represented in the psi literature. I suggest that this is 
because, like consciousness, the mechanisms are not readily reducible. Some sound 
far-fetched and can be accused of merely introducing new terms that are il-defined. 
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They are problematic to mainstream science as a result. Nevertheless they are 
important because they show that for some scientists the data for psi is indicative that 
additional explanatory schemes are required to account for the phenomena. Further 
work in developing psi theory in conjunction with mainstream science could help 
ameliorate this problem. 
Supernatural theories 
There are many people and religious organisations who ascribe a supernatural theory 
to explain psi events. This is the most dominant popular theory that is proposed to 
explain the phenomena. The type of supernatural theory wil vary across cultures and 
times, it might be variously a God or Gods, a nature spirit or biblical demon. 
Supernatural accounts for psi were mentioned earlier in this chapter when I outlined 
the historic evidence for psi, therefore I won't go into any more detail here. In the 
next chapter, the history of the supernatural explanation for psi is shown to be 
important as it has informed curent assessment of the explanatory situation. 
Skeptical theories 
Skeptical theories that account for psi either propose that fraud is the most appropriate 
explanation for the phenomena. In Chapter 1 examined two philosophical arguments 
that advocate such an approach. However, I critiqued both of the arguments and 
showed that in order to maintain such an explanation further justification as to how 
fraud can account for the phenomena must be shown. 
Some psi commentators have proposed more sophisticated accounts of how 
psi phenomena can be explained, not just by appealing to the fraud explanation, but to 
other 'normal' means of explaining the phenomena. I therefore draw on the work of a 
prominent contemporary anti-psi psychologist (James E. Alcock) who has given a 
detailed account of why he considers psi phenomena can be explained through 
'normal' means. 
James E. Alcock, mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, maintains that 
parapsychologists are mistaken in their belief that psi research has provided any 
indication of genuinely anomalous phenomena. Instead he argues that he 'remains 
doubtful about the existence of paranormal phenomena' and advocates instead the 
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'Nul hypothesis' which understands that 'the observed results came about naturaly, 
and have 'nothing to do with psi' (Alcock 2003, p31). In support of his claim he 
maintains that the evidence for psi is problematic on a number of counts. His main 
concerns are: that psi theory is lacking; it hasn't progressed; there are stil problems 
with replication of the phenomena in experimental conditions; that the convincing 
evidence relies heavily on statistics; and that parapsychology 'fails to jibe with other 
areas of science' (Alcock 2003, p45). Alcock maintains that the evidence for psi is 
lacking, and most likely able to be explained by fraud, the product of self-delusion or 
sloppy science rather than indicative of genuinely anomalous effects. He suggests that 
the reason the mainstream continues to reject parapsychology is 'not because of some 
unfair bias, but simply because parapsychologists have not been able to produce data 
that persuade the larger scientific community that they have a genuine subject mater 
to study.' (Alcock 2003, p47). Therefore from this point on in the thesis I ascribe to 
the Skeptic hypothesis the notion that fraud, or flukes or coincidence or flaky 
experimental methodology are able to account for psi phenomena. The shorthand I 
use for this explanation is the 'fraud, fluke or flaky methodology' explanation. This is 
a more comprehensive explanation for the body of evidence for psi, rather than just 
appealing to fraud, and does more justice to the Skeptic hypothesis than the 
philosophical arguments that I critiqued in the last chapter. 
Summary of theories 
I have undertaken a very brief overview of some of the main theories that are 
represented in the literature. Some have been more thoroughly developed than others 
(like some of the current quantum physics theories) and some are modern 
developments on an old theme (like Persinger's signal theory). And I have shown that 
skeptic theories are concerned with 'normal' explanations for psi that are more 
complex than the fraud arguments. I don't want to go into too much detail about the 
actual theories themselves as the particulars are not pertinent to the analysis 
undertaken in this thesis. Instead it is my intention to provide an indication that there 
are psi theories that are being developed and that the skeptic theory is represented in 
some detail in the psi literature. I outline in the section below how the psi theories are 
similar to those in philosophy that address the hard problem of consciousness. 	  
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2.4.3 Psi hypotheses discussion 
I showed that the discussion regarding the hard problem of consciousness can be 
represented by the three contrasting approaches: 
1)The eliminativist – denies the problem 
2)The Direct realist – introduces a new ontology to solve the problem 
3)The reductive realist – reduces the problem using current scientific theory 
The various psi theory proponents' contrasting theories can also be categorised in a 
similar fashion: 
Eliminativist 	 skeptical theories that claim psi is explained by 'normal means' 
who thus 'eliminate' the problem of explaining psi as genuinely 
anomalous 
Direct realist 	 theories that require additional ontological commitment- 
1)non-physical scientific theories 
2)supernatural theories 
Reductive realist physical scientific theories that use curent science to explain psi. 
I wil now take each in turn and define the hypothesis and detail the supporting 
theories for the hypothesis based on the outline of psi theory in the above section. 
I summarise the various approaches with the new names in a grid at the end of the 
section. I introduce new names for each of the psi hypotheses that wil be 
subsequently used in the remainder of the thesis. 
Eliminativist Skeptic hypothesis 
The psi Skeptic hypothesis is represented by those who maintain that the most 
reasonable theory to explain psi is that fraud, flukes of chance, flaky experimental 
methodology. It is similar to the `eliminativise stance in the consciousness discussion 
because it denies that there is any further issue that requires explanation. So, in a 
similar fashion the problem of psi is 'eliminated'. 
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Direct realist 1: Big Change Natural hypothesis 
Direct realist theories understand the phenomena to be in genuine need of an 
explanation and they introduce additional ontological categories in theories that 
explain the phenomena. Theories that require dualism or other ontological 
commitments that cannot be accounted for in physical terms fal into this category. I 
cal these Big Change Natural hypotheses because, if accepted, they require 
substantial revision of curently accepted scientific theory. 
Direct realist 2: Supernatural hypothesis 
The Supernatural hypothesis is also representative of the direct realist approach. The 
theories that support a supernatural explanation for psi propose that a divine agent or 
being intervenes on the natural workings of the world in order to create a psi efect. 
This is the most prevalent popular theory that is ascribed to psi, however, I show in 
the next chapter that it is problematic on two counts. I wil save further discussion of 
this hypothesis until then. 
Reductive realist: Smal Change Natural (SCN) hypothesis 
The Smal Change Natural hypothesis is related to the reductive realist position in the 
consciousness literature. Theorists that are represented here are those that promote the 
quantum theory explanations for psi, those like Persinger who use an existing known 
force to explain psi as a signal as wel as those that believe that psi wil eventualy be 
explained using accepted scientific theories. The features of the Smal Change Natural 
hypothesis are therefore to accept that psi is anomalous and reall9 and requires an 
explanation but that current theories of known forces wil eventualy be able to 
account for the phenomena, regardless of how surprising as they appear to us now. 
19 The word 'real' is philosophicaly loaded word. Here I mean it to indicate that the apparent psi 
effects are interpreted as indicative of 'something' and that that 'something' requires an explanation 
as a phenomena that is genuine. This view can be contrasted to the skeptic hypothesis that does not 
think apparent psi effects are 'real' as they can be explained by fraud or self-delusion and thus do not 
require further explanation. 
Occasionaly I wil use the umbrela term 'psi realist hypotheses' when referring to the BCN and 
SCN hypotheses together, as they both advocate that some natural theory be employed to account for 
the phenomena. 
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Direct realism 2 	 Supernatural 	 Body of evidence 




Ontology containing a 
supernatural entity 
is require in order 
to explain psi 
hypothesis 
The reworking of the psi hypotheses has been undertaken to provide a more thorough 
selection of competing hypothesis regarding explanation of psi. It wil be drawn on 
substantialy throughout the remainder of the thesis. In order to make the reworked 
hypotheses as clear as possible, I have placed them in the grid in below. The chart 
indicates how the renamed psi hypotheses are related to the philosophical approaches 
of the hard problem of consciousness, it and gives a summary of the theoretical 
approach and explanatory entailment of each newly names psi hypothesis. 
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The four hypothesis—Skeptic, Smal Change Natural, Big Change Natural and 
Supernatural—wil form the basis for the analysis in the folowing chapters. 
Chapter 2 has commenced the process of legitimising the Inference to Best 
Explanation process for psi. I have provided an outline of the body of evidence along 
with theories that have atempted to explain the phenomena. Then I compiled a group 
of hypotheses by comparing the evaluation of psi to a similar philosophical problem. 
The psi debate has now been refrained as a discussion between al curently plausible 
hypotheses. Therefore instead of referring to the psi debate I wil cal it a 'psi 
hypotheses discussion'. 
The task that remains is Stage 3 of the IBE process. This requires the selection 
of one of the competing hypotheses as the 'loveliest' explanation taking into 
consideration background beliefs that might be guiding the selection. The evaluation 
of the various hypotheses is undertaken during the course of the rest of this thesis. I 
commence the process by examining the history of the explanation for psi, which I 
show informs curently explanatory issues. 
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Chapter 3: Shifting sands 
The location of the shifting sands of the supernatural is thus obviously afected 
by the power of our explanatory systems. 
Michael Scriven 
The thesis now commences Stage 3 of the IBE re-analysis of psi. The task is the 
most complex of the three stages undertaken; the process of evaluating the 
competing hypotheses concerns the remainder of the thesis. During the course of 
discussing inference to the best explanation in Chapter 2, it was pointed out that it 
is important to take into consideration background beliefs when selecting one 
hypothesis from the list of compiled hypotheses. Therefore I commence with an 
examination of background beliefs that I show inform the psi hypotheses 
discussion, but which are rarely made explicit in the mainstream literature. 
Firstly, I present what I have caled the historic account. I draw on the 
work of David Ray Griffin and outline his argument that it is the explanatory 
history of psi which informs its status as paranormal in contemporary mainstream 
scientific and philosophical thought. I show that the explanatory history of psi as 
once generaly accepted as supernatural informs the mainstream assessment of psi 
today, and therefore impacts on the psi hypotheses discussion. 
Then I outline a subcategory of the Skeptic hypothesis—caled hardcore 
skepticism—and I show that for some skeptical psi commentators, it is assumed 
that explanation of psi as produced by any other than fraudulent means, entails a 
reversion to supernatural explanatory schemes. I subsequently make a case against 
the Supernatural hypothesis and I use this analysis to two-fold effect: firstly, to 
show that the hardcore skepticism is based on a false dichotomy; and secondly, to 
eliminate the Supernatural hypothesis from the psi hypotheses discussion. 
The remaining three hypotheses—the Big and Smal Natural Change 
hypotheses and the Skeptic hypothesis—then become the focus of further analysis 
in Part II of the thesis, in which further explanatory issues are examined. 
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3.1 Historic account 
The historic account is an assessment of the explanatory history of psi which 
shows that psi was once considered, by the mainstream, as supernatural. The 
account argues that there have been two transitions in the history of science that 
have informed the explanatory status of psi: 
1)Middle Ages to the Modern world view 
(roughly the 14th  8thcenturies) 
2)Modern world view to the Materialist world view (roughly mid 18th 
and 19th centuries) 
According to the scientific and religious scope of the time, the first transition 
placed psi-like events in the supernatural category of explanation. Curently, due 
to the second transition, psi is considered paranormal. The historic account 
maintains that it was the limits of mechanistic science that determined the scope of 
scientific explanation at the time the Modern world view was formed:Ay this time 
apparent psi events were considered supernatural in origin. Subsequently, with the 
rise of the materialist world view20, the supernatural category become obsolete as 
an explanatory category within the framework. Therefore, under the materialist 
view, psi-like events are unable to be explained as supernatural, but nor can 
current scientific theory account for the phenomena. The historic account suggests 
that science is currently unable to conceive of how to account for psi because the 
limits of scientific explanatory scope regarding action at a distance were set during 
the end of the first transition, when scientific theory was influenced by 
mechanism. 
2° For the purposes of this section, in which I introduce the historic account, I understand the kind 
of materialism that Grifin refers to as the kind dominant in science today. More specificaly, as I 
understand it, materialism represents the view that everything that exists is material and that what 
exists is best explained by reducing it to its most basic physical components. (Armstrong 1980, 
p65). In philosophy, however, there are opposing views that do not exclude the potential of 
supernatural explanation, and it is evident that for some theorists, such as deists, the supernatural 
category of explanation is stil currently tenable. I deal with related issues regarding psi and 
naturalism in section 3.4.1 before discussing the Supernatural hypothesis further. 
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In this section I outline in more detail the argument for the historic 
account. I draw in the main on the work of the philosopher David Ray Grifin21, 
who is the most major proponent of the account in philosophical literature that also 
deals with psi specificaly. I wil also draw on the work of the biologists Rupert 
Sheldrake and John Randal in order to lend support to Griffin's analysis. 
First of al I outline the two transitions which, according to Griffin, have 
significant impact on the explanatory assessment of psi. Then I show that Randal 
and Sheldrake make similar points in the course of their discussions of psi and 
biology. I subsequently examine further the effect that the transitions have on psi's 
current status as paranormal. Finaly I present a chart of the historic account which 
ties the transitions and the explanatory history of psi together in graphic form. 
3.1.1 Two transitions 
Griffin presents a case that there have been two relatively recent traditions that 
inform the contemporary assessment of psi phenomena. The first transition started 
in the 14th Century and was ongoing for four centuries, and the second occured in 
the mid 18th century and continued through the 19th century. I wil outline them 
each in turn. 
First transition 
According to Griffin from the 14th to the 17th centuries a gradual transition 
occurred in Western society that resulted in a situation whereby there were two 
explanatory categories: that of a law-abiding mechanistic physical category; and a 
supernatural, intangible category. Known as the mechanistic view of nature, 
science determined how the former operated and religious ideology the later 
(Griffin 1997, p17). The change coincided with the developments in scientific 
understanding and the founding of the modern world view by scientists such as 
21 David Ray Griffin is a process philosopher and theologian who has made a valuable contribution 
to analysing psi in relation to process philosophy. I realise that, controversialy, he has recently 
gained some fame as a.retired.professor whoisau advocate for 9/11 conspiracy theories. 
However, this thesis focuses on his early work in relation to psi phenomena, which is rigorous 
and thoughtful. 
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Isaac Newton. The view promoted the notion that God provides the mechanistic 
world with impetus. Grifin spels this out: 
The mechanistic view of nature was also used, for example by Boyle and Newton, to 
argue for the existence of God: if nature was devoid of self-motion, there had to be a 
supernatural being to have put it into motion and also to have imposed laws of motion 
upon it. Newton also argued that the mechanistic materialistic conception of mater, 
according to which it has no hidden powers and acts only by contact, shows the need 
for a cosmic spiritual being to explain the mutual atraction of bodies (gravitation) and 
the cohesiveness of atoms in solid bodies. ( Griffin 1988, p10-11) 
It is not surprising that the division of explanatory categories at this time impacted 
on psi and placed them firmly in the supernatural category of explanation. Psi 
events do not appear to have any known mechanistic explanation and in the past, 
prior to the time the modern world view was formed, psi events were generaly 
considered supernatural in origin2. However, subsequent developments in science 
and explanation impacted on this initial assessment of psi in relation to the 
explanatory scope of science. 
Second transition 
After the modern world view became dominant and explanation for psi was firmly 
grounded in the supernatural category, a second transition then occurred. The 
result changed the category in which explanation for such anomalous phenomena 
is sought. Griffin makes a case that from the mid-18th century and during the 19th  
century supernaturalism and dualism were gradualy replaced by the now curently 
dominant materialist worldview. The materialist worldview is underpinned by the 
notion 'that reality consist of nothing but a single al-embracing spatio-temporal 
system' (Armstrong 1980, p65). Furthermore explanation of reality is undertaken 
by reduction in terms of the four known forces electromagnetism, gravity and the 
strong and weak nuclear forces. Therefore under the materialist view, the 
supernatural category of explanation is obsolete. 
According to Griffin, the result of this second transition was that 'the 
supernaturalistic theism of early modernism transmuted into the naturalistic 
atheism of late modernism. Accordingly the mechanical philosophy's implication 
For instance, in Chapter 2 I outlined the historic evidence for psi and mentioned the early 
experiment of King Croesus who tested the oracles which were thought to use supernatural 
means to obtain precognitive information. I also mentioned that examples of psi-like events could 
be found in the Bible. 
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that events not understandable in terms of action by contact cannot happen 
naturaly came to mean that they cannot happen at al' (Grifin 1997, p23). In 
Griffin's analysis then, psi phenomena are currently difficult to explain, as they 
appear to resist mechanistic explanation in terms acceptable to current science, but 
nor can they be explained as supernatural as they have been in the past. 
However, a new explanatory category has emerged which is now 
commonly ascribed to psi. Paranormal phenomena are considered to be 'any 
phenomenon which in one or more respects exceeds the limits of what is deemed 
physicaly possible on current scientific assumptions' (Thalbourne 1982, p.50). 
The combined effect of the two transitions thus places psi phenomena into this 
category because without recourse to the supernatural category of explanation and 
without any known explanation in science, psi is considered unexplainable. 
The phenomena from spontaneous instances of psi such as in the 
catalogues described in the last chapter as wel as biblical, historical and early 
Greek reports of psi-like phenomena indicate that the phenomena themselves are 
not new to human experience. However, if Griffin's analysis is valid, then the two 
major transitions are pertinent to how the phenomena are received by mainstream 
scientists at any particular epoch. The assessment impacts on what realm of 
explanation (supernatural or paranormal) is considered appropriate for psi 
phenomena at different times. Griffm summarises the situation that obtains for psi 
as folows: 
The late modern worldview, with its materialism and atheism, has no room for the 
phenomena, period. The early modern worldview, with its dualism and 
supernaturalism, can alow that such phenomena do occur; indeed, it usualy insists on 
the reality of such phenomena under the name of "miracles." (Griffin 1997, p2) 
Griffin's resolution is to introduce a 'postmodern theism' with a naturalistic bent. 
(Griffin 1997, p3). I find Griffin's work thoughtful and provocative, but I have a 
different solution, which is to make a case against the supernatural theories of psi 
on the basis that most of the phenomena are mundane in nature. I present these 
arguments a litle later in the chapter, as first I wil outline some support for 
Griffin's analysis regarding psi's current status of paranormal. 
- 
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3.1.2 Support for the historic account 
To lend support to Griffin's claims about the history of explanation of psi, I 
outline similar accounts by two biologists who are also interested in the historical 
explanation of psi: John L. Randal; and Rupert Sheldralce. 
John L. Randal's account of the mechanistic/vitalst debate 
John L. Randal's account is slightly different, but it makes similar points to 
Griffin's about two transitions in the history of science which are relevant to the 
explanation of phenomena like psi. Randal traces a mechanistic/vitalist debate 
back to the times of Ancient Greek philosophers. He claims that Aristotelian 
theories of the soul were taken up by the major religions that subsequently 
dominated western thought on these maters (Randal 1977, p22). The efect was 
that 'such was the domination of thought by religion during the Middle Ages that 
few people stopped to ask themselves whether, in fact, the soul existed at al' 
' (Randal 1977, p22). That is, until there was a resurgence of the mechanistic view 
instigated by the works of Rene Descartes. The mechanistic view consisted of a 
law-abiding natural, mechanistic world combined with a 'soul implanted by God' 
(Randal 1977, p23). As with Griffm, Randal argues that it is important to 
consider the ramifications of the mechanistic view on subsequent developments in 
science. 
Randal maintains a second transition occurred. During the late 17th and 
much of the 18th centuries the vitalist/mechanistic debate was again a mater of 
contemporary concern with advocates for both sides. Gradualy though, as 
scientific thought progressed previously vitalistic disciplines such as chemistry 
and biology were explained without the need to postulate the 'vital force'. The 
materialist view thus became dominant and 'by the end of the nineteenth century 
those who believed that life was more than a mere 'fortuitous concourse of atoms' 
were in ful retreat' (Randal 1977, p26). 
J. L. Randal is a biologist and the overal project in his book involves a 
criticism of current molecular biology which asserts that the origins of life can best 
be explained in reductive, mechanistic terms. He covers this ground in subsequent 
. 	 • 	 . 
chapters. Obviously, his project is not the immediate concern of this thesis. 
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However, his account of the mechanistic/vitalist developments in science is 
pertinent because it gives support to the assertions made at the beginning of this 
section, namely, that two important transitions occured in science which have 
impacted on the ontological explanatory categories of phenomena, such as psi, 
which are problematic to curent materialist scientific orthodoxy. 
Rupert She/drake's account of the two transitions 
Rupert Sheldrake is another biologist whose research extends to parapsychology 
and who has writen on the topic of psi. He presents another version of the historic 
account and, in the same vein as Randal and Grifin, presents a summary of the 
changes over the course of time in order explore the ramifications of the current 
dominance of the mechanistic approach to explanatory problems encountered by 
psi. The first change occurred gradualy from the time of the Middle Ages: 
One way of understanding this crucial transition is in terms of a distinction, originaly 
made in the Middle Ages, between natura naturata (natured nature), and natura 
naturans (naturing nature). The former refers to nature in the sense of that which is 
produced, the phenomena we observe with our senses. The later refers to the unseen 
productive power which gives rise to the phenomena. In the animistic physics of the 
Middle Ages, souls played the role of naturing nature; they organized the autonomous 
development and behaviour of organisms, and motivated them by atraction.. When 
the founders of mechanistic science expeled souls from nature, leaving only passive 
mater in motion, they placed al active powers in God. Nature was only natura 
naturata. The invisible productive power, natura naturans, was divine rather than 
physical, supernatural rather than natural. (Sheldrake 1990, p61-62) 
The nature/supernatural distinction that Griffin pointed out obtained at the time of 
the founding of the modern world view is then, according to Sheldrake, due to the 
demise of animistic physics and the rise of the mechanistic view that divides 
explanatory categories into physical nature and active, non-physical supernatural. 
Thus, by the 17th century 'the souls that animated physical bodies in accordance 
with their own internal ends were exorcised from the mechanistic world of 
physics. Mater was inanimate and passive, acted upon by external forces in 
accordance with the mathematical laws of motion' (Sheldrake 1990, p61). 
Further to this, Sheldrake believes that science is stil informed by the 
mechanistic legacy, the result being that 'the only valid scientific explanations are 
mechanistic explanations' (Sheldrake 1990, p84). As with Griffin and Randal, 
Sheldrake claims that the explanatory history of phenomena that are intangible and 
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not easily reduced are assessed, perhaps incorectly, under the curent materialist 
world view as impossible and therefore paranormal. 
Summary of the historic account 
In summary, the supernatural explanatory category that historicaly accounted for 
psi events no longer available under the materialist framework. Furthermore, 
if the historic account is corect, science is most likely unable to readily account 
for the phenomena because the limits and scope of science were set when psi was 
classified as supernatural. With the transition the materialist world view, 
psi is consequently currently considered paranormal and unexplainable in 
scientific terms. 
The accounts given by Sheldrake, Randal and Griffin rely on a broad 
sketching out of the trends in scientific and religious theory over many centuries. 
It could be claimed that they over simplify the scenario. I deal with this possible 
chalenge to the historic account in the section below, before I emphasise the 
importance of the historic account to the current status of psi phenomena in 
relation to current scientific theory. 
Defence of the historic account against the chalenge that it/s too broad 
The bare bones of the historic account are reasonably uncontroversial. We know 
that psi-events were once considered supernatural (from historic accounts of psi-
events) and we know that psi is currently defined as paranormal (from dictionaries 
and encyclopaedias). There is also evidence for the two transitions that are thought 
to have occurred and which have impacted on explanatory issues regarding psi. If 
one alows that the historic account is a very broad brush stroke account then these 
claims are uncontentious. 
However, accusations could be made that the picture painted is todbroad, 
there has never been a consensus on these issues, and there have been debates and 
opposing points of view along the way. For instance, one could argue that the 
sketch of trends and transitions does not do justice to the fact that there are 
philosophers of a dualist persuasion and there are, of course, scientists and 
philosophers who have supernaturalbelief systems, so for them the supernatural or 
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immaterial mind explanatory category is stil an option, despite the apparent 
dominance of materialism in the sciences. 
I am only able to defend the historic account against this chalenge by 
conceding that it is a valid criticism, the fine detail is missing in this sketch and the 
controversies are more complex than the representation of historic transitions 
suggest. However, if it can be accepted as a rough indication of mainstream trends 
which have clear and obvious implications for psi, the historic account seems 
reasonable. This is because it is readily verifiable that psi is considered paranormal 
and psi was once considered supernatural by the mainstream authorities, even if 
there have been opponents to the mainstream assessment at these times. I argue 
then, that the historic account provides an important insight into the background 
beliefs that inform the mainstream assessment of psi. The most important assertion 
regarding psi taken from the historic account is the idea that the scope of science 
was set to deliberately exclude psi-like phenomena and that this background 
informs the assessment of psi today. I discuss this further in the next section. 
3.1.3 Scope of science and psi phenomena 
It is important to realise that the historic account puts the evidence for psi into 
explanatory context as it helps to explain why psi cannot be accounted for under 
the current scientific scope of lawful relations. For instance, to explain the 
influence that the modern worldview stil has on the scientific perception of 
anomalous phenomena like PK Griffin comments that: 
In the dominant thinking of the time [Newtown et al], the connection between the 
desire to exclude action at a distance in physics, on the one hand, and the desire to rule 
out al paranormal influence on and by human minds, on the other, was evidently 
something like this: given the dualism between (spiritual) mind and (physical) nature, 
excluding action at a distance from nature did not, strictly speaking, rule out the 
possibility that human minds might either receive or exert causal influence at a 
distance. (Griffin 1997, p20) 
Possible explanation of PK phenomena was therefore excluded in order to keep al 
distant interaction with the world, in the spiritual or mental realm under a 
supernatural/dualist worldview. More broadly, under the modern worldview the 
evidence for psi, whether anomalous action at a distance or anomalous 
communication, was to be explained as supernatural and therefore outside of the 
- realm of scientific inquiry and without further need to explain mechanisticaly in - 
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, 
RESULT FOR PSI 	 Psi is explained as supernatural: - 
EXPLANATION 	 remote action at a distance due to divine influence' . 	, 
Psi is explained as paranormal: . 	. beyond the limits of what is thought pqicalji posible".  
on curent scientific assumptions influenced by scope of_ 
scientific explanation set when the modern world view was fp-lined 
RESULT FOR PSI 
EXPLANATION 
terms of natural laws. The result of this explanatory scheme was to exclude from 
the scope of science the means by which psi could be explained as natural. And 
with the subsequent change to predominance of the materialist worldview, 
combined with the decline of the supernatural/dualist worldview, evidence for psi 
events such as the movement of an object without any known mechanism or 
communication without the use of the five senses were left without recourse to 
either supernatural or mainstream scientific explanation. 
The explanatory history of psi has informed some assumptions regarding 
the phenomena which should be made explicit. I deal with psi, and especialy the 
unlawful nature of the phenomena, in relation to explanation theory in Part II of 
the thesis, so I wil save further discussion of the problematic nature of 
explanation of paranormal phenomena until then. 
I have constructed a chart which clarifies how the sketch of trends outlined 
in this section impacts on the explanatory status of psi: 
The Historic Account - sketch of trends 






From God-centred to.. 
L..Mechanistic, two explanatory categories: SUPERNATURAL - intangible, active & NATURAL - law-abiding physical Modern world view formed, limits of scientific scope influenced by mechanistic explanation 
Transition 2: Modern to Materialist 
19th century 
20th century 
Modern, mechanistic-influenced to.. 
..MaterialistIne explanation category: 
reductionist, natural law-abiding, physical 
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The chart is intended to ilustrate the notion that the modern worldview was 
formed under the influence of mechanism when two explanatory categories were 
available for phenomena. However, the limits on science under the two-category 
mechanistic view influence the scientific assessment of psi events today thus 
relegating them to the unexplainable, paranormal category. 
The historic account suggests to me that, if the body of evidence for psi is 
considered legitimate, then it is therefore pertinent to look at the perceived limits 
of scientific explanation in order to discover how best to approach explanation of 
the phenomena as natural. However, it can also be argued that, given the history of 
psi as a once generaly considered supernatural phenomena, they should be 
reconsidered as divine in origin. I chalenge this manoeuvre on the basis that psi 
phenomena are similar to other phenomena that are considered natural, even if one 
alows for a supernatural category of explanation in one's ontology. 
3.2 Arguments against the Supernatural hypothesis 
In this section I wil make a case that the supernatural account is problematic on 
two scores. Initialy, I wil argue that the mundane nature of much of the evidence 
for psi indicates that even if supernatural accounts were part of one's explanatory 
scheme, psi events would not warant such explanation. Some might argue then 
that some apparent psi events are not mundane in nature in response to this view, 
so I then show that phenomena of a more dramatic kind fals to the same criticism 
as the argument for theism based on religious experience. Then I wil address the 
issue of experimental evidence and the anomalous nature of psi phenomena in 
relation to the Supernatural hypothesis. But first I wil discuss psi and 
philosophical notions of 'naturalism' pertaining to the sciences and methods of 
inquiry. 
3.2.1 Naturalism and psi 
Psi, with its supernatural explanatory past and current status as paranormal, is an 
important bone of contention in this debate. It is important to come to terms with 
the nature of the body of evidence for psi in relation to naturalism if the realist and 
supernatural hypotheses are to be compared to the Skeptic hypothesis. I wil 
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therefore now introduce the philosophical definitions of two different types of 
naturalism and then discuss the status of psi in these terms. 
It is reasonably wel understood that science deals with only those things 
that require natural explanation. It does not mean that the only things that require 
explanation are those that science deals with. For some — methodological 
naturalists — the most reliable method of inquiry is that which is undertaken by the 
natural sciences by whatever is deemed to be the most appropriate method. But 
methodological naturalists are not commited to holding that the only things that 
exist are natural. This view alows for natural but unexplainable things (such as 
some mind theorists hold regarding consciousness) as wel as for those who 
maintain that there are things that require natural explanation along with things 
that require supernatural explanation. Methodological naturalism is an epistemic 
stance so there is consequently epistemological debate regarding what phenomena 
fit into which category. So methodological naturalism is a statement about how we 
go about explaining natural phenomena, but it doesn't limit the phenomena that 
require explanation to natural things. However, ontological naturalism proponents 
maintain that the only things that exist are natural. Most proponents of this view 
also maintain that the natural objects and their relations are to be explained by 
science and, even more strongly, only those things which are reducible to physical 
mechanisms are to be considered natural. 
Psi is in a peculiar position in relation to naturalism. The historic account 
shows that psi, in the Western tradition, was considered supernatural at the time 
the modern world view was formed. The presentation of the body of evidence for 
psi in the last chapter showed that a smal group of researchers has been 
investigating psi as a potentialy explainable natural phenomena since the 18th 
century. Currently mainstream science and philosophy consider psi 'paranormal'. 
However, there is a case made for psi as a supernatural phenomenon which is put 
forward by contemporary theists; others disagree with this approach on account of 
the mundane, everyday nature of psi phenomena. 
Despite the history of investigation of psi as a natural phenomenon by a 
smal body of scientists and philosophers, psi is stil associated with the 
supernatural by some theorists. It should be noted that this discussion is not about 
• the_cornmon perception of psi as supernatural by the general populace, but rather _ 
the argtiMents put forward regarding the theological issues involved by current psi 
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theorists. The folowing discussion makes a case against the supernatural 
interpretation of psi events on two counts. First, the mundane nature of much of 
the body of evidence for psi is used to argue that when psi is mundane, if it is real 
then it should be considered natural even if it is currently unexplainable in these 
terms. Secondly, look at more dramatic, potentialy supernatural instances of psi 
and makes a case that the same argument applies here as does the argument for 
deism based on people's religious experiences. 
It could be argued that there it is not appropriate to divide psi into the two 
types of cases: mundane and,dramatic. Instead, it could be maintained that 
supernatural events could also be mundane, and indeed are so in some belief 
systems. Conversely some events that are considered natural are also dramatic 
(such as hurricanes and the like). Discussion of supernatural vs natural 
categorisation are of concern to much theological discussion and a detailed 
examination is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, I concede that these 
religious belief based assessments of what types of phenomena are commonly 
considered supernatural and what natural are open to myriad interpretations. 
I acknowledge that other philosophers, such as Stephen E. Braude, have 
addressed such issues in the past and have convincingly argued a case for psi to be 
considered ostensibly paranormal rather than supernatural (Braude 1979, p244) 
without the need to draw a distinction between the mundane and dramatic 
categories. However, for the purposes of this thesis I take my cue from Swinburne 
and Wiliams' discussion of the paranormal vs supernatural distinction because it 
is the place I have found a reasonably contemporary mainstream theological 
discussion with specific reference to psi and I am concerned here to address the 
concerns in current mainstream literature. 
3.2.2 Everyday psi 
The folowing discussion wil make a case for psi as a natural phenomenon on the 
basis that most apparent psi events occur in a similar fashion to other events which 
we currently consider explainable as natural occurrences in science. The case for a 
natural explanation for psi (debates about the evidence aside) is contrasted with 
the case for psi as a supernatural phenomenon. 
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The generic definition for something to be supernatural is reasonably clear. 
It is a phenomena that has its origins in something that is outside of the normal 
regular mechanistic, law abiding workings of the world. The explanation of the 
phenomena is ascribed to a deity or divine intercessor who has the ability to over-
ride the regular, mechanistic operation of nature. However, determining what 
phenomena are supernatural is problematic when one is dealing with phenomena, 
such as psi, that are also considered paranormal. 
Similarly, although some anecdotal incidents of ESP can involve life or 
death situations, most psi events are also likely to be about more everyday maters 
that are not so dramatic. Take, for instance the anecdote related in the last chapter 
regarding the injury of the husband's jaw while sailing. This is hardly an event 
significant to any body other than the person it occurred to and involves only a 
minor amount of discomfort for the people involved. Would a divine agent realy 
care to supervene the normal methods of communication in order to pass on such 
trivial information? Imagine if every scraped knee or cut thumb were to be given 
such status? 
Supernatural explanation might be more warranted if, say, the event 
involved the wife taking action that saved the husband in some way. But there 
appears to be nothing more than the communication of a minor discomfort 
experienced by the husband to the wife at the same time as the incident took place. 
The apparent knowledge that her husband had injured his jaw did not instigate the 
wife to somehow help her husband avoid the accident, nor was the information 
required in order to help the husband return home relatively unharmed. 
Amongst theologians the mundane nature of psi and its possible 
supernatural origins is a mater of debate. Richard Swinburne, a contemporary 
proponent of fme-tuning, makes the point that 'extraordinary events lacking 
religious significance are more appropriately characterized as magical or psychic 
phenomena rather than miracles.' (in Wiliams, 1990, p52) So for some thinkers 
the mundane and everyday nature of some instances of psi seem to indicate that 
even if a supernatural explanation is to be sought for other phenomena, such 
explanation should not be sought for psi because the events are not 'significant' 
enough for a divine agent to have the need to intercede. However, the theologian 
•T.C. Wiliams argues otherwise in The Idea of the Miraculous. He argues that it is 
'problematic to separate the potentialy natural from the-supernatural. 
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In contemporary times, many religions continue to maintain that psi events 
are supernatural in origin. In fact most major faiths consider the study of psi as 
'natural' to be antithetical to their belief system, as many use psi-like events are 
used to support the existence of a supernatural being or beings. Christian religions, 
for instance, understand poltergeist incidents as possession by spirits. Miracles in 
the Christian tradition or magic in animist traditions are two examples of such 
beliefs. Wiliams makes this point explicitly when discussing whether psychical 
phenomena should be considered supernatural or paranormal: 
Thus, in the first place.. there is (a) the sense which may be characterized for present 
purposes as necessarily involving reference to an invisible realm of 'God(s)'. Secondly, 
there is (b) the sense which centres on the basic phenomenological characteristic of the 
miraculous as this is to be found in the idea of a direct mental (and with this, 
super/para-normal) control over physical nature. That there is a strong contingent 
relation between (a) and (b) is obvious enough. It is plainly to be seen in the widely 
accepted religious assumption that evidence with regard to (b) constitutes a basis for 
belief in (a). At the same time, it is no less clearly the case that there is no necessary 
connexion between the two. Sense (a), for instance, might wel be accepted without any 
rider regarding (b)— as, for example, in the view that, though there are 'gods', they-
may have neither the interest nor power to intervene in the afairs of men. Again there 
is no need to assume from the acceptance of (b) that there is necessarily a realm of the 
supernatural in sense (a). Conversely to postulate (b) is not necessarily to negate (a).. 
More immediately, however, there is the vital point that the sufficiency of the idea of 
the miraculous is to be seen as turning, in the last resort, on (b) above rather than (a). It 
turns, in short, on the (phenomenological) super-normality of the happening itself, as 
opposed to any presumed supernaturalistic ascription as to cause. 
(Wiliams, 1990, pp50-51) 
As I understand it, Wiliams argues that everyday occurrences of psi have been 
associated with a supernatural explanation of cause, but that this should not 
necessarily be the case due to the more mundane nature of the events in contrast to 
'miraculous' events such as are writen of in Christian literature. He goes on to say 
that: 
On the basis of the above, therefore, there is the clear conclusion that the miraculous 
need not necessarily be conceived in the exclusive terms of the biblical model of such 
events. What is philosophicaly most basic to the idea is, not any contingent feature 
relating to scale or bizareness, nor any, necessarily speculative, claim as to origin, but, 
rather, the factor of some kind of super-para-normal wiling. That is, more specificaly - 
the phenomenological manifestation of purely mental, that is unmediated, control over 
physical nature. With this, too, there is the point that, as conceived in this way, there is 
nothing to negate the possibility of such events being brought about - even though, 
perhaps, only exceptionaly, and not necessarily exclusively - by the direct volitional 
activity of embodied rational, that is human, agents. Nor, again, in this connexion, is 
there any necessity to relegate such events exclusively to the past. It might 
(conceivably) be the case that they are happening at the present time. Even, indeed, 
(again, conceivably) that they are, to some degree, repeatable. (Wiliams, 1990. p51) 
In this analysis Wiliams argues that psi cannot be discounted as a supernatural 
phenomena on the basis that it is instantiated in the mundane and unexceptional, 
• 
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but at the same time, he also alows that it is not possible to rule out the possibility 
that some or al of the events associated with psi are not of human origin. He 
leaves us confused as to what kind of explanation 'should' be sought for the 
phenomena, although he gives us a very good account of the problems associated 
with making this diferentiation. His use of the hyphenated super/para-normal to 
describe the phenomena seem to indicate that he is not sure which he is dealing 
with in relation to psi phenomena. Despite this confusion in his wording I believe 
that he is making a case that psi should be treated as supernatural, although he 
alows that not everyone wil want to accept this view. 
I contend that if one is to advocate supernatural explanation for psi, as 
Wiliams appears to, there must be an additional reason to suggest that psi events 
are to be treated differently to other mundane events that are currently explained as 
natural even if the mechanism is, as yet, irreducible to purely mechanistic 
explanation. Wiliams himself appears to concede this point, but I think that if 
mundane instances of psi are to be ascribed to a supernatural explanation then 
every mundane everyday activity ought to be considered in a similar vein. If this is 
to be the case then Wiliams needs to explain why some events can be readily 
explained and others — like psi — are not. The invocation of a supernatural 
explanation for everything does not realy achieve anything in explanatory terms 
and Wiliams is stil left with the need to account for how it is that psi phenomena 
can be accounted for. 
3.2.3 Dramatic psi 
There are a number of accounts of psi which would not be popularly able to be 
accounted for under the 'psi is mundane and therefore natural' hypothesis. So, in 
order to comprehensively advocate a naturalist interpretation of psi events, I now 
deal with the Supernatural hypothesis as a general hypothesis that dramatic psi 
events are to be ascribed to a divine agent, the denomination of which is not of 
concern here. These are events that would not be able to be handled by the 
argument for a natural explanation on the basis of the normal, everyday nature of 
the phenomena as presented in the section above. 
The types of psi events that I am now referring to are those that have some 
dramatic impact on a person's life. For instaioe saving one's own or a love one's 
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life would seem to count as an act of significance. If one were to believe in a 
supernatural being then it would seem that the rescue or prevention of one's self or 
a loved one from death would be considered a dramatic enough incident to warant 
the atention of a deity (broader theological issues as to what this means for people 
who do not have a deity 'looking over them' are beyond the scope of this thesis). 
In Louisa E. Rhine's book Hidden Channels of the Mind there are some accounts 
of dramatic events that could lead to death that were precognised and consequently 
acted upon which resulted in the saving of a person's life. These events are of 
particular importance to psi research, Rhine says, because they are of religious and 
philosophical significance due to the question they raise about fate (Rhine 1961, p 
198). Earlier I gave an example of a woman who apparently acted upon pertinent 
information in a nightmare and saved her baby from severe injury or possible 
death by a faling chandelier. Here is another example of a potentialy supernatural 
psi event because of its dramatic life-saving consequence: 
During World War! the husband of a woman in California was chief engineer for a 
steamship company. He had been out to sea for about three months one time, when she 
was nbtified to go to Philadelphia to meet him. She left, and as she recals "---on my 
arival.at Philadelphia I caled the company. They notified me he would be at Pier 101 
the next morning at four o'clock. I had a bath and shampooed my hair andAvent to bed 
at about nine-thirty pm. I dreamed that the ship came in, unloaded, and reloaded 
without my knowing and sailed for parts in India; and about thirty hours from India 
what they caled a 'tin fish' hit the ship and sank her, and my husband was the only 
casualty aboard. When I awoke it was three-forty A.M. I tied my head up and had my 
clothes on in five minutes. In the meantime, I had caled the desk clerk to get me a taxi. 
He took me to Pier 1010 and they were finishing tying up. I handed the taxi a ten-dolar 
bil, ordered him to wait, ran by a guard at the gate and up on the ship, hysterical and 
crying, and the guard chasing me. My husband was on deck and I ran into his arms 
saying 'Don't go, don't go, the ship is going down.' 
When I was so very determined that he was to get off, he asked permission to be off. 
The company granted it. The ship sailed and her destination was India. She was 
torpedoed and sank. Al the men aboard were on a raft for sixteen days, floating around 
before they were picked up. 
When my husband went into the office here three weeks later they told him about the 
incident. (Rhine 1961, p200) 
A case of pure coincidence? Divine intervention to save a man's life? Or 
anomalous cognition? Some people ascribe the Supernatural hypothesis to explain 
dramatic case, especialy as the experiencers themselves often describe the 
information obtained as if by a 'message' or 'vision'. These words are akin to 
words that describe religious experiences. If this is so then an argument could be 
made for the Supernatural hypothesis on the basis that the experiences of a 
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supernatural nature and anomalous acquisition of knowledge are due to the 
existence of divine agents or supernatural beings. 
The next section wil outline the argument for deism from religious 
experience as wel as the argument made against this by J.L. Mackie. The same 
criticism wil be applied to the Supernatural hypothesis when derived from 
experiences that seem, to some, as if they had occurred through superanatural 
means. 
It should be noted that arguments for survival based on phenomena derived 
from mediums are not dealt with in this thesis. Although such phenomena is of 
interest as, if valid, it may indicate that there is personality existence after death, a 
discussion of the resulting ontological issues is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
The psi debate, as outlined in the introduction of this thesis, focuses on regular psi 
phenomena and though I intend in the future to make an analysis of the survival 
literature,I am unable to do so now because of the immense literature involved and 
the controversial problems concerned with validating this particular form of 
evidence: 
3.2.4 The argument from religious experience 
In one part of The Miracle of Theism J.L. Mackie examines the argument that 
religious experiences is evidence or proof of the supernatural which, aside from 
theistic doctrines or teachings, is defined generaly as 'something further, the 
reality of some higher but potentialy friendly power' (Mackie 1986, p177). 
The original theistic argument was developed because the problem of evil 
posed an awkward problem for theistic doctrines. Instead, arguments turned to 
religious experience as proof of a higher being. Regardless of faith or doctrine 
(sometimes atheists have been converted after such an experience) the event 
(feeling of union with a divine being, for instance, or communication received 
from what appears to be a divine agent) reveals to the person a higher, divine 
being as the source of the significant experience. It is acknowledged that the 
experience has dramatic effect on the person, for instance, a change from atheism 
to a belief in a God, but there is also an argument that maintains 'it may be held 
that the religious experience, as wel as being valuable in itself, is also evidence, or 
even proof, of the objective truth of some associated beliefs' (Mackie 1986, p177). 
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Religious experiences then are taken to be indicative of proof for the existence of 
the supernatural, with obvious resulting ontological implications. 
A certain category of psi experience can be equated to the religious 
experience. In these cases people experience access to information that ends up 
changing their lives (e.g. from a position of scepticism about psi phenomena they 
become avid believers) or they act on information that they should otherwise not 
have known and save their own, or a loved one's life (such as in the examples 
provided previously). Some people experience the acquisition of anomalous 
information in the form of guidance from a supernatural source or as if a divine 
agent is speaking directly to them in an anomalous fashion. These are the kind of 
psi experiences that would not be covered by the argument regarding the mundane 
nature of psi as waranting a natural explanation. So, the question then is: do some 
psi phenomena warrant a supernatural explanation? 
I argue that they do not for the same reason as the argument for a deity 
from religious experience is also countered. Mackie makes the point that the 
argument for a supernatural agent from religious experienceis problematic 
because 'if the religious experiences do not yield any argument for a further 
supernatural reality, and if.. there is no other good argument for such a 
conclusion, then these experiences include in their content beliefs that are 
probably false and in any case unjustified. This, it seems, must be scored as a 
disvalue against them' (Mackie 1986, p186). The case is made on the basis that an 
analysis of the phenomena involved in various types of religious experience 
reveals that the phenomena do not empiricaly require a supernatural explanation, 
for instance saints who 'hear' God hear voices in their head similar to those of 
people who halucinate. In general 'the undeniably real causal source of these 
impulses may be normaly 'unseen' and not understood or articulately reported; 
but it is eminently understandable, and it belongs wel within the same 
'dimensions of existence' as other, wholy familiar, mental phenomena' (Mackie 
1986, p184). This seems to put paid to the Supernatural hypothesis on the basis of 
religious experience as there is no evidence that cannot be accounted for in regular 
empirical terms, regardless of what the person who experiences the phenomena 
makes of the event. But what of psi? 
The experience of psi does indicate that something occurs that is not 
currently considered possible in the natural workings of things according to 
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science. If psi experiences are legitimate then information can be acquired through 
non-normal means and movement of objects takes places without any known 
cause. Is this suficient to ascribe the Supernatural hypothesis in the more dramatic 
cases? For we are not able, as in the case of the argument from religious 
experience, to maintain that there are already natural mental phenomena that can 
account for the psi experience. 
What can be postulated, however, are normal explanations for the feeling 
that the information has been given by a supernatural agent. For, as in the case of 
the religious experience, normal explanations can account for the description of 
the events as being from a supernatural source. And the question must be raised 
that why should one life be saved over another? If a supernatural agent is 
responsible for saving the life of the baby sleeping under the chandelier, why are 
other babies alowed to die in preventable circumstances? The answer would seem 
to_be because the nature of the psi event is not supernatural in origin but normal, 
even if unexplained, or potentialy mistaken as anomalous. Once again I 
,acknowledge that the scope of this thesis is unable to do justice to the broader 
discussions in theology and philosophy regarding related issues such as the 
problem of evil. I reserve further discussion on this point for the future. 
3.2.5 Experimental psi and the Supernatural hypothesis 
Experimental psi poses some interesting problems in regard to the Supernatural 
hypothesis, namely, because the anomalous nature of the phenomena dictates that 
experimental controls are put in place that discount natural cause for the 
phenomena. The negative definition of ESP and PK as anomalous only when 
regular sensori-motor mechanisms cannot account for the effects, raises questions 
about what is actualy obtained when psi effects are observed. Experimental 
evidence for psi is largely obtained through long-run experiments using normal, 
everyday situations or simple tests. The content itself is not important (nobody's 
life is at stake when a ganzfeld experiment participant makes a stab at guessing the 
target picture). However, as Michael Scriven points out, there are broader 
ontological problems when it comes to the evidence for psi because of its 
anomalous nature. He maintains that although there is 
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no diference in principle between showing that one has discovered a new natural 
phenomenon and showing that one has discovered a supernatural phenomenon, as far as 
the basic experimental design goes. The design is 	can only be—set up so as to 
exclude al existing natural explanations. (Scriven 1976, p185) 
The problem then is if one successfuly runs a psi experiment and obtains an above 
chance result and al protocols have ensured that there is no normal means by 
which this should occur, then what is shown to have occured is something that 
has no natural explanation. Has one then obtained proof of a supernatural 
phenomenon or a natural phenomenon that has, as yet, no natural explanation? 
Both of these instances would dictate that the phenomena be produced through 
non-normal means and if the experiment is successful this is what wil have been 
shown to have occured. The evidence wil be the same. Scriven deals with this 
situation as folows: 
It wil be clear., that the only circumstances under which one might plausibly be said 
to have demonstrated the existence of a supernatural phenomenon are those in which 
one has met the criterion for showing that it is not a natural phenomenon of the types so 
far understood, and also shown that it is so 'different' from those so far understood that 
it appears to be a case of 'another order of existence', and that it involves some agent or 
personality. (Scriven 1976, p185) 
Scriven then contents that because of the anomalous nature of psi, any experiment 
that is designed to show that a psi-effect is taking place wil be showing that 
something is occurring that is currently outside of the materialist framework. If 
this were not the case then it would not be an instance of psi. However, he argues 
that he does not believe that this indicates science should abandon its 
materialist/physicalist approach; nor that supernatural (as in the sense of divine or 
'outside' agents) should be invoked. Instead he maintains that because psi appears 
to involve human agency 'no differences in parapsychology appear greater than 
those in physics, and the mere involvement of human personality hardly persuades 
us that we should abandon materialism or naturalistic explanation' (Scriven 1976, 
p185). 
In another more recent forum Scriven revisited this argument and when 
asked: 'So for something to be truly supernatural, it would have to in principle be 
unexplainable, even in term of the physics of the far-distant future?' He replied: 
That's the problem. It then becomes very difficult to see how you would establish that 
such a thing existed. But there is another way. If in fact it was connected to the 
intervention of a divine being or a family of beings, then that's a conventional part of 
the connotation of supernatural, and so one might wel say that this was a supernatural 
event because it was puled of_by the_conductor_who orchestrates the things that break 
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al the rules. If there was evidence for that, then I would be quite wiling to talk about 
those phenomena as supernatural. (Scriven interview Mishlovel 998, online) 
So for Scriven the natural and supernatural are both logical options but psi, 
because it does not appear to require the intervention of a 'divine being' should be 
considered as a natural, even if unexplained, phenomenon. 
Summary of natural/supernatural discussion 
I have shown that the Supernatural hypothesis runs into problems on two counts, 
firstly because of the mundane and everyday nature of the events that are 
described or elicited through experimental procedure; one would not ascribe 
a supernatural explanation to other everyday phenomena, why do so for psi efects 
just because the mechanism is as yet unexplained?. 
As wel, I have shown that even more dramatic instances of psi cannot 
be ascribed a supernatural explanation. I showed apparent psi experiences that 
are popularly ascribed to supernatural origins, elicit the same response as 
arguments for god on the basis of religious experience. I realise that theologians 
might contest this issue further by countering that belief in God requires faith not 
empirical proof, but further discussion of these more general deist arguments are 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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3.3 Application of the supernatural assessment on the psi 
hypotheses discussion 
The arguments against the Supernatural hypothesis have a two-fold efect on the 
psi hypothesis discussion. Firstly, and most obviously, it means that the 
Supernatural hypothesis no longer forms part of the discussion of the competing 
hypotheses for psi. Secondly, less obviously, the assessment can be used to show 
that the hardcore skepticism regarding psi is unfounded. Hardcore skepticism is 
based on the notion that the acceptance of psi as legitimate necessitates a reversion 
to supernatural explanatory schemes. I examine the hardcore skeptic approach 
to psi in more detail below. 
3.3.1 Hardcore skepticism and the Supernatural hypothesis 
The hardcore Skeptic hypothesis is not a theory as such, hence it does not 
feature in the presentation of psi theory that Was undertaken in the last chapter. 
Instead it is an a priori assessment of paranormal phenomena such as psi on the 
basis that acceptance of the legitimacy of such phenomena is a reversion to ilicit 
superstitious explanatory schemes. It is traditionaly upheld by those who also 
hold views of extreme scientism and active promoters of atheism. Advocates of 
this position are vocal in non-academic mainstream science journals (for instance, 
Michael Shermer, who's views are outlined below, has a:column in Scientific 
America (Shermer 2003) as wel as in the popular press. Although a minority 
(there are not many who would advocate such extreme scientism) they are 
prominent and influential and responsible for promoting their view strongly, 
which then filters through to the mainstream reception of psi phenomena in the 
general interested public as wel as academia. 
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I therefore think that it is pertinent to use the analysis undertaken in 
this chapter to review the hardcore skeptical approach to explanation of psi 
phenomena, as the historic account combined with the arguments against the 
Supernatural hypothesis are relevant to the assessment of psi promoted by the 
hardcore skeptics. 
The hardcore skeptical approach is exemplified by the science 
commentator Michael Shermer, co-founder of the USA Skeptics Society in 1992, 
who explains it as folows: 
.myths, religions, and claims of the paranormal are lures tempting us beyond rational, 
critical, and scientific thinking, for the very reason that they touch something in us that 
is sacred and important—life and immortality. (Shermer 2005, p65) 
According to Shermer, the paranormal and the supernatural are the same type of 
category of explanation for anomalous phenomena such as psi. Furthermore he 
contends the acceptance of the phenomena as legitimate chalenges the rationality 
of science. When the hardcore skeptic account is presented, there appears to be 
some confusion from about psi's status current status as paranormal and what it 
means ontologicaly to ascribe a supernatural explanation for the phenomena. It is 
evident in the folowing assessment of the goals of science: 
Scientism is a scientific worldview that encompasses natural explanations for al 
phenomena, eschews supernatural and paranormal speculations, and embraces 
empiricism and reason as the twin pilars of a philosophy of life appropriate for an Age 
of Science. (Shermer 2002, online) 
For Shermer, psi, whether considered supernatural or paranormal, is something 
that just can't possibly exist. No mater what it looks like fraud or other normal 
explanations must be employed to account for the phenomena. (Shermer 2005, 
p63). The approach is different to the Explanation by Fraud Argument and the 
Modem Miracle Argument. Instead it appears to be founded on notion that if psi is 
accepted as legitimate, then society is in danger of reverting to superstitious 
explanatory schemes. 
James Randi, a magician and professional debunker of the paranormal, is 
another such proponent. Randi is not a scientist, however, he is stil caled upon by 
the mainstream press to comment on the scientific evaluation of psi even though 
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his expertise is in magic and he has no scientific training23. Randi and Shermer are 
both advocates of atheism and sometimes present themselves as defenders of 
'science' and 'rationality' (Shermer 2005, p63). 
The historic account sheds some light on how this confusion regarding 
psi's problematic explanatory status in regard to science has eventuated. I suggest 
that the historic account gives us a hint as to the motivation of this group of radical 
psi commentators. The explanatory history of psi as a supernatural phenomena 
most likely informs the hardcore skeptic set up of the assessment of psi, which is 
to present a false dichotomy: namely, when one is presented with what appears to 
be psi one must choose between reversion to the supernatural explanation for such 
phenomena, or ascribe fraud to account for the phenomena. 
The historic account indicates psi was once determined to be a supernatural 
phenomena and explained as such. In much of the mainstream literature that 
discusses psi there is confusion regarding the difference between psi's current 
status as paranormal and its former status as supernatural. Sometimes the words 
supernatural and paranormal are used interchangeably. I suggest that psi's 
explanatory history might inadvertently inform the hardcore skeptic's apparent 
concern that re-acceptance of psi as produced by any other than fraudulent means 
would entail a reversion to older systems of supernatural belief. 
Even if legitimately anomalous psi, it would appear, is mundane in nature. 
If the evidence can't be explained readily through any of the three Fs (fraud, fluke 
or flaky methodology) then it should be treated as a natural, even if anomalous, 
phenomena. I conclude then that the hardcore skeptic proposes a false dichotomy 
based on a faulty assessment of the explanatory status of psi which does not take 
into account the history of the explanation of the phenomena. 
We do not need to view psi as a chalenge to scientific rationality on the 
basis that acceptance of the phenomena entails supernatural beliefs. Psi certainly 
poses an explanation chalenge to science; it is not readily accounted for by any 
23 For instance when there was a controversy regarding the British physicist Brian Josephson's 
statements regarding the legitimacy of evidence for telepathy, it was Randi who was interviewed 
on BBC radio. James Randi presents his view on telepathy and quantum physics as folows: 
There is no firm evidence for the existence of telepathy, ESP or whatever we wish to cal it, and I think it is the 
refuge of scoundrels in many aspects for them to turn to something like quantum physics, which uses a totaly 
different language from the regular English that we are accustomed to using from day to day, to merely say, oh 
that's where the answer lies, because that's al very fuzzy anyway. No it's not very fuzzy, and I think that his 
[Josephson's] opinion wil be differed with by•th-e-kieitifie-bodyin`ieirefal (MacGregor 2001, online) 
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known scientific theory. The chalenge now is to come to terms with the 
anomalous nature of the phenomena. This can be perceived as less problematic if 
the curent assumptions stemming from the creation of the modern world view are 
reconsidered using knowledge from contemporary philosophy of science. 
This chalenge is one I take up in Part I of the thesis where I further examine the 
three remaining psi hypotheses, the skeptic hypothesis and the two realist psi 
hypotheses, in relation to issues of explanation in the philosophy of science. 
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Part I: Beyond Beliefs 
To make a policy of bewilderment is surely the worst form of defeatism. 
John Belof 
Part I of Beyond Beliefs leaves us in a position to make an assessment of issues 
pertinent to psi theory and explanation. The purpose of the next three chapters is 
to undertake an analysis of the competing three hypotheses in relation to theoretical 
development and explanatory issues in the philosophy of science. 
In Chapter 4, Boundless Sea, I start by examining a recent discussion between 
proponents representative of two of the three competing hypotheses. I show that the 
discussion is undertaken at cross purposes and examine the issues in the context 
of Lary Laudan's research traditions. I use the analysis to show that explanatory 
issues are important to making a comparison between the competing hypotheses. 
I then go on in Chapter 5, Explanation, to focus on the dominant hypothesis 
(skeptic) and make a case that an outdated explanatory theory (the covering law 
model) has influenced the reception of psi in philosophy to this day. I argue that 
a re-analysis of psi in terms of curent explanation theory is in order. 
This re-analysis is undertaken in the last chapter, Terra Firma, where I show 
that the reasons that the covering law theory declined are pertinent to psi because 
of the changes to explanation theory and, most particularly, the status of laws of 
nature within contemporary explanation theories. It is at this stage that I undertaken 
a re-evaluation of how to express the psi explananda without emphasising their 
anomalous nature. I then use this analysis to examine the competing hypotheses in 
relation to curent explanation theories. I conclude that I have prepared some cleared 
ground from which further comparison of the psi hypotheses discussion can take 
place. Consequently the apparently unresolvable psi debate and the problematic 
mainstream philosophical arguments that deal with psi that were outlined at the 
beginning of the thesis in Terra Incognita have been re-appraised and presented 
in a form that is open to further discussion as science, explanation theory and psi 
theory progress. 
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Chapter 4 - Boundless sea 
Data and theory. Evidence and mechanism. These are the twin pilars of sound science. 
Without data and evidence, there is nothing for a theory or mechanism to explain. 
Without a theory and mechanism, data and evidence drift aimlessly on a boundless sea. 
Michael Shermer 
This chapter wil continue to examine the competing hypotheses in relation to 
pertinent issues involved with theory development. I wil first make a case that 
development of psi theory is important. I then analyse a curent example in which 
scientists discuss two representatives of the competing hypotheses (the Skeptic 
hypothesis and a smal natural change hypothesis). It is rare that psi is discussed in 
mainstream science so I use this unique contemporary example to further explore the 
explanatory issues at play when scientists and philosophers discuss psi today. 
The proponents of the competing hypotheses in the radio discussion are shown 
to be representative of opposing positions regrading the use of psi in science. I use 
this to demonstrate how recouching the psi debate as competing hypotheses is 
beneficial to coming to understand how a dialogue about psi can progress. It becomes 
apparent that one hypothesis is driven by data and the other by conservative 
explanatory issues already flagged as problematic in the analysis of the mainstream 
psi arguments. 
I suggest that this indicates the various proponents are approaching the 
phenomena from different research traditions that give different weight to issues of 
data and explanation in science. I use Larry Laudan's work on research traditions to 
put the discussion into perspective and use it constructively to tease out issues that 
require further evaluation. Due to recent developments in explanation theory 
I maintain that a review is in order. This wil be commenced in the next chapter. 
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4.1 The importance of the development of psi theory 
The unresolved tensions that the psi debate has given rise to have created a problem. 
As I mentioned in the introduction, a Catch 22 situation has developed whereby 
mainstream scientists and philosophers criticise psi theory development because no 
single theory has become clearly dominant, however, if this type of theory is ever to 
be developed it wil no doubt require development in conjunction with mainstream 
disciplines such as neuroscience, biology, cognitive science and physics. 
I should note here that some philosophers have tackled the problem of psi 
theory development in the past. For instance in C.W.K. Mundle's thoughtful essay on 
'Strange facts in search of a theory' (Mundle 1972). And, of course, Stephen E. 
Braude deals with various theories in his books on the philosophy of psi (1979, 1986, 
2003). I do not mean to diminish the importance of these inteligent philosophical 
discussions of psi theory. However, despite these contributions to the philosophical 
discussion of the evidence, psi theory development remains problematic. Firstly, there 
are many competing theories with various ontological implications; the formulation of 
one working theory acceptable to the mainstream has remained elusive. Secondly, the 
dominance of the mainstream arguments has very comprehensively rendered the less 
mainstream investigation of psi on the fringe. However, I have shown that the 
mainstream arguments are problematic and, more importantly, that they are based on 
some assumptions that should be brought out into the open. The upshot of the 
situatiOn is that one working theory is unlikely to develop, if it ever does, unless it is 
undertaken in conjunction with mainstream scientific theory development. Given this 
situation, at this stage the discussion between various interpretations of the evidence, 
rather than the promotion of one working theory itself, should be considered progress. 
The philosopher H.H. Price also made a similar case in 1940. He appealed for 
wider discussion of psi in philosophy and the sciences and that as scientific 
investigation of psi was fledging area of inquiry. He wrote that: 
it was a mistake to lay down a hard-and-fast distinction between a scientific investigation of the 
facts and philosophical reflection about them (or, if you like, about the terminology in which 
they are formulated). At the later stages the distinction is right and proper. But if it is drawn too 
soon and too rigorously those later stages wil never be reached. (Price 1940, p109) 
In the next chapter I outline why it might be that philosophical interest in psi 
diminished subsequent to H.H. Price's appeal in 1940. I argue that it is most likely 
due, in part, to the publication of Hempel and Oppenheim's seminal paper on 
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covering law theory in 1948 and the subsequent dominance of the covering law 
theory. But briefly, here I note that I think that because the fraud hypothesis has 
dominated the philosophical discussion of psi in contemporary philosophical analysis, 
the type of speculation that Price caled for in 1940 never substantiated. This thesis is 
an atempt to further productive discussion of the competing hypotheses. I commence 
in the section below by analysing an example of contemporary debate. 
4.2 Example of contemporary discussion about psi 
In this section I use an example of contemporary discussion about psi to highlight the 
issues involved when current scientific discussion occurs between proponents of 
competing hypotheses. This serves to develop an understanding of how best to 
proceed in developing psi theory for al hypotheses. The comparison is used to tease 
out the various theoretical and explanatory issues involved. I show how sometimes 
professionals who undertake discussion of psi theory compare competing hypotheses 
at cross purposes because diferent values of explanatory worth underlie their 
assessment of the phenomena. It is argued that these should be brought to the fore and 
this initiates further discussion of psi in relation to explanation theory. First I present 
the details of the radio discussion. 
4.2.1 The radio discussion in context 
A recent radio show on Radio National (ABC24) featured a discussion between a 
psychologist, a cognitive scientist and a philosopher. The topic was the use of psi in 
developing cognitive theory. To put this into context I wil first make some comments 
about why this radio show caught my atention and I defend the use of it in this thesis. 
First of al it is unique to have curent mainstream scientists engaging in psi 
theory development. It is even rarer to have a discussion between proponents of 
competing hypotheses. This is because, curently, the development of psi theory is 
caried out mainly in the parapsychology literature or psi-oriented literature (such as 
the work of Dean Radin or Dick Bierman) which is not widely accessed by 
24 In Australia, the ABC stands for the Australian Broadcasting Commission and it is the government-
funded national broadcaster. It has a national television station, a national radio station as wel as a 
youth station and numerous local stations that draw on the national service as wel. 
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mainstream scientists and philosophers. There is a handful of mainstream 
philosophers and other academics who contribute to the discussion on a philosophical 
level. I have mentioned before that Stephen E. Braude is the most prolific of these in 
philosophy having published now three substantial works on philosophy and psi as 
wel as numerous articles. But his work is rare in the philosophy arena. It is 
interesting to note that many of the journal articles he has writen on psi have been 
published in psi-oriented parapsychology journals whereas mainstream journals carry 
his articles on less controversial topics such as self identity. This is not meant as a 
criticism, but rather a comment on the fact that even an expert on philosophy and psi 
is presumably unable to combine the two research interests in the mainstream forums 
for publication. 
Secondly, I have mentioned before that psi is almost invisible in philosophy. 
My analysis of research into psi indicates that psi is most often published in forums 
dedicated solely to that activity in, for instance, parapsychology journals or books 
solely dedicated to the topic of psi. In 2002 I surveyed philosophy texts in a major 
university's book store and revealed that only one text had an indexed reference to psi 
and the comment regarding psi in the text was quite derogatory. Though the radio 
show discussion lacks a certain rigour because of the medium, I justify its use because 
it is unusual to find a realist psi theorists and the mainstream in conversation. 
Furthermore, the radio discussion I draw on exemplifies two of the hypotheses with 
regard to current issues in science which can then be used as a relevant case to study 
the pertinent issues raised in philosophy of science. I therefore proceed to by outlining 
the discussion before I reword the content into representative stances, relevant to this 
thesis, so that further discussion can folow. 
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4.2.2 The setting 
The radio discussion is taken from a transcript of an ABC program which airs weekly 
caled 'Al in the Mind' In this particular week it aired a show caled The Paranormal 
and Quantum Theory - Beyond the realms of scientific respectability? (Browning 
2005, online). Julie Browning is the host of the show which was produced by 
Gretchen Miler. The participants in the interview for that program were: 
Dr Peter Slezak — philosopher 
School of History and Philosophy of Science, UNSW, Sydney, Australia 
Dr Diane Powel — psychiatrist 
Cambridge Hospital (formerly) - currently director 
of the John E. Mack Institute 
Dr Ken Hennacy — cognitive scientist 
Computer Science Department, University of Maryland, USA 
The main content involved a discussion between Dr Powel and Dr Slezak regarding 
the use of psi in constructing theory. Their two views are representative of the 
problems that are encountered when comparing competing hypotheses for psi and wil 
provide a basis for further examination of psi theory in this chapter. The discussion 
commenced as folows: 
Today we explore speculation that quantum physics may account for some of these unusual 
phenomena of the mind. And I have to give a warning - that the folowing ideas most regard as 
way off the wal, beyond the boundaries of respectable science, and we'l come to that later. But 
at a recent international conference on the science of consciousness psychiatrist Dr Diane 
Powel and computer scientist Dr Ken Hennacy from the University of Maryland argued the 
case for the paranormal and quantum mechanics. , 
The introduction acknowledges that the topic mater25 is considered 'off the wal' and 
'beyond the boundaries of respectable science' which voices a common perception 
about the study of psi. They use the word paranormal, but the content of the 
subsequent program indicates that they are refering to anomalous communication. 
The program becomes more relevant to the psi hypotheses discussion once the 
conversation between the psychologist and the philosopher starts to deal with the 
potential use of psi in current speculation about models of the mind. 
25 The radio show does not use the word 'psi' but their example and the discussion are clearly about 
this aspect of the paranormal rather than the broader category of such phenomena which usualy 
includes ghosts or UFOs. So the ensuing discussion wil use the word 'psi' in place of their 
'paranormal'. 
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4.2.3 The psychologist and the cognitive scientist 
The psychologist, Dr Diane Powel, commences the discussion by outlining how she 
became interested in using psi to develop cognitive theory. She relates how her 
interest in the phenomena was instigated because on two occasions, when apparent psi 
phenomena were exhibited in her presence. Folowing these experiences she says she 
felt that 'they were so compeling and I, being a scientist, believed that you need to be 
open minded to changing your paradigm or your theory if you have data that just wil 
not fit in it' (interviewed in Browning 2005, online). Consequently, in colaboration 
with cognitive scientist Dr Ken Hennacy they have developed a new model of how 
the mind functions. In a paper which outlines her new theory she explicates: 
I've been colaborating with Ken Hennacy, a physicist with expertise on quantum mechanics 
and artificial inteligence, to create a new model for understanding savant abilities. Our model 
suggests that there are two modes of processing information within the human brain. The 
processing we are consciously aware of is what we cal "classical." It is slow, linear, and 
capable of handling only a limited amount of information. It solves problems by using abstract 
concepts, relies upon neural network connectivity and occurs in the neocortex. "Quantum" . 
processing, by comparison, is extremely rapid, paralel, and capable of handling exponentialy 
more information than classical processing, but it usualy operates outside of conscious 
awareness. It takes place in al brain regions and becomes more evident when classical 
processing is turned down or off. (Powel 2005, p17) 
Powel has developed her theory to explain the ability of savants to perform mental 
feats that are beyond the capability of the average person. The memory feats include 
the ability to calculate complex equations quickly or ability to play complex music by 
ear. Powel also believes that the model might be applicable to psi. It is a theory that 
adds the quantum level of processing into a regular brain mode1.26 
The radio show contrasts Powel's model to the more widely accepted model 
for mind which maintains that 'the mind is like an algorithmic computer and the 
brain's vast neural network is the key to the mind's complexity' (interviewed in 
Browning 2005, online). I am unsure whether this statement refers to a connectionist 
or computational theory of mind or whether it is referencing both modes, but I take it 
26 I note here that even without psi, this it is a controversial step in itself, given the explanatory gap that 
must be negotiated to explain how the micro and macro levels of the model interact. However, this is 
not unique to psi theory. It has already been mentioned that mainstream mind theories contain just 
such assertions, such as the theories of Roger Penrose which I mentioned earlier. The theories are 
problematic because they require some answer as to how to explain the micro/macro interaction 
between the micro quantum level and the macro level. I address this issue in relation to contemporary 
explanation theory further in Chapter 6. 
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that that they are referring to some kind of dominant mainstream mind theory that 
advocates a physicalist account of mind where mind is equated to brain states. 
The radio show host points out that Dr Powel risks her reputation by 
including psi in her theory development. The host then asks that given this is a 
controversial manoeuvre, why is it that she takes the contentious step of including 
both psi and quantum theory in her proposed on mind models? Telingly Dr Powel 
answers: 
.. because I realy think that even though it is very, there are going to be a lot of sceptics, it's 
very controversial, I think that it's necessary to put it out there to stretch people, to get them to 
start thinking about some of these things that for a long time people have realy been puzzled by 
and are not explained by the current model. And so the way that science evolves is by proposing 
new models that explain the data that's out there and then generating hypotheses and testing, 
testing the model and then refining it and moving forward. 
(interviewed in Browning 2005, online) 
Her defence of the use of psi is very pertinent to theory development and 
competition in philosophy of science. These wil be examined in much more detail 
shortly. But first a brief summary of the opposing point of view taken from the same 
program. 
4.2.4 The philosopher 
A philosopher from the University of New South Wales, Dr Peter Slezak, was asked 
onto the show in order to respond to the new model of mind which Dr Diane Powel 
and Dr Ken Hermacy were developing. His first point was about the mention of 
paranormal (psi) phenomena that the theory postulates as part of its explanatory 
scope. He comments: 
If one is going to introduce the whole idea that there are paranormal phenomena the first thing 
that has to be said is that there's not the slightest empirical grounds to believe that such 
phenomena exist. So before one resorts to explanations that invoke paranormal abilities one 
would have to have some grounds for believing that there's evidence that warrants these claims. 
Further to this he does not think that there is any need to introduce another level of 
process into the model of mind. Slezak says: 
The area of quantum physics as an explanation of either the abilities of savants or other forms of 
consciousness is, I think, fair to say, speculative but it's again on the wild fringe end of 
speculation in this area. The question that has to be asked is whether the existing understanding 
of conventional physics and in fact, just the understanding of the brain and its neural networks is 
adequate to explain these behaviours. And there's not the slightest reason to think that current 
models are inadequate. 
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He then goes on to make a comment regarding the introduction of quantum physics 
into the model of mind and questions the reasons why this is necessary: 
There's lots of things we don't understand but it doesn't mean that you invoke immediately 
some, what I have to say is, sort of a wild level of explanation that goes wel beyond what is 
currently within the existing framework. 
Dr Peter Slezak makes it clear that although the problem of consciousness is very 
much discussed (What is there to explain? Wil science ever be able to explain it?) in 
the philosophy of mind, he believes that science wil eventualy understand the brain 
in the same way that it understands the functions of other parts of the body. His 
statement does not take into account that there are dualists who might disagree with 
such an assertion, but given that in Australia materialism is the dominant tradition he 
is voicing an opinion that would be upheld by many, if not al, Australian 
philosophers of mind. Dr Slezak concludes by saying that the main diference 
between his point of view and that of Dr Ken Hennacy and Dr Diane Powel: 
is whether one has to resort to what I think one would say are extreme alternatives, as opposed 
to working within the framework of our curent understanding, which appears to be adequate 
and which we are racking our brains to kind of solve these problems. 
Dr Slezak's position is therefore at odds with Dr Powel's. At the point at which the 
radio show ends the discussion, they are in a situation whereby the just have to agree 
to disagree. The situation is similar to the psi debate which I outlined in the 
introduction to this thesis. One cannot expect much more from a radio discussion on 
the subject, however, I wil use this example to clarify some of the issues that inform 
the discussion. The points of views expressed on the show between these disparate 
views are very teling. I outline the main positions represented below. 
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4.2.5 Discussion of competing hypotheses 
The example of how a scientist and a mainstream philosopher respectively assess psi 
theory in a mainstream medium wil be used to explore relevant issues of theory 
development in philosophy of science and hence provide a beter understanding of the 
issues involved in comparing the competing hypotheses. The arguments for each side 
advocated in the discussion deal with theories, anomalies, problem-solving, and 
evidence. They are therefore pertinent to issues in the philosophy of science, and I 
wil show how they can elucidate the issues regarding the psi hypotheses discussion. 
The respective views of each of the contributors on the radio show wil now 
be honed down to two representative stances. I cal them the pro-psi and anti-psi 
stances. Dr Slezak is representative of the anti-psi approach and Dr Powel and Dr 
Hennacy of the Pro-psi approach. Here they are in point form: 
Pro-psi 
• Apparent psi phenomena (ESP) require an explanation 
• It is also apparent that the phenomena are anomalous 
• The evidence for psi is apparently legitimate and science should try to explain 
the data 
• A new model of mind has been developed to explain another unsolved (but not 
anomalous) phenomena (skils of autistic savants) 
• Psi mechanisms can possibly be explained by this new model of the mind 
(which introduces QM) 
CONSEQUENCE The data for psi require an explanation. The new theory 
proposes a radical new model of mind functioning (because it 
involves adding another level of operation) which, if corect, 
potentialy explains how psi might work. 
The pro-psi approach is representative of the reductive realist approach to explaining 
psi phenomena. This is because it advocates a theory that accounts for psi as an 
anomalous phenomena which requires explanation. It does this by introducing a new 
model of mind, which though controversial, does not add any new ontological 
category to the connectionist model. In terms of progress of theory development in _ 	 _ 
science the pro-psi account considers the generation of the more problematic, radical 
'theory worthwhile because it has greater explanatory capacity. According to this 
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view, theory-generation is considered more important than maintaining a conservative 
approach and it is based on the perceived need to explain psi data. 
Anti-psi (AP) 
• Evidence for psi is weak or nonexistent therefore it most likely does not 
require an explanation 
• The current (connectionist/computational) mind models are adequate and 
the best working models so far, even if there are some phenomena as yet 
unresolved (e.g. savants). 
• The evidence for psi does not warrant reconsideration of the current model. 
CONSEQUENCE The current theory remains unchanged with the anticipation 
that it is capable of solving any currently unsolved problems. 
(though there is disagreement about what problems require 
a solution) 
Slezak states clearly that 'there's not the slightest empirical grounds to believe that 
such phenomena (anomalous communication) exist' (ABC radio 2005, online). I 
suggest therefore he Is a representative of the anti-psi approach and a proponent of the 
eliminativist view that there is therefore no phenomena that require explanation. In 
earlier chapters I have shown that the debate over the body of evidence for psi is 
complex and involves beliefs about the phenomena based on explanatory 
considerations. More specifically to make the statement along the lines of 'there is no 
evidence for psi' is to either display ignorance about the state of play of the evidence 
or (more likely) to be making an assessment of the phenomena based on the 
mainstream arguments for psi which I have shown to be problematic. So the anti-psi 
proponent who states that 'there is no evidence for psi' is really making a claim 
regarding conservative explanation and theory development. 
Slezak's own statements appear to support this analysis as he sees the main 
difference between himself and Hennacy and Powel as making a differentiation 
between 'whether one has to resort to what I think one would say are extreme 
alternatives, as opposed to working within the framework of our current 
understanding which appears to be adequate and which we are racking our brains to 
_ 
kind of solve these problems' (interviewed in Browning 2005, online). 
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In summary, the anti-psi approach denies there is a problem to solve in regard 
to explaining psi and consciousness and advocates the adequacy of current models to 
eventualy explain current unknowns such as the behaviour of savants. On the other 
hand the pro-psi proponents believe that there are phenomena that require explanation 
(psi, abilities of savants) and that these phenomena can be accounted for by 
developing a new, more complex, scientificaly problematic, more radical model of 
mind functioning with the hope that the roughness of the new theory wil be smoothed 
in time. 
The example taken from the Al in the Mind radio program exemplifies the 
explanatory trade-off that is required for each option to be maintained. In the analysis 
of the main psi arguments in Chapter 1, I mentioned that there was no way to 
determine which of the two alternatives (copied below) would eventualy be shown to 
be the most reasonable when, as is the case with psi, a body of evidence for a 
phenomenon is anomalous. 
En - psi cannot be explained currently as a natural phenomenon therefore the 
fraud hypothesis is the most rational 
over 
Eq,- psi does not fit into current scientific theory, but, given the apparent 
evidence, some kind of explanation is required regardless of the ontological 
outcome 
The radio discussion presents a case where we see discussion about psi between 
proponents who are representative of both the En and El, approaches. The anti-psi 
proponents maintain a conservative, more Simple approach at the expense of 
explanatory scope (En), versus the pro-psi proponent's more radical and more 
complex theory, but one which has greater explanatory power (E,p). However, these 
two stances wil remain at loggerheads unless the discussion can be ameliorated. In 
the broader picture these are different approaches to theory development in science 
that are relevant to explanation theories in philosophy of science which wil be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter6. For the time being in this chapter I wil continue 
to examine the competing hypotheses and focus on issues pertaining to theory 
development in science. 
I suggest that the most important question now to consider is: when should 
conservative explanatory concerns give way to the development of new, even if 
radical, theory? The pro-psi approach maintains that the data that indicate psi effects 
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means that a theory should be developed to explain them and they have started to 
formulate some ideas that involve quantum mechanics to explain psi which they have 
developed to explain another unsolved problem in cognitive science. Their approach 
is considered radical according to contemporary mind theory, and is even more 
radical because it is used to explain psi phenomena. 
On the other hand the anti-psi approach maintains that curent theory is 
adequate to the task at hand and wil eventualy be used to explain the unsolved 
problems such as the ability of savants to calculate quickly and they question the 
addition of psi as a phenomenon that requires explanation because the evidence is 
believed to be unsubstantiated. 
I therefore suggest that the pro and anti psi stances represented on the radio 
show, are beter understood if it is shown that the discussion confuses two important 
issues. The pro-psi approach is data-driven whereas the anti-psi approach is theory-
driven. Both.of these issues are important to explanatory considerations. I wil explain 
this further in the next section when I use the work of Larry Laudan to clarify this 
point. 
4.3 Research traditions 
This chapter wil continue to explore the anti-psi and pro-psi stances using relevant 
areas in philosophy of science. In particular it wil look at Laudan's analysis of 
research traditions to provide an avenue to understand how the competing hypotheses 
can be understood with this broader context in mind. Laudan's work is pertinent 
because, as I started to indicate in the section above, the two camps can be seen to 
represent different conflicting approaches to the body of evidence for psi. Laudan's 
theories on research traditions give a framework to try to understand some of the 
issues that inform the discussion. First I wil outline Laudan's notion of research 
traditions and then apply it to the discussion. I wil also draw on the analyses of psi 
undertaken previously in Part I of this thesis (especialy the historic account) and tie 
any relevant issues into the discussion of research traditions in this chapter. 
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4.3.1 Research traditions and the radio discussion 
I note at the outset briefly that Laudan himself appraised ESP phenomena 
as folows: 
Most scientists today would claim to be unsure that there is any evidence of ESP which is in 
need of theoretical explanation. The so-caled "pseudo-sciences" (as wel as newly emerging 
sciences) generaly flourish on just such cases, where it is unclear whether there is, at the outset, 
any problem which needs to be solved. (Laudan 1977, p33) 
I hope that I have shown in the earlier chapters of the thesis that there is a 
problem. The outline of the radio discussion further gives weight to the problem when 
competing hypotheses are compared. I think that they are representative of different 
research traditions and wil use Laudan's work on such to further understand the 
issues involved. 
Laudan's notion of research traditions was developed because of criticisms of 
both Kulm's idea of paradigm change and Lakatos's postulation of research programs. 
Laudan defines a research tradition as folows: 
A:research tradition provides a set of guidelines of the development of specific theories. 
Part of those guidelines constitute an ontology which specifies, in a general way, the types 
of fundamental entities which exist in the domain or domains within which the research 
tradition is embedded. (Laudan 1977, p'79) 
Further to this: 
The function of specific theories within the research tradition is to explain al the empirical 
problems in the domain by 'reducing' them to the ontology of the research tradition. 
(Laudan 1977, p79) 
He gives the example: 
If the research tradition is behaviourism, for instance, it tels us that the only legitimate entities 
which behavioristic theories can postulate are directly and publicly observable physical and 
physiological signs. (Laudan 1977, p79) 
According to Laudan then, research traditions dictate what is acceptable science at 
any one time. They are a way of understanding that science is informed by current 
beliefs, history and general consensus regarding what is appropriate in terms of 
methodology and (importantly for psi) content. They are 'a set of ontological and 
methodological "do's" and "don't's" (Laudan 1977, p80). This can change over time 
as has been witnessed by major developments in science over the years. The usual 
examples are the over throw of Aristotelian physics by Newton's physics and then 
later, the changes to scientific theory after Einstein's relativity theories gained favour. 
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A dominant research tradition is considered: 
A set of general assumptions about the entities and processes in a domain of study, and about 
the appropriate methods to be used for investigating the problems and constructing the theories 
in that domain.' (Laudan 1977, p81) 
I wil now apply the notion of a research tradition to psi. The study of psi uses the 
accepted methods of investigation that are required by the current dominant research 
tradition. However, the actual subject of the study is what is open to question in this 
regard. The curent dominant research tradition declare psi to be paranormal (as 
shown in Chapter 3). This is where the historic account comes in and helps to put the 
competing psi proponents into perspective. For Laudan also advocates that: 
Because these larger systems (which I have caled "research traditions") function at any given 
time as the efective units of acceptance (or rejection), it folows that the intelectual historian—
in so far as he wants to explain the evolving vicissitudes of belief—must take such traditions as 
his fundamental units for historical analysis. (Laudan 1977, p182) 
Once the historic account is brought to bear on the example of the discussion between 
the anti-psi and pro-psi stances, the issues become clearer. Remember that the historic 
account made a case that psi is currently considered paranormal because of its 
explanatory history as a supernatural phenomena at the time the modern world view 
was formed. Thus, the limits of science which were roughly sketched in those times 
impact on its status according to current day science. Despite the changing status of 
the explanatory category of the phenomena and the consequent assessment of psi as 
anomalous to curent science, the data that requires explanation has persisted. 
There has been a continued build up of evidence for psi. Evidenced, for 
example, by the continuing colation of anecdotal evidence as wel as the increasing 
experimental evidence. There must be a point at which the apparent need to account 
for the evidence wil convince some that conservative explanatory considerations 
must eventualy be put to one side. I think that the discussion on the radio station 
indicates that we are seeing such a change now. 
Anti-psi proponents, who represent the dominant research tradition, maintain 
that the current framework works too wel to be upset by the introduction of 
phenomena that appear to be unexplainable within the framework. Pro-psi proponents 
consider the reverse and maintain greater explanatory scope is required in order to 
encompass the data that the current framework provides even if it is anomalous to that 
framework. One is a conservative theory-driven approach (anti-psi) which puts its 
hopes on curent theory to eventualy resolve the problems the data have given rise to. 
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The other (pro-psi) is data driven and regards the anomalous data associated with the 
body of evidence as being substantial enough to warrant a more radical development 
in mind-theory. 
Therefore the discussion on the radio was caried out at cross purposes and 
was not, in fact, a discussion of similar concerns regarding mind models and psi 
phenomena, but instead the presentation of two conflicting points of view regarding 
explanation. They wil remain unreconciled until it is realised that they represent these 
two different approaches representative of the dominant mainstream research tradition 
and a minor data-driven research tradition. Each stance (pro-psi and anti-psi) is 
equaly worth investigating at a meta-level which compares them with these issues 
upfront. An analysis of the approaches as competing research traditions helps to tease 
out the explanatory issues that inform the discussion. So I now turn to Laudan's work 
on comparing research traditions to further tease relevant issues in the psi hypotheses 
discussion. 
4.3.2 Comparing research traditions 
According to Laudan 'a successful research tradition is one which leads, via 
its component theories, to the adequate solution of an increasing range of empirical 
and conceptual problems.' (Laudan 1977, p82) It is important to note that he also 
believes that a successful research tradition is not necessarily more or less correct in 
its assessment of the world than an unsuccessful one. In fact a strong research 
tradition may be ontologicaly or methodologicaly flawed in comparison to 
competing traditions but may remain dominant for other reasons. So the anti-psi 
research tradition, which represents the mainstream take on psi phenomena, has 
remained strong, despite the empirical disadvantage that it cannot explain certain 
apparent anomalous events (psi) and so has no alternative to rejecting the mass of 
evidence that I outline in Chapter 2 as having been produced by fraud, self-delusion, 
flaky methodology or flukes of coincidence. It could be considered flawed in this 
regard (because of the amount of fraud etc. that must be postulated in order to explain 
the evidence in such a fashion), but according to Laudan this wouldn't necessarily 
diminish its status as the dominant research tradition. What his analysis helps us to do 
is understand that such traditions can remain dominant despite such problems. 
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Trevor Pinch is a sociologist of science with an interest in 'fringe science'; he 
makes a pertinent point about the fraud hypothesis in his paper 'Normal explanation 
of the paranormal: the demarcation problem and fraud in parapsychology.' He 
questions 'what makes the 'fraud' hypothesis a beter scientific explanation for the 
results of the parapsychologists than the 'paranormal' hypothesis?' (Pinch 1979, 
p330). During the course of answering this question he makes a case that 'the fraud 
hypothesis can be rejected as unscientific for the same sorts of reasons that have been 
used to reject parapsychology' (Pinch 1979, 334-335). He does this on the basis that 
the fraud hypothesis is not generalisable (that is, showing one instance in which a 
fraudulent activity has produced an apparent psi effect does not mean that this is the 
case for al psi effects) nor is it falsifiable. Finaly he suggests that it is theoreticaly 
inadequate, that is, there is no successful theory that explains why so many people 
would engage in fraudulent activity. His answer as to why, what he cals the fraud 
hypothesis, is dominant despite these problems is: 
The 'normal' hypothesis is, almost by definition, more central than the paranormal hypothesis: 
hence the weight of the demarcation process has been directed towards denying scientific status 
to the claims of the parapsychologists. (Pinch 1979, p343) 
His analysis gives weight to my notion that the pro and anti-psi stances are 
representative of different research traditions, one more radical than the other (pro-
psi) because of how far it varies from the central tenets of contemporary science. As a 
social constructivist Pinch maintains that he is 'pessimistic about the possibility of 
establishing independent standards of rationality' (Pinch 1979, p344) leaving the 
question about determining which hypothesis is the most reasonable unanswered. 
Though I find his analysis of the fraud hypothesis relevant, I think otherwise. I 
suggest that teasing out the explanatory considerations and showing what beliefs 
about theory development and data inform each hypothesis„ alows us to at least 
understand how to go about making a comparison of the hypotheses. 
I wil therefore turn back now back to Laudan's work which outlines a similar 
scenario in which 'if a theory is closely linked to an unsuccessful research tradition 
then — whatever the problem solving merits of that particular theory — it is likely to be 
regarded as highly suspect' (Laudan 1977, p83). This appears to be what is occurring 
in the discussion between the pro-psi and anti-psi proponents. It is borne out by the 
reception that the pro-psi stance was given in the radio discussion by the upholder of 
the status quo anti-psi proponent. More specificaly the pro-psi theory was considered 
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suspect because it was speculative and involved data from a questionable area of 
scientific research according to the anti-psi (mainstream) proponent's hypothesis 
which maintained that it was more reasonable and was based on the need to maintain 
the dominant mind theory at the expense of representing a conservative approach to 
theory development. 
The question now remains: if we are not to accept the status quo, how does an 
independent analysis of the two positions come to a conclusion regarding the most 
appropriate approach to developing psi theory? I don't think that at this stage we can 
determine resolutely whether we go with the more.radical, less accepted pro-psi 
approach or the conservative theory-driven anti-psi stance. I suggest what we can now 
see is that different issues guide the development of each theory and the hypotheses 
are not wel-matched for comparison; one is data-driven, the other theory-driven. 
4.3.3 Summary of radio discussion 
I have used an analysis of a radio program regarding.psi to show that discussion in 
science and philosophy between representatives of the competing hypotheses is 
complex, and involves comparison of different research traditions. It is not a mere 
mater of epistemologicaly evaluation the body of evidence. Even with the historic 
account taken into consideration it is not normatively clear which of the anti-psi or 
pro-psi advocates is the most reasonable path to folow. What is clear is that the 
discussion of the conipetirig psi hypotheses require further analysis which takes into 
account various stances regarding how science explains anomalies. I therefore take up 
the task of assessing psi in relation to explanation theory in philosophy of science in 
the next two chapters. 
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Chapter 5: Explanation 
It is beter to be atacked than it/s to be ignored. 
J.B. Rhine 
In Chapter 4 the theoretical and explanatory issues of the psi debate were teased out 
and it was concluded that a re-evaluation of the hypotheses in terms of explanation 
theory is warranted. In this chapter I continue to explore the discussion of the psi 
hypotheses with particular focus on the Skeptic hypothesis and explanation theory in 
science. I think it is pertinent to understand what has informed the dominant 
hypothesis in order to gain perspective on explanatory issues involved when 
comparing the competing hypotheses. 
To commence, I tie together points made earlier in the thesis regarding the 
currently dominant mainstream assessment of psi, and re-iterate the importance of 
explanatory considerations to understanding the background issues that inform the 
Skeptic hypothesis. I then outline the main tenets of the covering law explanation 
model before explaining why the covering law theory is problematic for psi. I go on 
to show that the covering law model of explanation was dominant shortly after the 
experimental data from the early laboratory-based psi research was first brought to 
wider mainstream public and academic atention. It is suggested that the ,Skeptic 
hypothesis assessment of psi was influenced by the covering law theory, which was 
the 'received view' in the philosophy of science until the early 1970s. I show that 
despite a brief flurry of renewed interest in psi after this time, the assessment made 
when the covering law theory was the dominant model stil prevails today. Finaly, it 
is concluded that because the covering law theory is no longer dominant, but appears 
to have influenced assessment of psi, it is pertinent to review psi in the context of 
contemporary explanation theory. I use the work of C.D. Broad on mind-theory and 
causation as a philosophical precedent to support the case for reassessment. 
A re-analysis of psi and explanation theory is then undertaken in the next chapter. 
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5.1 The Skeptic hypothesis 
As I have shown in discussions during the course of the thesis, the Skeptic hypothesis 
maintains that psi phenomena are most reasonably explained by normal means. 
Fraud, self-delusion, coincidence or flaky experimental methodology are thought 
suficient to account for psi phenomena. I have already indicated that the Skeptic 
hypothesis is informed by certain explanatory assumptions. If the hypothesis is to be a 
genuine atempt to explain psi then the assumptions should be made explicit. In this 
section I briefly summarise these points in order to tie together previous points that 
are pertinent to furthering the discussion. 
In Chapter 11 flagged that conservative explanatory considerations were 
responsible for the assessment that fraud was the most rational explanation for the 
body of evidence for psi. I also showed that some proponents make a case that as the 
phenomena exhibited are so counter to what is expected according to curent science, 
they are most reasonably accounted for by fraud or self-delusion, despite apparent 
evidence for psi efects. The intricacies of the relationship between anomalous 
phenomena and explanation wil become more prominent in this chapter and the next. 
In Chapter 3 I presented the historic account which showed that psi's 
problematic position as paranormal had roots in the way the supernatural/natural 
divide developed at the time the modern world view was formed. The historic 
explanatory situation has impacted on the curent assessment of psi because the 
theories that were developed to explain psi under the supernatural scheme had 
become defunct and unable to cross over into current mainstream theory 
development. I flagged that the psi hypotheses discussion should be understood with 
the history of pertinent issues of explanation in mind. 
Finaly, in the last chapter I concluded that explanatory issues inform different 
research traditions. Such competing approaches to psi produce conflicting 
assessments of the data and take diferent strategies regarding the potential to use psi 
in developing scientific theory. In particular, I showed that proponents against the use 
of psi in new theories made their case on the basis that it was unnecessary to 
introduce such 'wildly speculative' theories, even if those theories appear to have 
more coverage. In essence, the discussion highlighted the fact that different values 
were placed on explanatory considerations. More explicitly, the status quo that 
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maintains the Skeptic hypothesis was shown to be driven by conservative explanatory 
considerations and the proponents for the use of psi in current theories were driven by 
the apparent data for psi, which they claim requires scientific explanation. The 
scientists who do undertake psi theory development, who are in a minority, also 
usualy claim that psi cannot be explained successfuly unless new theory is 
developed. 
Two main themes have become clear during the analysis of the dominant 
Skeptic hypothesis over the course of this thesis. I have argued that there are two 
main concerns that inform the assessment of the body of evidence for psi in 
mainstream philosophy, namely they are: 
1) Conservative explanatory considerations 
2) Assumptions about the anomalous and unlawful nature of psi phenomena. 
In contrast proponents of the Smal and Big Change Natural hypotheses are informed 
by the need to explain apparent evidence for psi regardless of the consequences, even 
if new theory is required. 
In this chapter I am concerned with making a case that the explanatory issues 
that I have shown inform the current discussion require reassessment. I commence by 
showing that the Skeptic hypothesis was formed at a time when the covering law 
explanation model was dominant. Furthermore I maintain that the rejection of psi 
theories, on the basis that they cannot be explained adequately, was informed by the 
strictures of the covering law theory, which required a general law as put of the 
scientific explanatory scheme. The covering law theory is no longer the received view 
in contemporary scientific explanation theory, which provides a case to make a re-
evaluation of the body of evidence for psi. The ensuing discussion wil substantiate 
this claim by first outlining the main tenets of the covering law theory and then 
analysing the mainstream assessment of psi prior to and shortly after the point in time 
when the covering law theory emerged as the received view of scientific explanation. 
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5.2 The covering law model 
This section lays the foundations for the subsequent discussion of psi in relation to 
contemporary explanation theory. I focus here on the covering law model of 
explanation and discuss it in relation to anomalous phenomena. The covering law 
model of explanation was developed in philosophy of science in the middle of the last 
century and was dominant, even if stil debated, for three decades afterwards (Salmon 
1990, pp8-10). 'Studies in the logic of explanation' writen jointly by Carl Hempel 
and Paul Oppenheim in 1948 is most often referenced as the article which first 
brought the covering law theory to wide atention.27 
I chose to focus on the deductive nomological (DN) explanation model 
because the publication of Hempel and Oppenheim's 1948 version of the theory is 
considered an 'epoch-making' moment in explanation theory in the sciences (Salmon 
1990, p3) and therefore contains the sort of import that I require when I go on to use 
the analysis of psi and covering law explanation theory to suggest that the model has 
informed the currently dominant Skeptic hypothesis.28 
The section starts with an outline of the main tenets of the covering law model 
as expounded in Hempel and Oppenheim's seminal paper. I draw on both the 1948 
article and 1965 book Aspects of Scientific Explanation by Hempel to outline the main 
tenets of the covering law model when earlier points made in the 1948 are presented 
in a clearer fashion. 
The 1948 paper contains a discussion of vitalism and how the covering law 
model deals with explanations which contain no general law such as those postulated 
to explain vitalism. I show that the situation is similar for psi as there are no known 
laws that can be appealed to that explain the phenomena exhibited as psi efects. I use 
the comparison to show how such problems are dealt with under the covering law 
model. I conclude that under the covering law model such lawless explanations are 
2" The publication of Hempel and Oppenheim's paper in 1948 is considered the seminal presentation of 
the covering law theory, however, prior to this publication Hempel had published versions of the 
theory which are drawn on in the 1948 paper. So, there were intimations of the theory prior to 1948. 
In the reference list for the 1948 paper Hempel refers to 'The function of general laws in history' 
which was published in The Journal of Philosophy in 1942 (Hempel & Oppenheim 1965, p289). 
28 Some evidence for psi is statistical in nature and would equaly warant discussion using the theories 
of statistical explanation that Hempel later developed (Hempel 1965). However, I exclude 
discussion of other aspects of the Hempel's explanation theories in this thesis because 
of the timing of the publications the efects of the deductive nomological model were already 
impacting on the mainstream assessment of psi, thus making assessment of the later theories 
redundant in my argument. 
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considered lacking in empirical meaning because they cannot provide theoretical 
understanding. 
5.2.1 Outline of the deductive nomological (DN) argument structure 
The DN model of covering law explanation theory was developed by Hempel and 
Oppenheim as part of a broader assessment of explanation in the sciences. According 
to Hempel and Oppenheim 'to explain the phenomena in the world of our experience, 
to answer the "why?" rather than only the question "what?", is one of the foremost 
objectives of al rational inquiry' (Hempel & Oppenheim 1948, p 135). Answers to 
why questions 'may be regarded as an argument to the effect that the phenomenon to 
be explained, the explanandum phenomenon, was to be expected in virtue of certain 
explanatory facts' (Hempel 1965, p336) Under the DN model the fact in question is 
explained by an argument in the folowing form: 
Log it:a I 
deduction 
C1, C2,...Ck statement of antecedent conditions 
L1, L21..1, general law 
Explanans 
E description of the empirical phenomenon 
to be explained Explanandum 
(Hempel & Oppenheim 1948, p138) 
Lines one and two are the premises and the third line is the logicaly deduced 
conclusion. The argument is the explanation and must be both valid and sound. So, 
for an event E to be explained there must be a statement of antecedent conditions and 
at least one general law (the explanans) which are used as premises in order to 
conclude E (the explanandum). Because of its structure and reliance on a general law 
,this form of scientific explanation has become known as deductive nomo logical 
(DN) model of explanation. 
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There are certain conditions that must be met for an argument of the DN type 
to be considered an explanation. Hempel further explains that: 
a DN explanation answers the question 'Why did the explanandum-phenomenon occur?' 
By showing that the phenomena resulted from certain particular circumstances, specified 
in CI, C2,.. Ck, in accordance with the laws Li, 1,2,•••Lp By pointing this out, the argument 
shows that, given the particular circumstances and the laws in question, the occurence of 
the phenomenon was to be expected; and it is this sense that the explanation enables us to 
understand why the phenomenon occured. (Hempel 1965, p337) 
Hempel and Oppenheim divide them into two categories: the logical conditions of 
adequacy and the empirical condition of adequacy (Hempel & Oppenheim 1948, 
p137). The logical conditions of adequacy that must obtain if the argument is to 
provide a valid explanation are threefold: 
(derivability) 	 the explanandum must be logicaly derived from the 
explanans 
(lawlikeness) 	 at least one of the explanans must be a general law 
(empirical content) 	 the explanans must be empiricaly testable 
And the empirical condition makes a fourth criterion that must hold if the 
argument is to serve as anexplanation for the event in question: 
(truth) 	 the sentences of the explanans must be true. 
Only if al of these criteria are fulfiled can the argument be considered a legitimate 
explanation for the why question originaly proposed (Hempel & Oppenheim 1948, 
.pp 137-138). Further to this, Hempel and Oppenheim explain that the model they have 
developed is also intended to predict what wil happen if the same initial conditions 
are encountered. The predictive aspect is important to science and to their theory of 
scientific explanation. They state that: 
it is this potential predictive force which gives scientific explanation its importance: only to 
the extent that we are able to explain empirical facts can we atain the major objective of 
scientific research, namely not merely to record the phenomena of our experience, but to 
learn from them, by basing upon them theoretical generalizations which enable us to 
anticipate new occurrences and to control, at least to some extent, the changes in our 
environment. (Hempel & Oppenheim 1948, p138). 
So if the deductive argument is both valid and sound, contains at least one general law 
and is empiricaly testable, then one should be able to use it as both an explanation 
and a means to predict the outcome of a similar situation. 
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As an ilustrative example, take a question: 
Why was there water al over the floor of my apartment this morning? 
Then put it into the DN format of explanation: 
The metal pipes in the block of apartments were ful of water 
The temperature was below zero 





Al water expands in volume if its temperature 




Therefore, last night the water pipe ruptured 
because the pipe was too smal to contain 
the water when it froze and expanded. 
Explanandum 
I have then an explanation for the flood in my apartment in the form of a deductive 
argument. It looks like I should cal a plumber, but if I realy want to make sure that 
my explanation is a reasonable assessment of the situation I double check to see if this 
argument fulfils Hempel and Oppenheim's requirements for an explanation. • • 
(derivability) the explanandum must be logicaly derived from the explanans 
Yes, the explanandum is logicaly derivable from the explanans. You can see that if 
the metal pipes are filed with water and the water freezes then the water wil expand 
and consequently the pipes wil burst. 
(lawlikeness) at least one of the explanans must be a general law 
Yes, the second premise is derived from a general law (AV = 13VAT) 
Where AT = temperature change and AV= volume change and 'the constant [3, which characterizes the 
volume expansion properties of a particular material, is caled the temperature coeficient of volume 
expansion, or the coefficient of volume expansion.' (Sears et at 1987, p349) 
(empirical content) the explanans must be empiricaly testable 
Yes, I can freeze some water and measure its expansion rate. 
(truth) the sentences of the explanans must be true. 
Yes, the sentences are true: the pipes were ful or water and the temperature did drop 
below zero. I can also verify the law regarding the expansion of water when frozen 
— - through empirical means. 
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The covering law model can be used to provide an answer to a why question in the 
form of a deductive argument and has practical application as the example above 
exemplifies, it was subsequently to become the dominant conception of explanation 
in the sciences. 
5.2.2 The 'received view' 
Notwithstanding criticism (Angel 1967, Scriven 1962) the DN explanation model 
described in the subsection above is acknowledged as the dominant model for some 
decades. Its dominance was such that in an essay on 'Scientific explanation: How we 
got from there to here' Wesley Salmon caled the model 'the cornerstone of the old 
consensus' (Salmon 1998, p302). And it is widely acknowledged as the 'received 
view' of explanation until the early 1970s, after which the explanatory territory in 
philosophy of science became much more complex. 
I suggest that the dominance of the covering law explanation theory at a time 
when psi research-became more prominent in the mainstream press resulted in an 
assessment of psi phenomena which is the undercurrent to the Skeptic hypothesis and 
the dominant mainstream view of the phenomena today. I do not claim that this is the 
only influence, but I think that the connection made is significant. I make a case for 
this in section 5.4. But first I show why the covering law model is problematic for psi 
theory and why it has such an impact on the assessment of psi. 
5.3 Lawless psi and the covering law model 
It is not hard to see how the covering law model of explanation is going to pose 
problems for anomalous phenomena such as apparent psi effects. If the covering law 
theory is correct, then a law of nature is required for any acceptable scientific 
explanation. However, putative psi phenomena are anomalous; outside accepted 
scientific law by their very definition. Moreover, psi theorists themselves 
acknowledge that they are in no position to state generaly accepted universal or 
statistical laws to cover ESP or PK. It folows that if the covering law model is 
corect, no scientific explanation can be given for psi phenomena. It is a point which 
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gives the Skeptic hypothesis strength, for no mater what evidence there appears to be 
for the phenomena, another, more prosaic law-based explanation must be used to 
account for the apparent efects. The situation is not revisable unless either the 
covering law model is shown to be problematic or subsequent laws are discovered 
that explain psi. Put in terms of an outline of an argument, the situation for psi under 
covering law theory is as folows: 
PREMISE 1 	 Acceptable scientific explanations require that the explanandum 
is derived from a covering law and other conditions. 
PREMISE 2 	 Psi is not covered by any known law, nor have any psi-specific 
covering laws been found (or are likely to be found) 
CONCLUSION 	 Therefore, we have (and are likely to have) no scientific 
explanations that are inconsistent with the Skeptic hypothesis 
(namely that fraud, flawed methodology, flukes or self delusion 
explain psi efects). 
If either the covering law model does not hold or if psi can be explained in terms of 
natural laws, this argument is unsound and I wil discuss the issue further on in the 
• thesis when I address the more general problems that the covering law model 
eventualy encountered in the next chapter in section 6.1 For the time being, 
however, I am concerned with the ramifications for psi theory under the covering 
law model. 
The result of the analysis is important because, as I show in the next section, 
the covering law theory was dominant at just that time when the experimental data for 
psi was published prolificaly. I suggest that the dominance of the covering law model 
most likely influenced the mainstream assessment of psi and gave rise to the notion 
that psi cannot be accounted for by contemporary science. 
5.3.1 Psi and vitalism 
In their seminal 1948 paper, Hempel and Oppenheim discuss a similar scenario to the 
problematic position psi is currently in. They anticipate the problem of there being 
apparent evidence and theory to support a hypothesis, but for which there are no 
covering laws to appeal to. To explicate, they—Olitline- theifiesponse to a phenomenon 
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which, like the position psi is in at the moment, cannot be explained by appeal to a 
general law. Because of this similarity the case provides a test case for the assessment 
of psi under the DN model of scientific explanation. The case they discuss is vitalism 
and they contrast it to that of gravitational fields: 
A case in point is the neovitalistic atempt to explain biological phenomena by reference to 
an entelechy or vital force. The crucial point here is not—as it is sometimes made out to be—
that entelechies cannot be seen or otherwise directly observed; for that is true also of 
gravitational fields, and yet, reference to such fields is essential in the explanation of 
various physical phenomena. (Hempel & Oppenheim 1948, p145) 
Then they make the point that is so vital to understanding the predicament that psi 
faces when atempts to explain it are made using the covering law model: 
The decisive difference between the two cases is that the physical explanation provides (1) 
methods of testing, albeit indirectly, assertions about gravitational fields, and (2) general 
laws concerning the strength of gravitational fields, and the behavior of objects moving in 
them. Explanations by entelechies satisfy the analogue of neither of these two conditions. 
Failure to satisfy the first condition represents a violation of (R3)*; it renders al statements 
about entelechies inaccessible to empirical test and thus devoid of empirical meaning. 
Failure to comply with the second condition involves a violation of (R2)**. It deprives the 
concept of entelechy of al explanatory import; for explanatory power never resides in a 
concept, but always in the general laws in which it functions. (Hempel & Oppenheim 1948, 
p145.446). 	 • 
*R3 Li the requirement that the explanans are empiricaly testable 
**R2 is the requirement that at least one of the premises contains a general law. 
So the lack of a general law deprives a theory of explanatory power under the DN 
model. This is obviously problematic for psi. Even more poignantly the conclusion to 
this analysis is that: 
Therefore, notwithstanding the flavor of familiarity of the metaphor it invokes, the 
neovitalistic approach cannot provide theoretical understanding. 
(Hempel & Oppenheim 1948, p146) 
Psi does not fal to the same empirical problem as vitalism. There appears to be 
evidence for psi events, even if it is debated as to what this entails, whereas vitalism is 
a theory about natural phenomena. However, if one considers that workable theories 
are stil vying for consideration to explain the anomalous phenomena associated with 
psi the situation is similar. Therefore under a covering law model efforts to explain 
psi wil be discounted for the same reason: lack of theoretical understanding due to 
lack of a general law to appeal to when constructing an explanation that is acceptable 
to the tenets of covering law explanation. 
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5.3.2 A note on psi and laws 
For this section of the thesis when I refer to general law I intend the traditional 
notion of 'general law' that prevailed during the time the covering law was dominant. 
(I reserve discussion regarding the now widely acknowledged problematic notion of 
'law' in science for the next chapter.) Hempel and Oppenheim realised that the notion 
of 'law' was critical to their explanation model and defined a general law as 'a 
statement of universal conditional form which is capable of being confirmed or 
disconfirmed by suitable empirical findings' (Hempel 1965, p 231). Contemporary 
developments in philosophy of science aside, using the covering law era definition of 
a general law it is apparent that the theory spels doom for phenomena like psi. 
Psi, as we have seen previously, is curently anomalous to science. Despite the 
best efforts of the Big and Smal Change Natural hypotheses, there is no claim that, as 
yet, psi phenomena have been dealt with suficiently by reference to a general law. 
The phenomena exhibited in both spontaneous cases and laboratory-based 
experiments continue to remain problematic to science because there is no dominant 
theory that has been proposed that accounts for the phenomeni As a consequence, psi 
remains anomalous. In the section below I show that the perceived unlawful 
assessment, combined with the covering law model, could be the foundation for the 
curent dominance of the Skeptic hypothesis in mainstream philosophy and science 
today. 
5.4 Psi publications and the 'received view' 
In this section I make a case that the Skeptic hypothesis is currently dominant in 
philosophy is at least partialy informed by the chance congruence of two .events. 
Firstly, the developments in psi research started to reach a mainstream academic 
audience, and secondly the rise of the covering law explanation model as the received 
view of scientific explanation.29 
29 The analysis is of the mainstream assessment of psi and is not intended to include discussion of the 
evidence that has been undertaken within the discipline of parapsychology itself. (e.g. the 
discussions of the meta-analyses between Richard Wiseman, Julie Milton and other members of the 
parapsychology community (Milton & Wiseman 1999, Storm & Ertel 2001). Neither am I 
concerned here with the often discussed debate about the status of the evidence for psi that has been 
undertaken between parapsychologists and prominent skeptical psychologists. The discussions 
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I also made a case that it is detrimental to both parties to leave the debate in 
this state and this thesis is an atempt to unravel some of the background issues that 
inform the debate and to recouch the issues as a discussion between competing 
hypotheses. The aim is to produce a more constructive dialogue between the different 
approaches to explanation of the anomalous phenomena. 
I am concerned in this part of the thesis with the mainstream assessment of psi 
and to reassess psi theories in the light of changes in the philosophy of science over 
the post-positivist period. I wil focus on this as I proceed to discuss the dominant 
mainstream hypothesis (the Skeptic hypothesis) in relation to explanation theory in 
philosophy of science. Accordingly, in this section I look at the literature that shows 
how the mainstream reacted to the new developments in psi research. And draw on 
works published prior to, during and shortly after the covering law theory was 
considered the received view of explanation. 
5.4.1 Psi publications 
As:mentioned in Chapter 2, research into parapsychology in the 40s, 50s and 60s was 
dominated by the laboratory experiments first conducted by J.B. Rhine at Duke 
University in the 1920s and shortly thereafter replicated in other laboratories. 
Publication of the results of the new approach to psi research renewed mainstream 
interest in the phenomena. Between the late 1930s and the 1960s Rhine published five 
books, including Extrasensory Perception and New Frontiers of the Mind, which were 
both published in the 1930s. By 1977 he had enough laboratory experiments to draw 
on to publish History of Experimental Studies. Louisa Rhine's catalogues of 
spontaneous psi events were also published during this time — Hidden Channels of the 
Mind was first published in 1965, folowed by ESP in Life and Lab in 1967. Also 
notable as part of this research was the publication of Modern Experiments in 
between the views are wel documented in the psi literature and, as I showed in the introduction to 
the thesis, the pro-psi and anti-psi theorists have, in the main, just 'agreed to disagree' and have each 
continued their respective research programs accordingly. The focus is on the mainstream academic 
assessment of psi and I therefore look at mainstream journals for the assessment. 
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Telepathy in 1954 by S.G. Soal and Frederick Bateman30. The effect of the 
publications was tangibly apparent when the American Parapsychology Association 
was founded in 1957. The organization became an afiliate of the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science in 1969 and this elicited much 
discussion in mainstream science regarding the evidential status of psi phenomena. 
5.4.2 Mainstream discussion of psi 
During the same period, and perhaps because of the novel nature of the 
parapsychological publications, the work of the parapsychologists was also being 
discussed in mainstream journals in disciplines outside of parapsychology and more 
generaly in the popular press. Testament to this is provided in a 1938 article from 
The American Journal of Sociology, in which Harold 0. Guliksen writes: 
The immediate practical result of Rhine's experiments has been a wave of popular interest 
in the Duke University work. New Frontiers of the Mind has sold 110,000 copies. Rhine is 
also issuing special sets of ESP cards and score pads.. The Zenith Foundation, established 
by the Zenith Radio Corporation, broadcasts each week startling instances of ESP and 
• 	 conducts "scientific tests" to answer their frequent question "WHAT-is it?" The Journal of 
Parapsychology, edited by Wiliam McDougal and J.B. Rhine, has been recently 
established to take care of experimental studies in ESP.,(Guliksen 1938, p624) 
So it appears that the work of Rhine and other early parapsychologists was being 
examined and explored by interested parties in both the academic and lay areas. More 
specificaly the ESP experiments were being evaluated by academic disciplines for 
their scientific rigour and as a social phenomenon and, as the mention of the Zenith 
Radio program above indicates, there was enough popular interest to sustain a reality 
radio program on the topic. 
In philosophy too, the work of the parapsychologists did not go unnoticed. In 
1938 the journal Philosophy of Science published a lengthy article by H. Rogosin 
entitled 'Telepathy, psychical research and modern psychology' in which the author 
notes that psychical research '..has been frowned upon for many years; the very 
thought of it, in fact, has been anathema to a great number of scientists. But the 
atitude of both laboratory workers and laymen toward this field has been changing in 
3° Soal was accused of fraudulently producing experimental data in the experiments he carried out 
during WWI with Shackleton and spent much of his career defending himself against alegations of 
fraud. See Haynes 1982 for details of this incident. 
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the last few years' (Rogosin 1938, p472). The Rhines and felow psi researchers were 
certainly being recognised and their research discussed and debated. 
Other notable philosophical publications were the colection of essays by the 
prominent philosopher C.D. Broad, colated into the book Religion, Philosophy and 
Psychical Research in 1953. The colection includes essays based on papers given to 
the Society of Psychical Research between 1935 and 1938 (Broad 1953, pl). Broad, 
who, as I mentioned earlier, held the presidency of the Society for Psychical Research 
from 1935-6 and 1958-60, was among a smal group of mainstream philosophers who 
wrote in support of the evidence for psi and used it in the development of their 
philosophical theories. 
It is interesting to note that Broad's analysis of psi as seriously contravening, 
what he defined as, basic limiting principles (Broad 1949) was used in turn by George 
Price (1955) to support his version of the Modern Miracle Argument. The irony did 
not escape another philosopher, Michael Scriven, who, in an extensive review of the 
experiments cited in Soal and Bateman's Modern Experiments in Telepathy, noted 
that the notion that psi does not fit with the mechanistic world view 'is clearly a two-
edged weapon, and the opponents of ESP, such as Dr George Price, employ it to cast 
doubt on ESP research' (Scriven 1956, p248). The review was published in a 
mainstream philosophical journal (The Philosophical Review) and is evidence that 
research into psi was considered a topic worthy of discussions in mainstream 
philosophy at this time. Comments like this also indicate that the status of the 
evidence and its consequences for science and philosophy were 'debated. 
At this time some academics thought that the evidence for psi was substantial 
enough to warrant theoretical consideration. For instance, consider Alan Turing's 
comments on telepathy in his 'Computing machinery and inteligence' (Turing 1950). 
This is the wel-known article in which Turing addresses the question 'Can machines 
think?' He reworks the question and proposes a test for machine inteligence based on a 
game in which a machine and a person are shielded from a third player, the interogator, 
who can ask questions and ieceive answers from both the machine and the persoi and 
whose task is to guess corectly which is which. Turing's proposal was that we have 
32 In this section I have focussed on the literature regarding ESP as it was the most prominent aspect of 
psi that was discussed during this era. This is most likely because of Rhine's focus on his work on 
telepathy-experiments in his early publications. Although he and others did publish results of PK 
experiments they were not as great in volume or appeared to elicit such interest as the ESP 
experiments. 
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suficient evidence that machines can think when the interogator corectly sorts the pair 
at no beter than chance rate. The set up came to be known as the Turing Test, and is 
prominent in the literature in the history of discussion of artificial inteligence (Turing 
1950, pp433-434). For the purposes of this thesis I am interested in the section in which 
Turing makes a specific reference to ESP. In objection (9) The Argument from Extra-
Sensory Perception he states that: 
I assume that the reader is familiar with the idea of extra-sensory perception, and the 
meaning of the four items of it, viz, telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition and psycho- 
kinesis. These disturbing phenomena seem to deny al our usual scientific ideas. How we 
should like to discredit them? Unfortunately the statistical evidence at least for telepathy, is 
overwhelming..if telepathy is admited it wil be necessary to tighten our test up. The 
situation could be regarded as analogous to that which would occur if the interogator were 
talking to himself and one of the competitors was listening with his ear to the wal. To put 
the competitors into a 'telepathy-proof room' would satisfy al requirements. 
(Turing 1950, pp453-454) 
It is evident that Alan Turing, who was primarily known as a mathematical logician, 
believed that there was enough evidence for telepathy to warrant discussion of its 
confounding possibilities in this landmark paper. It seems to indicate that the work of 
parapsychology was being taken seriously and beyond the smal community of psi 
researchers. 
Another commentator on psi was the engineer-come-controversial logician 
George Spencer Brown, who also entered into discussion about psi phenomena in the 
mainstream academic arena. In 1952 he published an article in Nature which, among 
other issues critiqued the use of statistics in long-run psi experiments. It is a short 
article that had a large impact because of its wider implications on the use of random 
numbers in statistical theory. Brown wrote that: 
Since it is clearly meaningless to speak of 'influencing' random-producing agents on 
evidence which is nothing more than statisticaly significant, and since there nevertheless 
exist a number of highly 'significant' results in the best designed and most rigorously 
observed experiments, the simplest explanation left open to us is that the calculus which 
leads us to interpret these results as significant is itself misleading. (Brown 1952, p155) 
His comments elicited some debate from those interested in the use of statistics in 
science in general. There were some concerns that if his criticisms were valid then not 
only would the situation be problematic for confirming the validity of the evidence for 
psi, but that 'Brown's arguments could in principle raise serious doubts against the 
use of statistics in the interpretation of facts in any field of research (including 
psychology) which employs empirical means of randomization.' (Wasserman 1955, 
P135). History shows that this did not eventuate; ordinary statistical methods are stil 
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widely used in the sciences, and Brown's other criticisms have also been shown to be 
problematic (Wasserman 1955). However, these articles do indicate that the evidence 
for psi was at least thought to be sufficiently strong to warrant exploration of the 
implications for other fields of inquiry of psi phenomena. 
The salient point that I hope I have shown is that there was a considerable 
amount of mainstream discussion and publication regarding the results from the early 
experimental literature about psi (especialy ESP32). 
In the next section I make a case that after the covering law model became the 
'received view' regarding scientific explanation, the tone of criticisms against the 
possible use of psi changed and this eventualy leads to the situation that we 
encounter today, namely that discussion about psi registers litle in mainstream 
scientific or philosophical literature. I suggest that interest in psi dwindled most likely 
in part as a result of the difficulty involved in explaining anomalous phenomena under 
the covering law model which, as I showed in the previous section, is problematic for 
realist psi theorists. To help put the above discussion into perspective, here is a chart 
that indicates the timing of the major publications mentioned in the chapter in relation 
to the time the covering law theory was dominant: 
I further discuss the consequences for psi in the section below. 
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5.5 Consequences for psi theory 
I have already shown that the Skeptic hypothesis is the currently dominant 
philosophical stance in mainstream discussion regarding psi in both the sciences and 
philosophy. The question I entertain now is: what continues to inform the assessment? 
I suggest that concerns as to the explanatory worth of theories that have been 
proposed to explain psi inform the curent mainstream assessment of psi. And that 
this assessment continues to dominate in philosophy today. I have shown previously 
that the explanatory concerns are an important component of the Skeptic hypothesis 
and when the arguments are presented they are rarely made explicit. 
To back up my suggestion I wil provide ilustrative examples in three steps: 
firstly, the change in tone of the discussion regarding psi prior to the publication of 
the initial outline of the covering law theory is examined; then secondly, it is shown 
that after the problems of the covering law theory became more widely acknowledged 
in the 1970s there was a brief flurry of new mainstream philosophical discussion of 
the anomalous phenomena. Finaly, I show that this interest quickly subsided. 
In the previous section I presented the bare bones of the major publications of 
psi research, and showed that prior to and shortly after the 1948 publication of 
Hempel and Oppenheim's covering law theory, there was some level of mainstream 
interest, from philosophy as wel as other disciplines, regarding the evidence for psi 
and its implications. The Skeptic hypothesis maintains that the evidence for psi can be 
best explained by appeal to fraud, fluke, flaky methodology or self-delusion, however, 
I have also shown that this assessment is not made in relation to an evaluation of the 
body of evidence for psi as such. It is in fact informed by a variety of influences: 
conservative explanatory considerations; the history of psi as a once supernatural 
phenomena; assessment of the phenomena as counter to basic certainties in science. 
The Skeptic hypothesis is the dominant stance in mainstream science and philosophy 
today. In this section I make a case that the congruence of interest in laboratory-based 
psi research quickly folowed by the rise of the covering law theory as the dominant 
explanatory model that was the 'received view' for the subsequent two decades 
influenced further assessment of psi as unexplainable. Hence the dominance of the 
Skeptic hypothesis continues. 	 — 
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Once again I note that I am focussing on mainstream assessment and 
discussion of psi, not the psi-specific literature. I have therefore used the jstor' 
database of journal articles as my source for an assessment of mainstream 
publications with reference to psi. It includes archives of relevant publications such as 
Mind, The Journal of Philosophy, Nous, Philosophical Review, Philosophical 
Quarterly, The American Journal of Sociology among many others. I list the entire 
selection and the database details in Appendix I. 
5.5.1 The Skeptic hypothesis prior to 1948 
Prior to 1948, the year that Hempel and Oppenheim's covering law explanation model 
first gained considerable atention, there was a flurry of interest in psi phenomena due 
to the success of J.B. Rhine's book Extra-sensory Perception amongst other 
publications that detailed the results from psi experiments and which were considered 
novel at the time. The mainstream academic discussion regarding the phenomena was 
varied. Some, like Turing (mentioned above) thought that the evidence for 
phenomena such as telepathy was `overwhelming' (Turing 1950), however, others 
were more guarded. Representative of the later point of view is H. Rogosin who 
criticised reports of evidence for psi, amongst more mundane and widely debated 
analysis of statistics and procedure, on the basis of the anti-materialist conclusions 
Rhine advocated if his experiments were to be accepted. (Rhine was indeed an 
avowed' dualist (Rhine 1954).) Rogosin summarises as folows'. 
Scientific progress in the physical sciences does not support the argument for a fundamental 
change of direction. The experiments at Duke University and elsewhere, upon "extra-
sensory perception" and "supernormal cognition" are based upon faulty assumptions 
regarding probability theory, the nature of proof, the place of mathematics in the 
development of Science; in short, faulty assumptions regarding philosophy of science. 
(Rogosin 1938, p 48) 
Rogosin is concerned throughout the article with the use of psi to support an anti-
materialist account of nature as wel as with experimental procedure and use of 
statistics (something which, if a valid criticism, would have to apply more broadly). 
In the literature critical of Rhine's work were similar discussions regarding 
methodology and use of statistics as wel as analyses of the possibility of sensory 
leakage. The kind of searches I undertook were for any articles that discussed or 
mentioned psi data, but as far as I can glean from the articles that I found, during the 
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pre-1948 era, fraud was usualy suggested as one of other possible explanations for 
the psi phenomena reported in the experimental psi literature. However, the main 
focus was on experimental methodology and the use of statistics, a fledgling part of 
science itself. 
5.5.2 Skeptic hypothesis post 1948 
The mainstream assessment of psi does not change immediately after the publication 
of the covering law theory by Hempel and Oppenheim in 1948. However, once the 
covering law theory gains ground and becomes the received view it is interesting that 
a different assessment of psi is presented in mainstream philosophical assessments of 
the anomalous phenomena. 
I mentioned earlier that George Spencer Brown published a paper in Nature in 
1953. The paper provided a controversial assessment of psi that was widely critiqued 
at the time. It is a good example because it was published in such a high-profile 
mainstream scientific journal and created much interest. Brown's assessment of psi 
was as folows: 
The recent aim of research workers seting out to demonstrate the occurence of telepathy, 
etc., has been to devise experiments to give statisticaly significant results which might 
reasonably be interpreted as evidence for the phenomena claimed. They have succeeded in 
doing this, but with important limitations. In the first place, although some of the 
experimental results appear by statistical reasoning 'highly significant', identical 
experimental conditions do not as a rule bring about their repetition. Thus, in an important 
sense, the phenomena remain undemonstrated. 
The other. serious limitation in the so-caled demonstrations of telepathy, "etc:, is the lack of 
satisfactory control series. (Brown 1953, p154) 
Like the pre-48 discussion, Brown's assessment examines the methodology of the 
experiments and involves analysis of wider implications for science. However, the 
discussion of psi markedly changes not long after in the mid-1950s when George 
Price published his influential paper in Science. Price's Science article provided the 
first airing of the Modern Miracle Argument which I detailed in Chapter 1. The 
argument was structured along the lines of Hume's 'ever-lasting check' for the status 
of miracles and was presented as a definitive statement on psi. The argument 
concludes in favour of the fraud hypothesis. 
The timing of the new approach to psi coincides with the years that the 
explanation theorist Wesley Salmon maintains the covering law theory became the 
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'received view' of scientific explanation. In Four Decades of Scientfic Explanation 
Salmon states that Hempel and Oppenheim's covering law paper in 1948 'was more 
of a harbinger of the second decade than a representative of the first. (Salmon 1999, 
p11). So, although the covering law theory was first proposed in the late 1930s it 
wasn't until the mid-late 1950s that the influence of the theory gained wider ground. 
I have shown earlier in the thesis that this is the main philosophical argument 
regarding psi phenomena and it has been re-iterated in mainstream philosophy 
subsequent to this first representation of the argument in 1955. The argument is in 
striking contrast to previous critiques of the newly emerging psi data, such as those of 
Rogosin who was quoted above. George Price, for instance, mentions the problem of 
laws for psi specificaly (Price 1955, p361) and, as we have seen, introduces Broad's 
analysis of Basic Limiting Principles into a modem interpretation of Hume's Miracle 
Argument. 
It is interesting to note also that broader changes in concepts of scientific 
explanation also occured at this time. During the 1930s and 40s the era of logical 
positivism was at its height. Under this school of thought explanation was not a goal 
of science. For the logical positivists, science developed theories and built on truths 
which were cumulative; knowledge grew as science progressed (Pit 1988, p5). 
However, post World War lithe logical positivists lost the dominant ground and 
logical empiricists such as Hempel dominated the mid-later half of the century. 
They were instrumental in changing the assessment of explanation as an important 
goal of science (Salmon 1999, pp338-339). 
The change of focus is tangible in the discussion of psi in general 
philosophical literature. The earlier assessments do not use the notion of a law of 
nature (or BLP) or psi's apparent contravention of such to argue against the 
plausibility of psi phenomena. Instead they focus on more pragmatic issues of 
experimental methodology and use of statistics, as wel as on investigation of the 
implications for mainstream philosophical thought if the evidence for psi is 
considered valid. The mention of psi by Turing and the investigation of implications 
for materialism by Broad (mentioned in the section above) also indicate that, 
speculation regarding the implications of psi effects were appropriate discussion 
topics in mainstream philosophy. The speculation that the evidence was produced by 
fraudulent means was but one of many varied interpretations of the evidence. 
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It is also pertinent that Scriven, a critic of the covering law model of 
explanation during the time it was the received view, is also a philosopher who 
subsequently went on to contribute to the psi-specific philosophical literature (for 
instance, his discussion on supernatural explanation and psi which was drawn on 
earlier in the thesis). 
Of course the psi debate (evidenced through the history of its study as a 
putative natural phenomena) continues and there has never been any one single 
consensus as to the best approach to exploring the phenomena further. But it can be 
seen that the nature of the arguments against the acceptance of psi phenomena that 
was presented in the work of the early laboratory-based experimenters changed in the 
mid 1950s, as evidenced by Price's influential paper in Science in 1955, and which 
continues to be re-iterated in more recent assessments of psi. 
Price's article on psi advocating an everlasting check, mirrors the concerns 
that the change in focus in philosophy of science exhibited at the same time. For_ 
instance Price acknowledges that there is evidence for psi effects, however, he argues 
for a modern form of the Htunean miracle argument rather than accept the plausibility 
of the data. He rests his case on the anomalous nature of psi (for more details see the 
presentation of his theory in detail in Chapter 1). 
Price himself does not mention the covering law theory in his paper, so I am 
not suggesting that such an obvious connection can be made, but rather that even if it 
is not explicit in Price's paper, the content of the argument regarding psi is such that 
when combined with a covering law explanation theory it provides support for the 
lack of explanation for the phenomena, which I have shown discounts it under the 
covering law model. 
It would be imprudent to claim that the only factor that was relevant to this 
change was the burgeoning dominance of the covering law explanation theory, but it 
would seem reasonable to suppose that it was a significant contributor, especialy 
given the problems that I have shown are encountered by psi under the covering law 
model of explanation. It is an important consideration especialy when it is shown that 
the tone of the arguments (Price's was intended as an 'everlasting check') have indeed 
been caried through to this day, as the dominance of the Skeptic hypothesis atests. I 
wil discuss this point in more detail in the next section. 
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5.4.3 Psi research in the 1970s, 80s and onwards 
If the covering law model was influential on the mainstream assessment of psi then 
one would expect that when it became clear that there were serious problems with the 
model then there would be renewed interest in psi phenomena3. And to a certain 
extent this is borne out by the flury of publications that covered the philosophical 
aspects of psi in the 1970s. Significantly, three philosophical compilations that deal 
specificaly with psi and philosophical issues were published in the mid 1970s. These 
are Philosophy and Psychical Research (1976) edited by Shivesh Thakur, Philosophy 
and Parapsychology (1978) edited by Jan Ludwig and Philosophical Dimensions of 
Parapsychology (1976) edited by James M.O. Wheatley and Hoyt L. Edge. These 
compilations concentrate on issues of theory development and explanation and the 
relation of anomalous-phenomena to science, amongst other topics. Price's Modern 
Miracle Argument is represented in one of the books (Philosophy and 
Parapsychology) along with subsequent discussions by Meehl and Scriven,1 
and J.B. Rhine. 
The publications of these compilations is also an indication that psi was 
gaining wider mainstream atention. There was even a positive review regarding the 
potential to use similar approaches in marketing as are used to research psi (in Non-
science is not non-sense' published in the Journal of Marketing Research in 1970). 
Along with the Skeptic hypothesis, the other realist hypotheses appeared to be the 
topic of discussion and interest for those outside the parapsychology community. 
In psi literature the renewed mainstream interest in psi is atributed to the 
effects of the publication of Thomas Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolution in 
1962. Psi, as anomalous, can be viewed as the potential instigator for the crisis stage 
of a Kuhnian-style scientific revolution. And by the 1980s it was noted that 'today the 
vast majority of parapsychologists stil highly esteem or more or less explicitly 
subscribe to Kuhnian opinions' (Hovelmann 1984, p105). Whether this is so outside 
of the parapsychology community is more difficult to gauge. What is clear is that 
33 There were also more general changes in philosophy at the end of the 1960s. There was a greater 
metaphysical tolerance as a result of chalenges to the logical empiricists account of linguistics in 
which philosophy consisted of an analysis of language in, for instance, Kripke (1980). 
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despite this initial renewed interest by the mainstream in psi, by the 1980s psi was 
assessed in a similar fashion to earlier assessments, like Price's, made during the time 
the covering law theory was dominant 
The change in focus and tone is evidenced by the publication of another 
anthology of philosophical research into psi (Readings in the Philosophical Problems 
of Parapsychology (1987) edited by Anthony Flew. This is a comprehensive 
colection of many different views and issues that the evidence for psi gives rise to, 
but most notably for my current concerns, it featured a section which reprinted the 
1955 Price article,along with a snippet from Htune's original miracle argument and 
Flew's own argument based on a similar formula. The modern form of the miracle 
argument presented earlier by the philosophers Keith Campbel and Anthony Flew 
remained present even when changes in philosophy of science made some of the work 
on psi more appealing. However, even after the demise of the dominance of covering 
law theory the Skeptic hypothesis continued to provide a counterpoint (or perhaps a 
response) to the renewed interest in psi post 1970. The situation indicates to me that 
the 'fraud hypothesis' assessment of psi (notably absent from two of the three 1970 
compilations) assumes a certain understanding of psi in relation to science that is 
crucial to understanding the foundations of the Skeptic hypothesis. 
It would seem then that the assessment of psi as most rationaly atributed to 
fraud or self-delusion on the part of parapsychologists is informed by an assessment 
of the phenomena that was at least partialy influenced by the covering law model 
of explanation. More specificaly my contention is that prior to the dominance of the 
covering law theory, commentators assessed the experimental merits of the psi 
experiments. Post the mid-1950s the scenario changed dramaticaly and blanket 
arguments using psi's anomalous nature dominated the literature. I believe that the 
covering law theory played a role in the change of emphasis and stil influences the 
dominance of the Skeptic hypothesis today. Of course there has been discussion al 
along the way and the dominant view has not been the only one to be presented in 
mainstream forums. However, if this analysis is reasonable then a case can be made 
that a re-evaluation of psi in relation to explanation theory in philosophy of science is 
warranted. I make this case in the last section of this chapter, but first I shal take a 
quick look at the representation of psi in mainstream contemporary philosophy. 
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Contemporary mainstream philosophy and psi 
As I noted earlier, psi is almost invisible in mainstream psychology and philosophy 
textbooks and my own experience continues to be that when I mention psi to 
scientific professionals or other philosophers, it is often assumed that the Skeptic 
hypothesis is the only valid hypothesis, that the experimental evidence for psi was 
some aberration of the free-wheeling 70s. I cannot claim too much from this kind of 
personal assessment of the situation. What I can claim is that there is a smal group of 
researchers who have continued to study psi (In Chapter 2 there is a summary of 
curent activities and publications). There is also no doubt that the Skeptic hypothesis 
is the currently dominant assessment of psi. There has also been a marked change in 
tone by philosophers regarding the use of psi in theoretical explanation. For instance, 
contemporary philosophers consider Alan Turing's discussion of telepathy in his 
work on artificial inteligence as an odd, perhaps eccentric aberation,. Some even 
speculate that he was joking. For instance in the entry on Turing in the online 
Stanford Encyclopedia the philosophers Graham Oppy and David Dowe mention that: 
The strangest part of Turing's paper is the few paragraphs on ESP. Perhaps it is intended to 
be tongue-in-cheek, though, if it is, this fact is poorly signposted by Turing. Perhaps, 
instead, Turing was influenced by the apparently scientificaly respectable results of J. B. 
Rhine. (Oppy & Dowe 2005, online) 
Then they provide their assessment of psi: 
Leaving aside the point that, as a mater of fact, there is no curent statistical support for 
telepathy—or clairvoyance, or precognition, or telekinesis—it is worth asking what kind of 
theory of the nature of telepathy would have appealed to Turing. 
(Oppy & Dowe 2005, online) 
These philosophers assume that there is no evidence for psi and that Turing was most 
likely mistaken in his assessment. Daniel Dennet and Douglas R. Hofstadter also 
thought Turing might have been joking; they remark with surprise in their colection 
The Mind's I that: 
Apparently Turing was convinced that the evidence for telepathy was quite strong. 
However, if it was strong in 1950, it is no stronger now, thirty years later-in fact, it is 
probably weaker. 
They go on to say: 
But it is safe to say that the majority of physicists-and certainly the majority of 
psychologists, who specialize in understanding the mind-doubt the existence of 
extrasensory perception in any form. 
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They do not give a reason why they doubt the existence of ESP, so it is hard to gauge 
on what basis they make this claim. It could be that they do not think the evidence 
stands up to scientific scrutiny or that they found their assessment in a similar fashion 
to that of Price and Campbel. Either way it is an indication that the Skeptic 
hypothesis remains dominant in contemporary philosophy. Hofstadter and Dennet 
finaly conclude that: 
Turing took "cold comfort" in the idea that paranormal phenomena might be reconcilable in 
some way with wel-established scientific theories. We differ with him. We suspect that if 
such phenomena as telepathy, precognition, and telekinesis turned out to exist (and turned 
out to have the remarkable properties typicaly claimed for them), the layvs of physics 
would not be simply amendable to accommodate them; only a major revolution in our 
scientific world view could do them justice. One might look forward to such a revolution 
with eager excitement—but it should be tinged with sadness and perplexity. How could the 
science that had worked so wel for so many things turn out to be so wrong? The chalenge 
of rethinking al of science from its most basic assumptions on up would be a great 
intelectual adventure, but the evidence that we wil need to do this has simply failed to 
accumulate over the years. (Hofstadter and Dennet 1988, p67-68) 
Once again there is litle justification regarding an assessment of-She actual evidence 
and statements regarding psi's contravention of known science along with a statement 
regardink the problems this would likely cause current science. ;Their words suggest 
they are unconvinced that the inductive or statistical evidence has been obtained. The 
final paragraph of this example indicates that they are concerned that current day 
readers wil be swayed by Turing's authority in other maters to rethink the 
mainstream assessment of psi. If the assessment is, as I tentatively suggest, based on 
conservative explanatory considerations, it is pertinent to remark that, as noted earlier 
in the thesis, appeals to epistemic conservatism can easily pre-empt an inference to 
the best explanation by ilicitly ruling a theory out of consideration altogether. There 
has to be further justification for taking this step, especialy as the evidence for 
apparent psi effects is generaly considered to be convincing.34 
I hope I have shown that the assessment of psi is much more complex than 
the short dismissive statements in contemporary philosophy indicate. And that the 
Daniel Dennet, in fact, has a very personal reason for dismissing the evidence for psi as valid. The 
parapsychologist Dick Bierman has published that in personal corespondence Dennet has promised 
that he would 'commit suicide if paranormal phenomena turned out to be real' ( Bierman 2001, 
online). This surely is not meant to be a serious threat to take his own life, but rather a joke or 
perhaps a statement that shows how strongly Dennet feels about the possibility that psi could be real. 
Dennet is infamous for some of his over-the-top rhetoric and controversial views so perhaps it is 
wrong to read too much into this kind of statement. However, I think that the comment at least 
highlights the type of intense response that psi elicits in some contemporary prominent philosophers 
and perhaps, even if a joke, indicative of the kind of intense emotion-driven response that psi seems 
to elicit from some mainstream philosophers. 
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mainstream understanding of psi, as presented by thinkers such as Dennet and 
Hofstadter and, as was mentioned in the last chapter, by Paul Churchland who 
dismissed psi because of lack of a dominant working theory (Churchland 1998, p319), 
has been at least partialy influenced by a now outdated covering law model of 
explanation. 
This is good news for the realist psi theorists, because it means that the 
situation should be reassessed taking into consideration curent developments in 
explanation theory. I make a case for this below based on a similar philosophical 
problem addressed by C.D. Broad in the philosophy of mind. 
5.6 A case for reassessment 
Like many philosophical theories, the covering law model has had its critics 
since the first major publication outlining the main tenets in 1948. However, since the 
1970s the model has been chalenged and has generaly been considered significantly 
flawed from this time onwards. The DN model was criticised on ,three main counts: z: 
the problem of irrelevance; the problem of symmetry and, most pertinent to psi, on 
account of the problematic use of laws. These criticisms and their relevance to the psi 
hypotheses wil be detailed in ful in the next chapter. Explanation theories that have 
atempted to address these problems and which are curently vying for dominance 
wil also be discussed in the next chapter in relation to psi explananda. The salient 
point for this part.of the thesis is that the covering law theory is no longer considered 
a valid means to assess the legitimacy of explanation of phenomena. 
In section 5.3 I noted that although the covering law theory posed dificulties 
for any non-normal explanation of psi given the apparent lack of a law that covers the 
anomalous phenomena. If the covering law theory does not obtain, then the criticism 
that psi is unlawful cannot be used to dismiss the evidence. In this section I make a 
case that as the mainstream assessment of psi in terms of explanation is outdated, the 
explanatory considerations that inform the discussion of competing psi hypotheses 
require reassessment. 
There is precedent for such re-analysis in philosophical literature. For instance 
C.D. Broad made a similar case in his discussion of mind theory in his book Mind and 
Its Place in Nature. In a discussion about the theory of mental interaction, Broad 
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points out that 'the problem of Interaction is generaly discussed at the level of 
enlightened common-sense; where it is assumed that we know prety wel what we 
mean by 'mind', by "mater" and by "causation" (Broad 1968, p96). Under this view 
it is assumed that the mental interaction required by a dualist conception of mind is 
problematic because there is no known mechanism by which the interaction of mind 
and mater can be explained. More explicitly there is no known causal chain between 
a mental event and a brain event which created a problem for interactionist dualism 
for many years. Broad points out, the commonsense notion of causation is outdated, 
given Hume's critique in Treatise on Human Nature. Therefore the causal objection 
to dualism is reasonable only if ordinary assumptions about causation are retained. 
However, if the Humean causation accounts holds and causation is thought to be no 
more than constant conjunction then there is no reason why such conjunction could 
not obtain between mental and physical events as wel as between two physical 
events. Changes in the empiricist epistemology can be used to unravel earlier 
empiricist rejection regarding metaphysical theorising regarding mind theory (Broad 
1968, p96-98). 
In other words, Broad argues that there is good reason to reassess the 
philosophical assessment of the plausibility of the mind/mater interaction problem. 
His case is made on the basis that the assessment of mental interaction continued to be 
influenced by an outdated notion of causation. 
In exactly the same fashion, I argue that there is good reason to reassess 
explanatory issues that inform that assessment of psi. I made the case on a similar 
basis which understands that the covering law objection to psi theorising is 
reasonable, however, it is only good if Hempel and Oppenheim's assumptions about 
the nature of explanation are retained. If an empiricist rejects these, the objection fals 
away. Again, the change in empiricist philosophy of science can be used to unravel 
earlier empiricist rejections of psi theorising. I therefore undertake a re-evaluation of 
psi in the context of contemporary explanation theory in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 Terra Firma 
Facts which at first seem improbable wil, even on scant explanation, drop the cloak 
which has hidden them and stand forth in naked and simple beauty. 
Galileo Galilei 
In Chapter 6, I consider the remaining psi hypotheses against the backdrop of 
contemporary explanation theory. The aim is to prepare the explanatory teritory 
for subsequent discussion of psi in philosophy, rather than resolutely resolve the 
discussion in favour of one hypothesis over another. I show that this is not possible 
at this stage. Instead, I open up the discussion to alow an examination of al three 
hypotheses in relation to each other, informed by an updated assessment of 
explanatory concerns. The analysis I give serves two functions: it wil provide a 
contemporary assessment of the contentious body of evidence for psi; and it wil 
also provide an interesting case study to test the ways in which 'various explanation 
theories respond to issues raised by anomalous phenomena. 
I wil first of al place the discussion in the context of the revised IBE 
(Inference to the Best Explanation) model that has been advanced in this thesis. 
Then I briefly outline the problems that the covering law model of explanation 
encountered, and what eventualy lead to its demise as the dominant standard for 
scientific explanation in philosophy of science. I explore the issues at stake here 
with particular reference to two concerns especialy pertinent to the psi hypotheses 
discussion: the problem of laws; and the problematic nature of explanation and 
anomalous phenomena. 
I argue that the way the psi explananda have usualy been presented has 
assumed explanatory problems with regard to the anomalous nature of the phenomena 
and the curent limits of scientific explanatory scope. A review of the psi explananda 
is subsequently undertaken which presents the psi explananda in the form of 
interrogative statements. A deliberate atempt is made to formulate the questions 
with as litle assumed about the anomalous nature of the phenomena as possible. 
A fictional example is used to create a grid of questions and answers. The questions 
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are phrased in the revised interrogative form and answers to the questions are drawn 
from the various theories supported by the competing hypotheses. The resulting grid 
of questions and answers is then examined in the light of the three major 
contemporary theories of scientific explanation: pragmatic, causal and unificatory. 
Finaly, it is argued that although psi theory is stil problematic for 
contemporary explanation theory, there is more scope for development of al three 
hypotheses now than under the covering law model. It is acknowledged that it is not 
possible at this time to gauge which hypothesis is most certainly the 'loveliest', but I 
have a hunch the Smal Change Natural hypothesis shows the most promise. 
6.1 Review of IRE process 
The case was made in Chapter 1 that a reassessment of the mainstream arguments was 
necessary on the basis that they are pre-emptive inferences to the best explanation 
(PIBE). I argued that the IBE structure should be used as a template to re-analyse the 
situation and make a more thorough assessment of the body of evidence for psi. The 
IBE process has been undertaken in the folowing three stages: 
The evidence, data or phenomenon that requires explanation is 
examined. 
(111,..11.) A group of possible hypotheses is compiled which is guided by 
background beliefs and explanatory considerations that should be 
made explicit. 
The loveliest hypothesis is chosen from the group of hypotheses 
such that it has the greatest subjective probability of being true of 
the group. 
The three stages are represented in graphic form below in relation to the relevant 
sections of the thesis: 
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IBE stage 
Stage 1 - E Evidence 
Stage 2 - 	 ,..,Hn} Compilation 
Stage 3 - H Process of selection 
Section 	 Brief content summary 
of thesis 
2.2 	 Outline ofevidence and theory, 
discuss issue of testimony 
2.6 	 Compile the hypotheses based 
on curent psi theory and 
comparison to the hard problem 
of consciousness 
Chapter 3 . 	 Discuss background beliefs, 
present the historic account 
Chapter 4 	 Discuss competing hypotheses 
Chapter 5 	 Discuss dominant hypothesis 
Chapter 6 	 Compare remaining hypotheses 
What can be seen here is the progress of re-examining the philosophical argument for 
psi in terms of a legitimate Inference to the Best Explanation35. I have taken care to 
'address the concerns regarding the mainstream philosophical arguments regarding psi 
that I outlined in Chapter 1. Firstly, I outlined the body, of evidence for psi, secondly I 
compiled the hypotheses by making a comparison to a similar contemporary problem 
in philosophy — the hard problem of consciousness. I then argued that the 
Supernatural hypothesis was problematic, which narowed the group of competing 
hypothesis down to: the Skeptic hypothesis, the Smal Change Natural (SCN) 
hypothesis and the Big Change Natural (BCN) hypothesis. 
Subsequent discussion of explanatory concerns has ensued: the explanatory 
background that informs the curent assessment of psi was outlined in Chapter 3; and 
then, in Chapter 4, a discussion between two of the competing hypotheses (skeptic 
and SNC) was analysed which helped pin point further explanatory issues. I have then 
argued that a reassessment of the dominant hypothesis is waranted because it is likely 
that the mainstream assessment of psi in philosophy has been partialy informed by an 
35 It could be argued that as some explanation theorists do not think that the IBE process is a legitimate 
means of evaluating hypotheses (for instance van Fraassen 1980, p20), the re-examination of the 
body of evidence for psi should not be undertaken as an IBE. However, I do not think that this poses 
a problem for this thesis even though I re-examine psi as a 3-stage IBE process. I could also argue a 
case for a re-analysis of psi in terms of contemporary explanation theory even without undergoing the 
3-stage process as I could sho-w thit unfounded conservative explanatory bias of the mainstream 
arguments requires reassessment in a contemporary explanatory context and a review could be 
undertaken without necessarily going through the same assessment procedure. 
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outmoded explanatory theory — the covering law model. Below I outline the 
problems that eventualy caused the demise of the model. 
6.2 Problems for the covering law model 
I showed in the last chapter that the covering law model of scientific explanation was 
problematic for realist psi theorists. However, it is generaly understood that the 
covering law model, though dominant during the 40s-60s, fmaly fel victim to 
significant problems in the 1970s (Salmon 1990, p10). I argued that because the 
covering law model most likely informed the mainstream assessment of psi a re-
evaluation should therefore be undertaken. I outline below the main problems that the 
covering law model fel to: the problem of irrelevance, the problem of symmetry and 
the problem of laws. 
6.2.1 The problem of irrelevance 
The problem of irrelevance was first raised by Wesley Salmon in 1970 using 
the folowing example: 
John Jones avoided becoming pregnant during the past year, for he has taken his wife's 
birth control pils regularly, and every man who regularly takes birth control pils avoids 
pregnancy. (Salmon 1971, p.34) 
The example can be represented as deductive argument which looks like this: 
John took the contraceptive pil last year 
People who take the pil correctly don't get pregnant 
John didn't get pregnant last year 
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The argument is of the form acceptable to the covering law model of explanation as it 
folows the format stipulated by Hempel and Oppenheim as folows: 
C1, C2,..Ck statement of antecedent conditions 
(John took the contraceptive pil last year) 
L1, L2,.. I, 	 general law 
(people who take the pil correctly don't get pregnant) 
E 	 description of the empirical phenomenon 
to be explained 
(John didn't get pregnant last year) 
The conclusion that John didn't get pregnant because he took the pil is clearly 
absurd, as the fact that John took the contraceptive pil is not the reason he did not 
become pregnant. However, the argument is a legitimate explanation under the 
covering law model as both premises are true, one is a general law and the argument 
is valid. The covering law model is thus unable to cope with the subtleties required in 
order to exclude absurd explanations of this type. It is widely agreed that the example 
shows a flaw in the covering law model as 'this explanation seems unsatisfactory, and 
its conformity to the DN model has been an embarrassment to the model's advocates 
ever since' (Cartmil 1980, p383). If, as the 'John didn't get pregnant' example 
ilustrates, the covering law model can be used to support a nonsensical answer to a 
why question, then it is problematic to use it as a model by which explanations in 
science are assessed. 
6.2.2 The problem of asymmetry 
The problem of asymmetry was first raised by Sylvain Bromberger in the 1960s. He 
uses the example of a building and a ray of light which emanates from the top of the 
building to ilustrate that the problem. Bromberger's example runs as folows: 
There is a point on Fifth Avenue, M feet away from the base of the Empire State Building, 
at which a ray of light coming from the tip of the building makes an angle of 0 degrees with 
a line to the base of the building. From the laws of geometric optics, together with the 
"antecedent" condition that the distance is M feet, the angle 0 degrees, it is possible to 
deduce that the Empire State Building has a height of H feet. (Bromberger 1966, p92) 
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In response to the question: Why does the Empire State Building have a height of H 
feet? I have placed the example in the form of a covering law model deductive argument 
to show that the example fulfils the criteria of an explanation under the model. 
C1, C2, .. Ck statement of antecedent conditions 
('the distance is M feet', 'the angle 0 degrees') 
Li, L2, .. L 	 general law 
(the laws of geometric optics) 
E 	 description of the empirical phenomenon 
to be explained 
(The height of the Empire State Building is H feet high) 
As both premises are true, one contains a general law and they together with the 
conclusion they form a valid deductive argument, Bromberger' s example is shown 
to provide a legitimate covering law model explanation. However, intuitively the path 
of the ray of light does not explain the height of the building, rather it is the 
height of the building that explains the path taken by the ray of light. 
In subsequent philosophical literature on explanation theory and the problem 
of asymmetry a similar example was used. Instead of the Empire State Building and 
a ray of light, a flagpole and the shadow cast by the pole is used to ilustrate the 
problem for covering law theory. In a later discussion of the problem Wesley Salmon 
points out that: 
Clearly the interaction between the photons and the flagpole temporaly precedes 
the interaction between the neighboring photons and the ground. The reason that the 
explanation of the length of the shadow in terms of the height of the flagpole is acceptable, 
whereas the "explanation" of the height of the flagpole in terms of the length of the shadow 
is not acceptable, seems to me to hinge directly upon the fact that there are causal processes 
with earlier and later temporal stages. (Salmon 1971, p72) 
But the DN model is unable to account for the temporality for, as both of the 
examples above indicate, a legitimate covering law deductive argument can be made that 
'explains' the height of the building or flagpole in explanatory terms that are obviously 
counter intuitive. 
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6.2.3 The problem of laws 
According to the covering law model, for a deductive argument to serve as an 
explanation, one of the premises must contain a general law or a law derived from 
one. The notion of a natural law that is universal is therefore crucial to the covering 
law theory. I mentioned before that for Hempel and Oppenheim a general law is 'a 
statement of universal conditional form which is capable of being -confirmed or 
disconfirmed by suitable empirical findings' (Hempel 1965, p 231). That science is 
able to provide such laws has subsequently been questioned by philosophers of 
science and has given rise to another criticism that eventualy proved problematic to 
the covering law theory of explanation. 
In a paper on the problem of general laws for the covering law theory, David 
Gruender argues that laws of nature pose a problem for the covering law theory 
because covering law theory is 'wrong in seting spatial and temporal universality as a 
standard for laws to be accepted in science' (Gruender 1984, p97). He bases the 
assessment on an historic account of laws of nature. Gruender analyses the notion of a 
natural law from the time of Euclid and argues that geometry has historicaly 
informed 'the very ideal of our understanding of the laws of nature' (Gruender 1984, 
p95). and furthermore that 'one of the important characteristics of geometry in this 
classical period is that its laws are universal both with respect to space and to time' 
(Gruender 1984, p95). 
Gruender then argues that the general concept of a law based on the universal 
nature of geometric statements has changed over time; an epistemological shift has 
occurred. Rather than relying on the traditional notion of universal applicability 
derived from the laws of geometry, the contemporary discussion regarding natural 
laws now focuses on 'how to distinguish between an "accidental regularity and a 
"causal" one' (Gruender 1984, p96). And he points out that 'the contemporary 
discussion focuses on the logical, syntactic, and semantic devices it is thought might 
make the necessary discriminations.' (Gruender 1984, p97). In short Gruender argues 
that as it is far from agreed upon that science is able to provide universal laws, and the 
covering law model requires a general law as one of the premise of a deductive 
argument, the covering law model is therefore problematic. 
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In support of Gruender's assessment I draw on the work of David M. 
Armstrong who outlines the state of discussion regarding laws of nature in 
philosophy. Armstrong gives a summation of the situation that obtains between 
theories of laws of nature when he discusses laws of nature in relation to his theory of 
universals and contrasts it with that of David Lewis. Armstrong argues that his theory 
of universals solves some problems regarding laws of nature (such as accounts of 
laws in terms of regularity) as he can use his notion of universals to explain laws as 
'irreducibly higher-order relations (or necessitation or probabilification) holding 
between universals' (Armstrong 1989, p138). For him laws of nature 'exist 
independently of the minds which atempt to grasp them' (Armstrong 1983, p7). 
Armstrong contrasts his account against those such as David Lewis who 
maintains that laws of nature are regularities that are derived from the best theories in 
science. Armstrong mentions that Lewis, as a Sophisticated Humean, thinks that 
Armstrong's account of 'relations between universals is a mystery whose link to the 
unobserved cases is magic' (Armstrong 1989, p.139). Ontological and 
epistemological discussion regarding the laws of nature and related notions is 
ongoing. In the end Armstrong concludes that the fate of the contrasting theories and 
their various notion of laws wil be determined at a later date: 
Drawing a figure from the game of chess., a suitably sophisticated theory of universals 
and a suitably sophisticated theory of tropes can only be decided in the end game. Maybe. 
We are probably only at the beginning of the middle game as yet. (Armstrong 1989, p.139) 
In philosophy there is stil much to be worked out in regard to the role of laws of 
nature in science and how we can account for them. Thus, any explanation theory, 
such as the covering law theory, which depends on laws of nature as universal runs 
into difficulties and explanation theories have developed which do not rely on such a 
strong notion of a law of nature. 
To further back up the claim that the discussion regarding laws of nature is far 
from resolved I note that there are other accounts of laws of nature. For instance 
Nancy Cartwright maintains that laws of nature are descriptive statements about 
reality (Cartwright 1983, p55) and that they are not necessarily statements with 
general and universal applicability. In contrast to the critical position that the strength 
of natural laws was given under the covering law theory, for Cartwright: 
Chapter 6: Terra firma 	 168 
Laws, read literaly as descriptive statements, are false, not only false but deemed false in 
the context of use. This is no surprise: we want laws that unify; but what happens may wel 
be varied and diverse. We are lucky that we can organize phenomena at al. There is no 
reason to think that the principles that best organize wil be true, nor that the principles that 
are true wil organize much. (Cartwright 1983, p52-53) 
The discussion regarding laws, how they are assessed, to what extent they can be used 
to explain and how science goes about discovering them wil, no doubt, be a topic of 
philosophical speculation that impacts both on explanation theory and the status of 
anomalous phenomena such as psi. I go on to discuss this later point further in the 
section below. 
6.3 Psi and scientific explanation 
It is clear that the covering law account of scientific explanation encountered 
significant problems; the problem of irrelevance, asymmetry and laws are three of the 
major chalenges that posed critical problems for the theory. However, as Charles 
Adams points out, 'even if Hempel's DN and IS models have falen from grace, it is 
not clear what has taken (or should take) their place' (Adams, 1991 p58). Wesley 
Salmon, also agrees. In answer to the question regarding the state of post covering 
law explanation theory in philosophy: 'Is there a new consensus concerning scientific 
explanation?' Salmon answers 'At present, quite obviously, there is not. I do not 
know whether one wil emerge in the foreseeable future..However that may be, I am 
convinced that we have learned a great deal about this subject in the years since the 
publication of Hempel's magisterial "Aspects" essay. To my mind, that signifies 
important progress' (Salmon 1998, p317). 
As there is no theory that dominates the teritory in the way that the covering 
law model did and it is therefore not possible to perform a similar analysis on any one 
theory in the philosophy of science. I wil therefore focus subsequent analysis of psi 
and explanation on three major explanation theories—pragmatic, causal and 
unificatory—as al three are wel-represented in contemporary discussion of scientific 
explanation. However, I turn now to further discussions of explanatory issues with 
specific reference to psi-related issues and make a case that the psi explananda 
require reworking. 
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6.3.1 Psi and laws of nature 
The basic objection that pro-psi proponents encountered when the covering law model 
was dominant was that as al scientific explanations require universal laws and given 
that there are no laws that explain psi—nor does it appear as if any are immediately 
forthcoming—there was therefore litle or no prospect of a scientific explanation for 
psi. At best, current research into psi produced a set of apparent anomalous oddities 
and were conceded to be such. However, law-dependent models of explanation are 
problematic and are no longer dominant in contemporary philosophy of science. 
Michael Scriven, in a similar fashion to Cartwright, argues the point in his 1962 
article 'Explanation, predictions, and laws' where he points out that: 
The examples of physical laws with which we are al familiar are distinguished by one 
feature of particular interest for the traditional analysis-they are virtualy al known to be in 
eror. Nor is the eror trifling, nor is an amended law available which corects for al eror. 
The important feature of laws cannot be their literal truth, since this rarely exists. It is not 
their closeness to truth which replaces this, since far beter approximations are readily 
constructed. Their virtue lies in a compound out of the qualities of generality, formal 
simplicity, approximation to the truth and theoretical tractability. (Scriven 1962, p212) 
According to Scriven then, laws are only ever approximations of our current 
understanding of the workings of the world. In terms of their relation to issues in 
explanation, Scriven goes on to claim: 
Laws provide a framework for events which we use as a convenient grid for ploting 
phenomena that may need explanation. When we are trying to locate events with respect to 
what we know and understand, we often look to see whether they represent departures from 
paterns we know and understand, and these paterns are the laws. Their importance lies not 
in the precision with which they trace the characteristics of events or substances but in the 
fact that they provide a readily identifiable patern. The event in question either conforms to 
a known patern or it does not. It if does not, it probably needs explaining; if it does, then 
either it is not puzzling or the puzzle involves the origin or relation of the paterns. 
(Scriven 1962, p212-213) 
Scriven is not the only philosopher to have taken issue with the problematic role of 
laws to the covering law theory. But his analysis is particularly pertinent to issues 
relevant to explanation and psi in the contemporary era when the covering law theory 
nO-longer obtains. As Scriven's analysis above indicates,-the fact that a phenomenon 
is counter to what is currently understood to be lawful does not logicaly exclude it 
from the possibility of explanation.36 The fact that no law can curently be used to 
36 Hempel and Scriven engaged in discussion regarding the role of laws in explanation (for instance 
Hempel's defence against Scriven's comments in Aspects of Scientific Explanation 1965, pp359- 
364). However, as I have already shown that laws of nature were a problem for the covering law 
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explain apparent psi effects could demonstrate that a new law is required, or it might 
indicate that there is a problem with the way that laws are appealed to as a requisite 
for scientific explanation. Scriven's analysis is supported by instances in the history 
and philosophy of science whereby previously anomalous phenomena have 
subsequently been explained in terms of laws as the phenomena became beter 
understood. Contemporary views regarding the role that laws of nature play in 
explanation theory indicate that unlawfulness is not a strong enough reason to exclude 
the need for an examination of explanations for apparent psi events. I therefore 
continue the discussion of the psi explananda in relation to three contemporary 
explanation theories shortly, but first I cover more general issues regarding scientific 
explanation pertinent to anomalous phenomena. 
6.3.2 Anomalous phenomena and scientific explanation 
Anomalous phenomena pose special problems for scientific explanation. The 	 ' 
phenomena are anomalous for a reason, usualy because they cannot be readily 
explained using any known curently acceptable explanations. There are various - 
levels of anomalousness and they range from events that are merely unusual or 
unexpected to events that are considered anomalous because they are counter to what 
is thought possible. Psi is anomalous in the later sense. 
However, there is an important point to be made regarding how the 
anomalousness in question is characterised. Usualy psi phenomena that are to be 
explained are characterised in terms of statements that are already prejudiced against 
any possible scientific explanation of the phenomena. This is problematic because the 
statements presume a particular explanatory model which the phenomena, given their 
description as anomalous, cannot satisfy. I suggest that the psi explananda should be 
recast and phrased as interrogative statements in such a way that they do not 
anticipate explanatory problems because of the anomalous nature of the phenomena; 
that is, they are not explained before the fact. I flesh out this argument in the 
sections below. 
theory I wil not enter into an extensive discussion of this issue in this thesis. Instead I focus on the 
psi explananda and contemporary explanation theory. 
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Psi explananda 
In the introduction to this thesis I mentioned that psi phenomena are defined by what 
they are not. So, for instance, ESP is only apparent when al five regular sensory 
means of obtaining the information are ruled out. An apparent ESP event is only 
detected when, say, a subject of an experiment correctly guesses that the target object 
was the Queen of Hearts and al normal sensory means of obtaining the information 
could apparently be ruled out. Only in this negatively derived fashion does the event 
qualify as an instance of apparent anomalous acquisition of knowledge. Thus if an 
apparent psi event has occurred it is usualy described as an event that is anomalous in 
the strictest sense. And it folows that, given fraud or sensory leakage can reasonably 
be ruled out, there is no obvious explanation for the event. Therefore it is tempting to 
represent the psi explananda as contravening al known sensori-motor mechanisms. 
Indicative of a typical contemporary assessment of the psi explananda is the 
work by Charles Adams (1991) in a paper on psi, explanation and social change. In 
the paper Adams poses the question: 
Let us now suppose that science has accepted parapsychology's contributions of 
extrasensory perception (ESP) and psychokinesis (PK). Just what is it that we may 
say science has accepted? (Adams 1991, p45) 
He then suggests that: 
..at the very least, we must assume that science has embraced the elementary assumptions, 
findings, conclusions, and predictions that underlie, constitute, and make useful the ideas of 
ESP and PK. Some of these, at present, would be an embarassment to science in that they 
would appear to contradict some of the most fundamental beliefs that many scientists have 
formed from cumulative experimental evidence. (Adams 1991, p.45) 
Adams then lists the phenomena that require examination in the context of 
assumptions already made about the phenomena by science, i.e. the contraventions 
that make the phenomena anomalous in the first instance. He then goes on to list al 
the claims that can be made which warrant the psi explananda as unexplained, 
noting first of al that: 'It wil be useful to recognize just how polarizing 
a representative sample of such claims is' (Adams' 1991, p45). The list contains 
some of the folowing statements: 
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..al information about the external world that is possible for living organisms to have is 
acquired via the five recognized sensory systems.(Adams 1991, p45). 
..science rejects any suggestion that., mental events can be expressed in physical events 
independently of the brain.. (Adams 1991, p45) 
..because cause and effect stil holds for explanation and theories in macrophysics, the 
intuition that a cause must precede its efect is stoutly defended. (Adams 1991, pp46-47) 
The list is reminiscent, if updated) to the list of basic limiting principles outlined by 
C.D. Broad (1949) which I discussed at length in Chapter 1. The same criticisms can 
be applied. It is understandable why it is tempting to continue to represent the psi 
explananda in such a fashion. Psi is so obviously antithetical to current scientific 
expectations of what is possible that it seems the most sensible place to start. 
However, I claim that it is detrimental to present the psi explananda in terms 
that anticipate explanatory problems, as this move assumes too much based on the 
anomalous nature of the phenomena in question. I claim therefore that it is prejudicial 
to continue to construct the explananda assuming the phenomena cannot be explained. 
I give further support to the claim by referring to the historic account that was 
presented in Chapter 3 in which I noted that psi is currently considered paranormal 
most likely because of the explanatory history of the phenomena as once considered 
supernatural. The limits of science were set at a time when psi was considered 
supernatural, thus there might be scope to either expand science or modify 
expectations of what is explainable given the history of the phenomena. 
I suggest then that a re-analysis of the psi explananda should be undertaken 
and phrased as neutraly as possible, without assuming anything about the potential to 
explain the phenomena based solely on the anomalous nature of the event. In this way 
the anomalous nature of psi is presented as a puzzle to science as would any 
unexpected, but not necessarily unexplainable phenomena. 
Explanation, explananda and psi 
I showed earlier in this chapter that the covering law theory is not currently 
considered a viable theory of explanation in the sciences. Instead other theories have 
developed. Although I wil present these theories in more detail shortly, here I focus 
briefly on how each of the theories (causal, pragmatic and unificatory) deal with one 
of the most basic questions in explanation theory: what counts as an explanation? This 
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in turn helps ascertain how, according to the contemporary explanation theories, to 
best recast the psi explananda. 
For Wesley Salmon, a causal theorist, an explanation is a set of statements. 
'On my view, an explanation is a set of probability statements, qualified by certain 
provisos, plus a statement specifying the compartment for which the explanandum 
event belongs' (Salmon 1971, p75). The statements address the question of a certain 
form: 'Why does this x which is a member of A have the property B?' (Salmon 1971, 
p75). Bas van Fraassen, who is a philosopher associated with the pragmatic account 
of explanation, agrees that explanations are answers to 'why' questions. But for him 
'an explanation is not the same as a proposition, or an argument, or a list of 
propositions; it is an answer' (van Fraassen 1980, p134). However, Philip Kitcher, a 
proponent of the unification theory, proposes that 'an explanation is an ordered pair 
consisting of a proposition and an act type' (Kitcher 1981, p509). And though he does 
not limit the explananda to statements involving 'why' questions, he does include 
'why' questions as a legitimate means of posing questions that require explanation 
(Kitcher 1989,p435). Therefore there is a general agreement, at least 'among the 
theorists with which this thesis is concerned, that explanations involve postulating 
competing answers, probabilistic statements or propositions to questions. I therefore 
recast the psi explananda in the form of interrogative statements. 
Summary - a case for revision of psi explananda 
I have shown why it is explanatory prejudicial to present the psi explananda as 
anomalous to scientific orthodoxy. I have also shown that according to the three 
contemporary explanation theories it is appropriate to cast the psi explananda as 
interrogative statements. The task now, therefore, is to make an assessment of the 
evidence for apparent psi events and couch the explananda as questions which do not 
assume any explanatory problem in relation to the current limits of scientific 
explanation. I wil then draw on the theories that support each of the competing 
hypotheses to answer the newly constructed questions. In this way the ground is 
prepared for an examination of competing answers to the questions which can be 
analysed in the context of contemporary explanatory theory. 
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6.4 Psi explananda recast 
The outline of the body of evidence for psi that was made in Chapter 2 wil now be 
drawn upon to sketch the phenomena that require explanation. As an intelectual 
exercise I wil now assume that the evidence for psi requires an explanation. 
According to the case made in the section above, I wil now recast the psi explananda 
as a set of questions. 
6.4.1 Psi explananda posed as interrogative statements 
There are two distinct phenomena that are covered by the word psi: anomalous 
information acquisition and anomalous action at a distance. Anomalous information 
either involves another person, or an object or objects in the physical world. There is 
an added temporal dimension to both types of anomalous phenomena in that they are 
thought to occur in either the present, past or future. I have already outlined the 
apparent evidence for occurrence of these phenomena, so I wil not reiterate that here. 
Instead I construct a make-believe story based on the laboratory evidence for psi that 
can be used to phrase the questions and give them a frame of reference. 
Suppose that you are an under funded, underfed PhD student. You want a bit of extra cash 
to atend a conference that is being held in a city far away enough to need to fly there, but 
you haven't got the airfare. You see a notice up at the Psychology department. It is 
advertising for participants in an experiment. It wil take a couple of days out of your study 
time, but the pay is good and should help significantly towards your trip. You decide to 
sign up. 
The first day you are told that you are going to take part in a staring experiment. You are 
paired up with another student and each of you takes turns staring at the other from distant 
rooms, by viewing an image of the person in real time on a screen. The lab worker explains 
that the results indicate that shortly before the other student starts to focus on the image of 
you, the electrodermal reader that you are hooked up to has measured a reaction on your 
skin. 
You are then shuffled off to another room. This time you are asked to try to influence the 
swing of a bal that is hooked up like a pendulum to the roof of the room. You are asked to 
think about making it swing towards the left of the room, the right and sometimes asked to 
let it swing in the centre, as it would if left untouched. 
You are surprised to see that the bal, which you are unable to touch due to the glass pane 
between you and the pendulum, appears to move according to your mental commands. 
Finaly, you are asked to sit back in a comfy chair and let random thoughts enter your head. 
You relax (it has been a long day) and stretch out your feet. You start to drift into a day 
dream about dropping your PhD and becoming a ski bum for a year. The lab worker then 
requests over the intercom that you look at the screen on the wal in front of you. You are 
then shown four pictures: one of flowers in a vase, the next of a car on a windy road, 
another of a smiling old lady and one of a skier making tracks down a mountain covered in 
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snow. You are asked to choose which one most resembles the thoughts that were just 
recently in your mind. You choose the snowy mountain. Wel done! That's a hit, they say. 
Then they ask you to 'send' the image to the student who was 'staring' at you earlier in the 
day. In a distant lab room that same student says 'I feel cold and see nothing but whiteness, 
I hear a crunchy sound like someone is walking in the snow..37 
As you wander home, clutching your hard-earned cash in your hand, you begin to puzzle 
over the events during the psychology experiments. Previously you'd been a skeptic about 
psi but now you start wondering — why did I start thinking of a ski trip when relaxing in the 
chair? Was it just a coincidence that the target picture was a snowy mountain? Why did the 
bal apparently move to my command when I couldn't touch it? And how did I know when 
the other student was about to stare at my image in a distant room? You start to question 
how it is possible that any of this could have occurred; previously you'd thought it 
impossible. 
The questions that the student raises are hard to answer. The whole day sounds 
so implausible given how we are told the world works according to science and 
especialy given that you can reasonably rule out an obvious case of fraud or trickery. 
However, I wil now recast the psi explananda exhibited by the make-believe psi 
experiment in terms of questions which do not assume any particular explanation in 
relation to current science. I wil avoid the use of negative terms such as 'without 
normal means of communication' and such like. 
'At first this manoeuvre might appear trivial. Some might argue that I just 
substitute 'apparently screened off' for 'without any known force or sense'. However, 
in terms of explanation theory the move is significant. According to the pragmatic 
account of explanation, for example, the seting up of the question which requires an 
explanation is important and already has context-dependent ramifications depending 
on who is asking the question as wel as the emphasis in the phrasing of the question 
itself (van Fraassen 1980, p126-129). I am cautiously rephrasing the questions to keep 
them as unbiased as possible. I acknowledge that this already indicates that I do not 
immediately buy into the mainstream view of psi. However, I defend this move by 
drawing on work done during the course of the thesis. I have argued that it is 
necessary to provide a place to compare competing hypotheses for psi, rather 
than immediately assume that fraud or fluke or flaky methodology can account 
for the phenomena. 
37 Please note that the description is based loosely on experiments in the psi literature. It is intended to 
ilustrate the phenomena apparently exhibited as psi efects, not as a detailed description of any real 
or potential psi experiments. The story is used as a thought experiment to explore explanation issues 
related to the phenomena commonly cited in the psi literature. 
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As an ilustrative example of how the phrasing of the question must be 
carefuly constructed, take a case of apparent clairvoyance between a person X and 
a randomly selected target picture in computer W. Now, according to the usual way 
in which the psi explananda are presented, the question normaly asked would run 
something akin to the folowing: 
Why is it possible that X could gain information from W given science 
currently maintains that it is impossible to obtain information through any 
other means than the five senses? 
Instead, I suggest a more neutral formulation of the question regarding the apparently 
anomalous clairvoyant event as folows: 
Why is it that person X, while apparently screened off from al normal 
sensory channels, is tracking remote events at W with an accuracy ratio that 
is statisticaly significantly above that predicted by chance? 
The use of the less presumptive syntax that does not emphasise the anomalousness 
of psi upfront has a three-fold benefit: firstly, the anomalous nature of psi is not 
counted against itself when an explanation is first caled for;. secondly the question 
is not biased towards any particular explanation from any one of the competing psi 
hypotheses; and thirdly the phrasing does not assume fraud as the most reasonable 
explanation up front. I think that the third point is especialy important, because 
the body of evidence for psi cannot be ruled out per se by such an explanation, 
even though the contemporary representation of psi might lead some to believe that 
is the case. If fraud realy could account for the body of evidence without any doubt, 
then there would be no debate about the evidence for psi (as I pointed out in 
the Introduction). 
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I have created a question grid (see the chart below) which recasts the psi 
explananda as cautiously as possible. I draw on the student's questions after the 
fictional day of psi experiments to pose one for each type of psi phenomena38. 
Below is a chart listing the apparent psi effect, the student's question and the question 
recouched using the neutral syntax which I outlined above: 
Psi efect 	 Student question 	 Why question 
Precognition 
Psychokinesis 
Why did my skin register on 
the electrograph shortly 
before the student in a 
distant room stared at my 
image on a screen? 
Why did my thoughts influence 
the swing of the pendulum? 
Why does an electrographic reaction 
on person X's skin corelate 
(at a statisticaly significant level) with 
the moment just prior to person Y's 
concentration on an image of person X 
when both X and Y are apparently screened of 
from any normal means of communication? 
Why did a person's X's intention to 
influence object P corelate with the 
movement of object P when X was apparently 
screened of from any normal contact with object P? 
• Clairvoyance 	 Why did I know that the snowy 	 Why is it that person X, while apparently 
mountain picture was the corect one? screened of from al normal sensory channels, 
is tracking remote events at W with an 
accuracy ratio that is statisticaly significantly 
, 	 above that predicted by chance? 
ESP Why did the student in a remote room know that I was thinking 
about snow at that moment 
in time? 
Why did person X corectly identify, 
at a statisticaly significant level, 
images that corelated with the pictures 
that person Y viewed and when person X 
and person Y were apparently 
screened of from any normal sensory 
contact with one another? 
38 I don't include retrocognition as the time-related issues involved in that type of psi phenomenon are 
similar to apparent precognitive events and the grid is intended as a thought experiment only which 
wil then be used to further the psi hypotheses discussion. 
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6.4.2 Psi questions and hypotheses 
I wil now postulate possible answer to the questions that were constructed using the 
student's story. I am careful to ensure that each of the competing hypotheses is 
represented: the Skeptic hypothesis; as wel as both Big and Smal Change Natural 
hypotheses. Before we go any further I remind that the Smal Change Natural (SCN) 
hypotheses regard the evidence for psi as genuinely anomalous draw on theories in 
current science in order to explain the phenomena. (An example is the 
PowelUHennacy theory which was discussed in Chapter 4.) The Big Change Natural 
(BCN) hypothesis also regards the evidence for psi as genuinely anomalous, however, 
theories that explain psi are proposed which require additional ontological 
commitments (e.g. the dualism). In contrast to the SCN and BCN psi realist 
hypotheses, the Skeptic hypothesis proposes that apparent psi events are successfuly 
explained by one of the folowing: deliberate fraud; coincidence; sloppy experimental 
methodology; or, that they are the product of self-deluded witnesses or psi 
researchers. 
I realise that some of these answers may appear trite: the skeptic may sound 
overly naive; the psi realists too credulous. However, it needs to be remembered that 
my aim here is to set the stage for a discussion between hypotheses, if! am successful 
the potential to explore more comprehensive answers and to develop more workable 
theories can take place. The chart should therefore be read as a thought-experiment; 
it does not represent a thorough examination of the merits of the contrasting psi 
theories. Rather I have constructed the grid so that the competing answers can be 
used more readily to further the discussion in relation to contemporary 
explanation theories. 
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Why question - PK 	 Answers derived from psi hypotheses 
Skeptic hypothesis 	 Smal change natural 	 Big change natural 
Why did person X's intention to 
influence object P corelate with the 
movement of object P when X was 
apparently screened of from any normal 
contact with object P? 
The person and/or 
experimenters mistakenly 
thought that their thoughts 
were afecting the pendulum. 
An electromagnetic force 
was discharged from the 
brain of the subject and 
influenced the movement 
of the pendulum 
Psi-ons are emited from 
the brain when a person 
focuses their intent 
on a physical object. 
These psi-ons are able to 
interact on both a macro 
and micro scale and they 
cary the force from the 
brain to the object. 
Why question - Precognition 	 Answers dervied from psi hypotheses 
Skeptic hypothesis 	 Smal change natural 	 Big change natural 
Why does an electrographic reaction 
on person Xs skin corelate 
(at a statisticaly significant level) with 
the moment just prior to person Y's 
concentration on an image of person X 
when both X and Y are apparently 
screened offrom any normal means 
of communication? 
The electrograph must be 
faulty or the experiment 
procedure flaky. 
Or perhaps temperature 
changes in the 
airconditioning 
unit could account 
for the changes. 
An indication that humans 
register events on their skin 
before they occur. 
It would be an evolutionary 
advantage for a species 
to have a warning 
of imminent danger. 
There is one colective 
mind to which we al 
have access, even if 
subconsciously. 
When a person focuses 
their atention on another 
it registers in the colective 
mind where time and 
space do not exist 
Why question - Clairvoyance 	 Answers derived from psi hypotheses 
Why is it that person X, while apparently 
screened of from al normal sensory 
channels, is tracking remote events at W 
with an accuracy ratio that is statisticaly 
significantly above that predicted by chance? 
Skeptic hypothesis 
The use of statistics 
to determine the significance 
of the outcome is flawed. 
Smal change natural 
On occasions when 
the regular senses are 
dimmed another sense 
is able to pick up 
on information from 
physical objects at a 
distance from the viewer 
Big change natural 
The mind is able to exist 
independent of the brain. 
If a person is relaxed and 
alows their consciousness 
to wander, they are 
able to perceive remote 
objects. 
Why question - Telepathy 	 Answers derived from psi hypotheses 
Skeptic hypothesis 	 Smal change natural 	 Big change natural 
Why did person X corectly identify, 
at a statisticaly significant level, 
images that corelated with the pictures 
that person Y viewed and when person X 
and person Y were apparently 
screened of from any normal sensory 
contact with one another? 
It was a set up and the 
participants in the 
experiment are tricksters. 
Quantum entanglement 
theories can be used 
to explain how mind-mind 
knowledge acquisition 
occurs at a distance. 
Topological folding of 
space/time occurs 
alowing for informaiton to 
pass from one person to 
another instantaneously., 
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In constructing the questions and possible answers to the questions I have tried to 
avoid assumptions about the anomalous nature of the phenomena. I have also been 
wary of favouring one hypothesis over another. I hope that the hypotheses at issue can 
now compete on even ground. It has taken some time to develop the discussion to this 
stage: the philosophical arguments were critiqued and a new analysis in the form of 
an IBE was undertaken; further explanatory considerations were teased out; and 
finaly a new set of psi explananda has been cast along with answers that represent 
each competing hypothesis. I wil now discuss the relative merits of each in the 
context of contemporary explanation theory. 
6.5 Psi explananda and contemporary explanation theories 
The pragmatic, causal and unificatory theories wil be taken in turn. They each have a 
diferent method of determining how to assess the relative merits of competing 
answers to explanation-seeking questions. I wil first outline the basic tenets of each 
explanation theory. Then the grid of questions and answers is used to determine 
which, if any, answers are reasonable explanations to the psi questions. 
6.5.1 Pragmatic explanation theory 
Bas van Fraassen is the philosopher currently associated with work on the pragmatic 
theory of explanation. (It should be noted that the pragmatic theory of explanation is 
different from the philosophical tradition of pragmatism such as that of Wiliam 
James). Van Fraassen's explanation account is strongly empiricist. Most importantly, 
the conception of explanation that the pragmatic theory developed is that the process 
depends on contextual and relevance relations. Even the same question can be asked 
in different contexts and elicit different explanations, each of which is a legitimate 
explanation depending on the situation. Van Fraassen explains as folows: 
The discussion of explanation went wrong at the very beginning when explanation was 
conceived of as a relationship like description: a relation between theory and fact. Realy it 
is a three-term relation, between theory, fact, and context.. In addition, the background 
theory plus data relative to which the question is evaluated, as arising or not arising, 
depends on context. (van Fraassen 1980, p156) 
- So the context of the questions and the background theory wil al have an impact on 
determining the accepted explanation. Van Fraassen goes on to explain that: 
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The description of some account as an explanation of a given fact or event, is incomplete. 
It can only be an explanation with respect to a certain relevance relation and a certain 
contrast-class. These are contextual factors, in that they are determined neither by the 
totality of accepted scientific theories, nor by the event or fact for which an explanation 
is requested. (van Fraassen 1980, p.130) 
The contrast class list is a list which determines: Why X rather than say Y or Z? 
The answer to the question in the form of a proposition is the explanation, which is 
context-dependent. The proposition is also informed by background issues. According 
to the pragmatic account, the elements of the explanation are set in generic terms as 
folows: 
the 'why' question Q expressed by an interrogative in a given context, 
wil be determined by three factors: 
The topic Pk 
The contrast-class X = (1)1,• • •,Pk, • -} 
The relevance relation R (van Fran ssen 1980, p42-43) 
The relevance relations are derived from causal statements regarding the topic Pk and 
are drawn from a 'causal net' which is 'whatever structure of relations science 
describes' (van Fraassen 1980, p124). The way that one explanation is selected 
amongst others is determined in three ways: whether it is acceptable and likely to be 
true; whether it is favoured over other members of the contrast-class; and if, when in 
comparison to the other options, it is more probable—taking into consideration 
,background theory and beliefs, the topic, and considerations of irrelevance in 
comparison to other answers (van Fraassen 1980, p146-7). According to pragmatic 
theory these factors wil determine which explanation is the most appropriate given 
the situation, but above al the process is contextual. 
In an outline of his explanation theory presented in the book The Scientific 
Image (Chapter 5) van Fraassen relates a tale caled 'The Tower and the Shadow'. 
The story was constructed to show how the pragmatic theory deals with the problem 
of asymmetry that befel the covering law model. It also uses structures and shadows 
and it is worth relaying as it helps also helps elucidate some of the critical tenets of 
pragmatic theory. 
In the story the narrator is troubled as to why the tower casts a shadow onto a 
balcony that would otherwise continue to catch the sun. The owner of the tower says 
the tower was constructed 'in 1930 to mark the exact spot where it is said that [an 
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ancestor of the owner] greeted the Queen when she first visited this house, and 
presented her with a peacock made of soap.. Since the Queen would have been one 
hundred and seventy-five years old in 1930, had she lived, I had the tower made 
exactly that many feet high' (van Fraassen 1980, p136). Later that evening while 
dalying with a maid the narrator muls over the same question, but she provides him 
with a different account: 'The truth is quite different, and has nothing to do with 
ancestors. That tower marks the spot where he kiled the maid with whom he had 
been in love to the point of madness.. he vowed that shadow would cover the terrace 
where he first proclaimed his love, with every seting sun- that is why the tower had 
to be so high' (van Fraassen 1980, p136). 
According to van Fraassen's analysis each explanation wil be an answer 
based on background theory which wil differ from context to context In the Tower 
Story it is sensible that the narator makes a hasty departure, given the explanation the 
maid gave and the activity he was engaging in at the time, but does it mean that the 
maid's explanation has any more validity than the host's? I think that the point is that 
it does not and that when we are comparing competing explanations for the same 
'why' question it is prudent to act on the one that has the most import on any given 
particular situation. Instead explanations are assessed according to factors determined 
by the context within which the original question is posed. 
However, The Tower Story as an exemplification of van Fraassen's 
explanatory scenario has been criticised for failing to solve the traditional problem of 
the asymmetries of explanation (Salmon & Kitcher 1998, pp179-80). In terms of the 
Tower Story, for instance, further delving could find out which of the answers to the 
innocuous query about the height of the tower was, in fact, the corect explanation. 
One could look for historical back up to the host's account or question the host further 
or ask other people who might have known about the maid incident to corroborate 
that explanation. Some theorists such as Salmon and Kitcher have developed other, 
rival, explanation theories that are in contrast to the pragmatic account. I outline the 
causal and unificatory accounts in the subsections below. 
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6.5.2 Causation explanation theory 
The causal theory of explanation essentialy maintains that to 'explain an event is to 
identify its cause' (Salmon 1998, p69). The deceptively simple statement has been the 
focus of much discussion in philosophy of science. An assessment of the voluminous 
literature on causation is far beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, the causation 
theory of explanation as developed by Wesley Salmon with some reference to the 
development of the theory in its early stages by Michael Scriven wil form the focus 
of this section of the thesis. 
There are certain assumptions about the causal nature of explanation that are 
learnt by us because of our everyday dealings with the world around us. One learns 
early on that a certain trail of events has causes and that they are a means of obtaining 
an explanation about certain situations. Think of the child saying 'I didn't do it' while 
the parent pieces together the trail of evidence around them - the cricket bat hidden 
under the armchair, the bal on the path outside and the broken glass of the window—
'Yes you did' says the parent. 'I can see the bat that you used to hit the bal which 
flew through the window smashing the glass. How many times have I told you not to 
play cricket inside!' The child does not have much recourse! It is obvious to the 
parent that the 'childhit the bal towards the window thus causing the glass to smash, 
and that this explains the evidence the parent is confronted with. Michael Scriven 
gives a similar every day example: 
Let us take a case where we can be sure beyond any reasonable doubt that we have a 
correct explanation. As you reach for the dictionary, your knee catches the edge of the table 
and thus turns over the ink botle, the contents of which proceed to run over the table's edge 
and ruin the carpet. If you are subsequently asked to explain how the carpet was damaged 
you have a complete explanation. You did it by knocking over the ink. The certainty of this 
explanation is primeval.. This capacity for identifying causes is learnt, is beter developed 
in some people than in others, can be tested, and is the basis for what we cal judgments. 
(Scriven 1959, p456) 
The notion of cause and effect is basic to our conception of how things work in the 
world and it is confirmed everyday by actions and the resulting consequences. 
Theories that use causation as means of determining valid explanation have 
consequently developed. Causation theories of explanation must make a case 
regarding how to define a cause as they depend on the notion if they are to ascribe 
explanatory worth to causes. Salmon has developed a notion of causation as a 
'process' in which 'an intersection of two processes is a causal interaction if both 
processes are modified in the intersection in ways that persist beyond the point of 
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intersection, even in the absence of further intersections' (Salmon 1998, p71). 
He goes on to say that causal processes are local (I take that to mean contiguous) 
and the processes are 'restricted in spacetime region, and processes transmit in 
spatiotemporaly continuous fashion' (Salmon 1998, p71). He concedes that quantum 
theory poses problems for it violates local causality (I understand this to be referring 
to Bel's theorem and the problem of non-locality). However, despite this difficulty 
at-the quantum level he argues that explanation is to be conceived of as 
causaUmechanical. Under this view explanations 'exhibit the ways in which nature 
operates' (Salmon 1998, p71) which is undertaken by learning the causal processes 
that lead to an event. 
As I understand it then, according to the causal account of explanation, as 
developed by Salmon, to explain an event `E' is to cite its cause 'C' and, using 
Salmon's notion of causation as a process it is to understand the causal history that 
leads from C to E. Before discussing the causal view in relation to the psi hypotheses 
I turn now briefly to the other significant explanation theory that was mentioned 
earlier — the unification theory of explanation. 
6.5.3 Unification theory 
Unification theory, as developed by Philip Kitcher, is based on the notion that the aim 
of science is to account for as many facts with as few theories as possible (Kitcher 
1981, p508). According to his theory we choose a particular explanation from a store 
of arguments which are, for Kitcher, supplied by science. The success of an argument 
patern is determined by how many phenomena it can be applied to. Kitcher spels 
this out: 
Science advances our understanding of nature by showing us how to derive descriptions 
of many phenomena, using the same paterns of derivation again and again, and, in 
demonstrating this, it teaches us how to reduce the number of types of facts we have to 
accept as ultimate (or brute). So the criterion of unification I shal try to articulate wil be 
based on the idea that E(K) is a set of derivations that makes the best trade-of between 
minimising the number of paterns of derivation employed and maximizing the number 
of conclusions generated. (Kitcher 1989, p432) 
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The basic aim is to generate as many explanations for phenomena using the least 
amount of argument paterns where K is the 'set of statements endorsed by the 
scientific community' (Kitcher 1989, p431). and E(K) is 'the set of derivations that 
best systematizes K' (Kitcher 1989, p431) Kitcher mentions Darwin's theory of 
evolution as a highly successful explanation because so many questions could be 
answered using the same patern. He states that: 
Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection addresses a number of general questions 
about the characteristics of life. These questions include problems of biogeography, of the 
relationships among organisms (past and present), and of the prevalence of characteristics 
in species or in higher taxa.. Darwin's principal achievement consisted in his bringing 
these questions within the scope of biology, by showing, in outline, how they might be 
answered in a unified way. (Kitcher 1989, p443) 
So the more facts a theory can account for, the more successful it is at explaining. 
If a theory can explain a once-off occurrence of an event it has less explanatory worth 
than if it can explain many other occurrences of similar events. 
It is interesting to contrast the unification in relation to my earlier discussion 
on laws of nature and covering law theory. One of the three major problems for the 
covering law theory was that it relied on a universal law. Kitcher argues, however, 
that his account of explanation reverses the situation. Because the unification theory 
of scientific explanation provides an account for 'acceptable' rather than 'correct' 
explanations assessed on their ability to explain more facts, it does not fal victim 
to a reliance on universal natural laws as was the case with the covering law theory. 
He suggests further that the unification account actualy indicates there may be no 
need for such a strong notion of laws in relation to explanation as he claims that the 
unification account of explanation when applied to examples in science alows for the 
'possibility that sciences may have no maxi-laws, and that their generality may 
consist in the paterns of derivation that they bring to the explanation of the 
phenomena.' (Kitcher 1989, p447). The point about laws is especialy pertinent 
to anomalous phenomena such as psi and I wil come back to it shortly. 
The three explanation theories that I have focussed on for this part of the 
thesis are complex. I have only been able to sketch out the basic notions that they 
have each developed in order to aid in understanding how it is we make a judgement 
about evaluating scientific explanations. Much more work can be done in this area, 
but for now I intend to provide an outline of the explanatory territory and most 
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importantly start the task of re-evaluating the status of the psi discussion. I start this 
process in the section below. 
6.5.4 Psi hypotheses and explanation theories 
I now tie together much of the work done earlier in the chapter when I recast the psi 
explananda as interogative statements and formulated some example answers taken 
from theories proposed by the competing psi hypotheses. I compare the theories that 
support the various hypotheses for psi and I use the outline of the contemporary 
explanation theories to assess the situation. A question and answer from the grid 
constructed earlier (p178) wil be used to ilustrate how each of the pragmatic, causal 
and unificatory explanation theories deal with the competing answers to the questions 
constructed from the student's story. I start with the pragmatic account of explanation. 
Pragmatic theory and psi 
I wil use the folowing question from the chart and place it into a form of explanation 
as set out in the pragmatic theory section above. The example involves an ostensible 
occurrence of precognition: 
Why question - Precognition 	 Answers dervied from psi hypotheses 
Why does an electrographic reaction 
on person Xs skin corelate 
(at a statisticaly significant level) with 
the moment just prior to person Y's 
concentration on an image of person X 
when both X and Y are apparently 
screened offrom any normal means 
of communication? 
Skeptic hypothesis 
The electrograph must be 
faulty or the experiment 
procedure flaky. 
Or perhaps temperature 
changes in the 
airconditioning 
unit could account 
for the changes. 
Smal change natural 
An indication that humans 
register events on their skin 
before they occur. 
It would be an evolutionary 
advantage for a species 
to have a warning 
of imminent danger. 
Big change natural 
There is one colective 
mind to which we al 
have access, even if 
subconsciously. 
When a person focuses 
their atention on another 
it registers in the colective 
mind where time and 
space do not exist. 
I then put the scenario into a form acceptable to pragmatic theory: 
The 'why' question Q expressed by an interrogative: 
Why does an electrographic reaction on person X's skin correlate (at a statisticaly 
significant level) with the moment just prior to person Y's concentration on an image of 
person X when both X and Y are apparently screened off from any normal means of 
communication? 
" The topic Pk 
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The skin of student X registered a charge shortly before student Y stared at an image of 
student X and they were at a remote distance from one another. 
The contrast-class X = {P1, • .,Pk,• • • } 
(the skin of student X registered a charge prior to student Y looking at an image of student 
X, the skin of student X didn't register a charge, the skin of student X registered a charge 
occasionaly whether or not student Y was looking at an image of student X from a remote 
location) 
The relevance relation R (van Fraassen 1980, p42-43) 
As I understand it relevance relations are statements in the form of an answer 
regarding the event in question; context determines which one is the most appropriate 
as do the relevance relations between the answers and the question. I assume for the 
purposes of this discussion that I have three possible answers, which I have taken 
from the chart of competing psi hypotheses. The possible answers are: 
SH Answer 1 
SCN Answer 2 
BCN Answer 3 
Because the electrograph is faulty and did not realy register any 
change in the skin. 
Because of a weak 'sixth sense' that has developed in some 
humans which gives them an evolutionary advantage. 
Because both had access to the colective mind and were 
connected subconsciously to the event which the target person 
felt prior to our current ability to measure the physical effect of 
thought on remote regions. 
The pragmatic account of explanation does not rule out any of these answers per se, 
rather it is a question of whether or not each is empiricaly adequate in according to 
current scientific theory. A psi theory that is acceptable to science would be alowable 
as a legitimate explanation according to the precepts of this theory. The pertinent 
question then is: how then does the pragmatic theory make a judgement regarding the 
explanatory merits of each answer? I mentioned before that the theory emphasises the 
context-dependent nature of explanations. It also emphasises that the answers are 
examined in terms of relevance relations. Furthermore, as I mentioned earlier, 
relevance relations are legitimate only if drawn from a 'causal net' of relations which 
are acceptable to science (van Fraassen 1980, p124). It seems then that I must 
eliminate Answers 2 and 3 because current science does not support the legitimacy of 
either of the these statements. Answer 2 is not alowed because there is no 'sixth 
sense' according to current science and Answer 3 for a similar reason regarding the 
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'colective mind'. This leaves the Skeptic hypothesis explanation as the only currently 
plausible account for the psi event in question under the pragmatic theory. 
Under the pragmatic theory of explanation then, until realist psi theory can 
come with some kind of causal account for the phenomena that would be acceptable 
to the relations that current science alows, the realist psi accounts are not able to be 
considered plausible explanations for the psi. Because of the issues I have raised 
regarding the explanatory history of psi, I question whether or not it is wise to exclude 
the potential to develop psi theory on the grounds that it is not currently understood 
by the scientific orthodoxy. There seems to be scope to develop theories that wil 
eventualy explain the phenomena to some extent. I therefore question whether the 
pragmatic account leans too heavily on the curent science at any one time to 
determine which explanation is most appropriate when assessing competing 
explanations. 
Philip Kitcher and Wesley Salmon have made a similar point regarding the 
heavy reliance on science under the pragmatic account. They ilustrated it with a 
discussion of the:death of John F. Kennedy. The scenario has some resonance to the 
psi case so I think it.is worthwhile making the comparison. Kitcher and Salmon first 
raise a problem for the pragmatic account by showing that an obviously unacceptable 
explanation (astrological) would suffice as an legitimate explanation. They ilustrate 
the problem as folows: 
Suppose Sq asks why John F. Kennedy died on November 22, 1963, where 
Pk=JFK died 11/22/63, X = {JFK died 1/1/63, JFK died 1/2/63,..JFK died 12/31/63, JFK 
survived 1963) 
and R is a relation of astral influence. (One way to define R is to consider ordered pairs of 
descriptions of the positions of stars and planets at the time of a person's birth and 
propositions about that person's fate.) An answer with core A might consist of a true 
description of the positions of the stars and planets at the time ofJFK's birth. Moreover, 
using astrological theory as background, one might be able to infer (at least with high 
probability) that JFK would die on 11/22/63. (Salmon & Kitcher 1998, p178) 
Under the pragmatic theory of explanation, they claim, the death of John F. Kennedy 
could be legitimately explained as due to the position of the stars at his birth. They 
chalenge the pragmatic account to show how it would rule out this type of 
unacceptable explanation. Then they show that van Fraassen replies to the criticism 
by claiming 'astrological answers are debarred by his [van Fraassen's] (frequently 
repeated) remarks that explanation makes use of accepted scientific theories' (Salmon 
& Kitcher 1998, p186). Theories based on astrological calculations are not curently 
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considered acceptable scientific theories. Therefore the astrological account is not 
considered a legitimate explanation for the death of JFK. 
A similar scenario would obtain in regard to the realist psi theories. Answers 
that are not scientificaly acceptable theories wil be ruled out. At least they wil be 
considered untenable explanations until perhaps a time comes when such theories are 
acceptable scientific theories. And my analysis showed that this is indeed the case 
when the pragmatic theory of explanation was applied to make an assessment of the 
possible answers drawn from the competing hypotheses. Both big and smal change 
theories would be considered ruled out because of their unsatisfactory status 
according to current scientific theory. 
But I have shown that historicaly there are good reasons why the big and 
smal change theories are considered 'outsiders' to mainstream scientific standing. 
I have also shown that it might be the influence of the previously dominant 
explanation theory that determined the status of psi and discouraged further 
development of psi theory. I suggest that under the pragmatic theory too 
much explanatory weighting is outsourced to science. I look now at the causal 
account which has some problems of its own in relation to explanation of quantum-
level theory. 
Causal/mechanical theory and psi explananda 
I mentioned earlier that the causal account for explanation that is used in this thesis is 
as folows: 
to explain an event `E' is to cite its cause 'C' 
and furthermore to cite cause 'C' is to relate: 
the process of the causal history that leads from C to E. 
To investigate how the causal theory of explanation deals with psi, I construct another 
example from the psi explananda table, this time using the psychokinesis example: 
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Why question - PK 	 Answers derived from psi hypotheses 
Skeptic hypothesis 	 Smal change natural 	 Big change natural 
Why did person X's intention to 
influence object P corelate with the 
movement of object P when X was 
apparently screened of from any normal 
contact with object P? 
The person and/or 
experimenters mistakenly 
thought that their thoughts 
were afecting the pendulum. 
An electromagnetic force 
was discharged from the 
brain of the subject and 
influenced the movement 
of the pendulum 
Psi-ons are emited from 
the brain when a person 
focuses their intent 
on a physical object. 
These psi-ons are able to 
interact on both a macro 
and micro scale and they 
cary the force from the 
brain to the object. 
Question 	 Why did a person X's intention to influence object P correlate with the 
movement of object P when X was apparently screened of from any 
normal contact with object P? 
I draw on the answer to provide me with three possible explanations for the apparent 
PK event in question: 
SH Answer 1. 
SCN Answer 2 
BCN Answer 3 
Because there was a false assumption that the experimenters were 
corect. 
Because at a quantum level the mental activity, and the pendulum 
are entangled. 
Because of the force of the psi-ons acting on the pendulum. 
The causal account maintains that an event is explained when its causal history is able 
to be traced. Answers to the question posed by my analysis of the psi explananda 
would have to provide just such a causal history in order to qualify as statements that 
could be used to compare explanations. Therefore, the next step of evaluation is to 
ask: are any of the answers acceptable explanations on this count? 
I suggest Answer 2 wil be problematic because the causal model has been 
criticised for being unable to account for causal processes at a quantum level, thus, 
presumably discounting any answer that relies on quantum theory as a plausible 
candidate. Bas van Fraassen has pointed out that this is a flaw for the causal account 
of explanation. In response to Salmon's concerns regarding the pragmatic theory of 
explanation van Fraassen has chalenged Salmon's account of causal explanation as 
being unable to account for quantum theory as a potential explanation. He says that 
the causal account of explanation is problematic in this regard because of the 
folowing points: 
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(1) the difficulties for the idea of the causal order arise at the level of the observable 
phenomena, and are independent of the inteligibility of the theory; (2) neither the 
phenomena nor the theory imply the possibility of empiricaly verifiable signals or action 
faster than light; (3) the non-classical correlations implied by quantum states may be 
described in terms of remote (nonlocal) conservation laws, but there is no sign of remote 
conservation mechanisms; (4) the temptation to see the phenomena as violating the 
classical logic and probability framework delineated by Boole and Kolomogorov 
is understandable enough, but also finds no warant in the phenomena. 
(van Fraassen 1985, p651) 
In contrast to the pragmatic account, which alows for quantum theories because 
they are part of the stock of acceptable scientific theories, the causal account has 
problems accounting the causal history of the phenomena at a micro-level. In the 
process of discussing issues of quantum mechanics and indeterminism Salmon 
addresses the problematic issue of understanding the causal process at the quantum 
level. He acknowledges that 'quantum mechanics poses two troubling problems, 
one concerning determinism, the other concerning causality' (Salmon 1998, p280). 
In response to the problem of causality (which is of more pressing concern to this 
thesis) he says that: 
quantum mechanics seems to involve action-at-a-distance, but it is important to distinguish 
the two forms it might take. Consider two distinct principles. The fiest is locality—i.e., the 
principle that it is impossible to interact with a remote physical system. The second is 
-separability--i.e., that it is possible to act on a part of a physical system that is extended in 
space without affecting the rest of that system.. Any measurement that is made on either of 
the parts occurs by contact with the whole system; the condition of locality is satisfied. 
However, separability is violated. It is impossible to make a measurement on one part of 
the system that leaves the other part untouched. It is difficult to understand how the remote 
parts of the system can react instantaneously to a local interaction with one of the parts. 
This aspect of quantum mechanics suggests that the world is glued tother more tightly than 
we previously realized. (Salmon 1998, p280) 
The analysis does not seem to address the problems that van Franssen raised in regard 
to the problem of accounting for the causal processes at a quantum level. Salmon 
appears to concede that there is litle understanding of the quantum processes in terms 
similar to macro descriptions of causal histories. I think that until this issue is resolved 
then quantum theories wil remain problematic to the causal account of explanation. 
The situation wil be resolved one way or the other, either the causal processes 
of events at the micro-level wil be understood or the causal/mechanical theory of 
explanation wil have to be revised. 
Under the causal account of explanation Answer 3 is also problematic because 
it introduces a new ontological concept which is not described in sufficient causal 
process terms in order to qualify as an explanation. Answer 1 would be acceptable 
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because you could trace the events during the experiment and verify exactly how the 
participants assumed falsely that the experiment was legitimate. 
However, I note here that under the causal model, the problem of laws is not 
an issue as it was for psi under the covering law model. If a psi realist account were 
to convincingly ascribe a causal process to a psi event then that explanation would 
compete with other potential causal process explanations for psi. There is the potential 
for the causal process to be investigated even without ful knowledge of the history 
of the event. 
, To ilustrate this point, just say, if on further investigation, Answer 1 proves 
to be insuficient and the apparent psi efects require further examination. It is 
possible to show what the causal path of the events was not like and to seek an 
explanation in terms of what did not cause the event. This would alow the 
phenomena to be investigated as unexplained, but not unexplainable, at least until 
further study revealed the causal process which elicited the apparently anomalous 
events. I think that this is a promising avenue to analyse further the apparent psi 
events which do not appear to be explainable successfuly by the Skeptic hypothesis. I 
now look at another psi question with relation to the unification theory of explanation. 
Unification theory and psi explananda 
I turn finaly to looking at how Kitcher's unification theory would assess various 
competing psi theories. I note that under this account an explanation E(K) 'is a set of 
derivations that makes the best trade-of between minimising the number of paterns 
of derivation employed and maximizing the number of conclusions generated' 
(Kitcher 1989, p432). The method of assessing explanatory worth of explanations is 
as folows: 
a derivation d is an explanation if and only if d belongs to the explanatory store E(K) which 
constitutes the best systematisation (or best set of derivations) of a given set of beliefs K. 
Informaly, an explanatory store E(K) is the best systematisation of K just in case, 
compared with any other set of derivations which systematize K, it offers a beter trade-off 
between the conclusions obtained and the eforts needed. Such eforts are not measured 
(as in earlier unificatory accounts) according to the number of facts we should accept as 
brute, but according to the number of paterns of derivations (argument paterns) utilized. 
(Sabates 1994, p274) 
I apply these concepts of explanatory worth to the question regarding ESP. I then 
perform a similar analysis on the answers as possible explanations for the apparent psi 
event and contrast them as I have done for the other two explanation theories. 
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Why question - Telepathy 	 Answers derived from psi hypotheses 
Skeptic hypothesis 	 Smal change natural 	 Big change natural 
Why did person X corectly identify, 
at a statisticaly significant level, 
images that corelated with the pictures 
that person Y viewed and when person X 
and person Y were apparently 
screened of from any normal sensory 
contact with one another? 
It was a set up and the 
participants in the 
experiment are tricksters. 
Quantum entanglement 
theories can be used 
to explain how mind-mind 
knowledge acquisition 
occurs at a distance. 
Topological folding of 
space/time occurs 
alowing for informaiton to 
pass from one person to 
another instantaneously. 
So, to the question: 
Why did person X correctly identify, at a statisticaly significant level, images that 
correlated with the pictures that person Y viewed and when person X and person Y 
were apparently screened off from any normal sensory contact with one another? 
We have the folowing possible answers: 
SH Answer 1 
SCN Answer 2 
BCN Answer 3 
They didn't because it was a setup and the participants in the 
experiment were tricksters. 
Quantum entanglement theories can be used to explain the 
exchange of data. 
Space-time folded and alowed the information to pass from 
one person to another. 
According to the unification theory, in order to count as a legitimate potential 
explanation the propositions must be statements drawn from K, which is the group of 
explanatory statements currently acceptable to science. They compete in terms of 
explanatory scope and one E(K) is selected which is the most acceptable in terms of 
unifying the science by reducing the amount of theories in science at the same time as 
covering more facts. Answer 3 would be ruled out on this basis as it is not currently 
accepted by K. I do not immediately disqualify Answer 2 because the discussion in 
Chapter 4 showed that there are working scientists who are developing just such a 
theory. However, I acknowledge that their theory is not necessarily part of K, if K is 
to be understood as mainstream science. Let's assume for the purposes of this 
exercise that we can alow Answer 2 to compete with Answer 1. In the example used 
for the purposes of this discussion then Answers 1 and 2 are alowable because they 
exist in K. Answer 1 wil form part of an explanatory set of theories which also holds 
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that psi phenomena are paranormal and unexplainable. There are historic cases that 
could be refered to which show that some exhibiters of apparent psi efects have, in 
fact, been deliberately produced by fraud. Answer 1 would then fit into other theories, 
especialy in psychology, which address the psychological reasons for this type of 
human behaviour. 
Answer 2 could possibly be considered a successful explanation because 
1) if tenable, it explains a body of evidence for psi that has previously been 
problematic and 2) it is a theory that is also being used to account for other 
.phenomena that require explanation. Therefore if one theory has more extensive 
explanatory coverage over others in the store of explanatory arguments the unification 
account would possibly favour Answer 2 over Answer 1. This is because the potential 
for a revised quantum—level explanation has more coverage than the psychology-
based fraud theory mentioned earlier. It is timely to remember that in Chapter 4 
_I examined a theory that was discounted by the anti-psi-proponent as wild and 
speculative, but which was championed by the pro-psi proponent on the basis that 
it had the potential to explain more data. So it is plausible that a case could be made 
on this count. 
Even as a thought experiment, it is hard to judge whether the psi quantum 
theories have more coverage in the same sense in which evolutionary theory is used 
to indicate a successful argument patern in Kitcher's work and perhaps the real 
response is to acknowledge that the Hennacy/Powel theory would have a hard time 
making it into K in the first instance. In defence, however, I remind that much of 
philosophy of science uses past scientific examples to explicate their theories and 
I am trying to apply the explanatory concerns to a contemporary, unresolved, 'live' 
example in which competing hypotheses are compared, even as they are being 
developed. Hindsight wil perhaps be the only way that we wil find out for sure 
which explanation theory best accounts for what is the most sensible explanation for 
psi. This is a possible flaw when it comes to developing explanation theories that are 
able to analyse contemporary situations, such as the psi hypotheses discussion. 
Once again, as with the pragmatic theory, it appears that current thought regarding 
acceptable explanation alows science to determine what theories are alowed to 
compete as explanations. I think that the unresolved nature of the psi debate indicates 
that contemporary explanation theories should be able to alow for some speculative 
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discussion regarding potential explanations, even if the theories are currently 
unaccepted by mainstream science. 
In this context it is interesting to consider that under the covering law account, 
the realist psi theorist was chalenged to produce a law that explains the phenomena; 
the covering law theory was an obstacle to psi theories entering discussion in science. 
However, in terms of psi and laws under the unification account, Kitcher's theory 
promotes an evaluation of explanation on the basis of acceptability rather than 
correctness and it does not rely on laws to assess explanatory worth. Under the 
unification account then realist psi theories could be developed that would count as 
acceptable if they were to show explanatory worth as unifying our understanding in 
other areas of science, they do not need to be explained in terms of laws. 
6.5.5 Summary of explanation theories and competing psi hypotheses 
The examination of the contemporary explanation theories undertaken in 
the end part of this thesis is intended as an indication of how the psi hypotheses 
discussion fares within the context of current explanatory considerations. I undertook 
this analysis in order to achieve two functions: 
1) to provide a contemporary assessment of the body of evidence for psi in 
relation to contemporary explanation theory; and 
2) to provide an interesting case study to test the ways in which various 
explanation theories respond to issues raised by anomalous phenomena 
I hope that I have shown that the different explanatory approaches are encouraging 
that future discussion of the psi hypotheses discussion wil elicit important 
developments for the discussion of psi theory. The assessment undertaken during the 
course of this thesis has shown that outmoded or ilegitimate conservative explanatory 
considerations have alowed one psi hypothesis (the Skeptic hypothesis) to dominate 
at the expense of others. I have argued that a review is necessary in the light of 
relevant findings outlined in this theses, and the various hypotheses should compete 
on equal ground. 
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Before drawing this thesis to a close, I summarise some of the pertinent issues 
that have resulted from the discussion in relation to the aims of this chapter outlined 
above. I then make some concluding remarks about the final selection of one 
hypothesis over the others in order to bring the three-stage IBE process to a close. 
1) Psi and contemporary explanation theories 
What I hope has become clear from discussion undertaken in the later part of this 
thesis is that when the body of evidence for psi is considered and it is asked 'what 
kind of work would be needed to meet the explanation goals of science?' the answer 
is now diferent to the one that would be given during the decades in which the 
covering law theory was dominant. The bar set under the covering law account was 
extremely high; psi researchers had to show that psi could be explained in terms of 
natural laws. I was particularly interested to show how the problem of laws was 
tackled by the contemporary theories, as I have shown previously that realist psi 
theories did not compete with the Skeptic hypothesis under the covering law theory 
because of the lack of a law that could be used to explain psi. However, the analysis 
above indicates that contemporary explanation theories are not reliant on lawful 
relations as a guide to what is considered a legitimate explanation and that the realist 
psi theories could stil, pending further development, compete with the Skeptic 
hypothesis on a number of counts. 
I think it is likely that some psi effects wil be explained by one of the three 
F's (fraud, fluke or flaky methodology) but that it is hard to argue that al psi effects 
can be accounted for in this manner. I have shown that the need for psi to be 
explained with recourse to a law has diminished and that the concerns of the 
contemporary explanation theories in this regard do not discount psi phenomena on 
the basis that they are not explained by such universal statements. However, I do not 
claim that psi phenomena are any less problematic now than they were under the 
covering law theory. Al proponents need to develop more sophisticated accounts if 
they are to be considered legitimate explanations under any of the contemporary 
explanation theories discussed in this thesis. For instance, according to the pragmatic 
account realist psi theories must be shown to be empiricaly successful; according to 
the causal account the process history must be accounted for; and under unification 
theory the theories need to be developed to encompass more explanatory territory. 
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2) Contemporary explanation theories and anomalous phenomena 
Some issues particularly relevant to assessing anomalous phenomena have been 
raised by the analysis undertaken in the later part of this chapter. I have shown that 
two of the theories (pragmatic and unifcatory) rely on science to supply the statements 
that are alowed into the comparison stage of the assessment of competing 
explanations. I think that this is problematic in relation to anomalous phenomena. 
The history and philosophy of science indicates science has, in the past, changed and 
developed new theories, discarded old ones in order to encompass phenomena that 
were once considered anomalous. And I have argued elsewhere (Chapter 3) that the 
historic account indicates that there might be historic reasons why the explanatory 
scope currently can't account for psi. I suggest therefore that potential explanations 
for anomalous phenomena should not be ruled out at an early stage of development. 
They might, one day, become theories that are acceptable to science and they can then 
compete with various other explanations that may be posited at that time. 
Under both the pragmatic and unifcatory accounts, there does not appear to be 
a way of assessing the psi hypotheses taking such maters into consideration. 
To counter this issue I point out that there is reasonable evidence that 'the past 
success of science in discovering truths about the universe dissolves under scrutiny 
into the continuing failure of science to produce anything solid enough to last 
unchanged. As new theories are developed, the universal truths of yesteryear are 
either rejected out of hand or modified or contextualized so as to restrict their scope.' 
(Pit 1988, p6). I maintain therefore, that there must be a place for discussion of 
theories that compete to explain an anomalous event, even if they are speculative 
and not yet acceptable to the body of science at any one time. I have shown that the 
covering law theory and the anomalous phenomena associated with psi influenced 
each other. The ostensibly unlawful nature of psi and the law-dependence of the 
covering law theory resulted in a bias toward a the Skeptic hypothesis that I have 
shown was subsequently unwarranted. I therefore suggest that the psi realist theories 
are alowed to develop and that they are compared again at a later stage. 
I mentioned that the causal account was criticised for being unable to deal 
with explanations that use quantum theory. This problem is not specific to psi 
theories. It wil be interesting to see what eventuates with developments in both 
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quantum theory and quantum-based psi theory and to relate the developments to 
progress with the causal account of explanation. I anticipate that in the future this 
issue wil be resolved one way or the other: either quantum theory wil develop an 
account acceptable to causal process theorists; or the causal account wil be found to 
be lacking. The effects of such developments should then be applied to a re-analysis 
of psi theory at that time. 
'Loveliest' explanation and the psi hypotheses discussion 
In the discussion above I did not indicate which of the theories I think most 
likely wil develop as the 'best' explanation. I concede that, given the state of psi 
theory development and continuing discussion regarding the nature of scientific 
• explanation, there is no clear 'winner'. However, as we are at the end of the IBE 
process I feel I should at least make a stab at indicating which of the competing 
hypotheses I think is the 'loveliest'. 
My hunch is that the Smal Change Natural hypothesis wil eventualy 
dominate the explanatory teritory because of its potential to explain other areas 
of science. The theories that are currently proposed require refinement, but they show 
promise. I fmd the Big Change Natural explanations too far fetched and commited 
to ontological categories that are potentialy problematic. The onus should shift to the 
proponents of the Skeptic hypothesis to show how fraud (or fluke or flaky 
methodology) can account for the body of evidence.for psi, and that the phenomena 
which can be accounted for in this manner should be excluded from further 
discussion. I anticipate that a rigorous assessment of the phenomena wil leave some 
anomalous phenomena that require further explanation. As it appears that the 
methodology used to assess the evidence for psi is legitimate according to the current 
scientific methodology, I also suggest that any legitimate criticism of the 
methodology used in psi research (such as the use of meta-analyses to analyse data, 
for instance) should also be used to more generaly critique other areas of science 
where similar processes occur. Above al I think that the history of psi as once 
subsumed under supernatural explanatory schemes, but now considered paranormal 
is the key to unlocking a more comprehensive understanding of psi as explainable 
in natural terms. Psi phenomena should be reviewed with this explanatory history 
in mind and related to the resulting current scope of science. 
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Conclusion: Beyond Beliefs 
You know, these words, "anomalous", "supernatural", 
"paranormal", they propound to explain something by not 
explaining it. That's lazy! 
John Doggett, The X-Files 
The concern which prompted this thesis was the desire to understand the divide 
between the mainstream view that psi must be explained by fraud, and the persistent 
minority view which contends psi is genuine and therefore requires other types 
of explanation. I commenced with an examination of the mainstream philosophical 
arguments for psi and argued for a re-analysis in a contemporary philosophical 
context. The main aim of this thesis was therefore to provide a new platform for 
productive dialogue between the various plausible approaches to explanation of psi 
phenomena. Below I recap the key considerations and arguments put forward in 
the thesis, before making some concluding remarks. 
Summary of key considerations 
The critique of the mainstream arguments in philosophy regarding psi revealed 
problems on a number of counts: failure to recognise the structure and logic of the 
arguments as inferences to the best explanation (IBE); failure to consider the body 
of evidence in its entirety; implicit reliance on explanatory conservatism; and failure 
to acknowledge the role of background beliefs in coming to the fraud hypothesis 
judgement. 
The remainder of the thesis took the form of a three-stage re-analysis of psi 
inspired by the IBE process: the evidence for psi was examined; a group of possible 
hypotheses was compiled; and finaly, the process of selecting the 'loveliest' 
hypothesis was commenced. The psi debate had evolved into a psi hypotheses 
discussion. Four different approaches to explain psi were put forward. They were 
drawn from both the mainstream and psi-oriented literature: the Skeptic hypothesis; 
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two psi realist positions, which I caled the Big and Smal Change Natural 
hypotheses; and the Supernatural hypothesis. 
Explanatory considerations guided the ensuing discussion. The background 
beliefs were discussed in relation to the history of explanation of the phenomena and 
it was shown that psi's explanatory history as a supernatural phenomena stil 
impacted on its assessment today as paranormal. Arguments were made against the 
Supernatural hypothesis on two counts: firstly that, if legitimate, most psi phenomena 
are mundane in nature; and secondly, that phenomena of a more dramatic kind fal to 
the same criticism as the argument for theism based on religious experience. 
The aim of the second part of the thesis was to alow an examination of the 
skeptic and psi realist hypotheses in relation to each other, informed by an updated 
assessment of explanatory concerns. I suggested that the Skeptic hypothesis 
assessment of psi was influenced by the covering law theory model of explanation, 
which was the 'received view' in the philosophy of science until the early 1970s. 
I concluded that because the covering law theory is no longer dominant, but appears 
to stil influence the mainstream assessment of psi, it is pertinent to review psi in the 
context of contemporary explanation theory. 
Further analysis of the three hypotheses was thus undertaken with particular 
focus on the problems associated with explanation of psi as an anomalous 
phenomena. The psi explananda were re-examined and it was found that the 
anomalous nature of the phenomena usualy prejudiced the way the explananda 
were commonly represented. The explananda were therefore recast as interogative 
statements with as litle presumed about potential explanatory issues as possible. 
The competing hypotheses provided speculative answers to the questions which 
formed the basis for ensuing discussion undertaken in the context of contemporary 
explanation theory. The analysis fulfiled two functions: a place was constructed 
where the three hypotheses competed on equal ground; and it provided a case study 
to test the ways in which various explanation theories respond to explanatory issues 
raised by anomalous phenomena. 
It was shown that the realist psi theories fal short of what is expected of 
acceptable explanations according to the pragmatic, causal and unificatory accounts 
of explanation. However, the point was made that unlike the situation that obtained 
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under the covering law theory, the psi realist theories were not ruled out on the basis 
that they were anomalous and unlawful. 
The discussion also highlighted the problematic nature of explanation of 
anomalous phenomena, as it emerged that contemporary philosophical theories 
of explanation rely substantialy on the body of science to provide the set of 
explanatory statements alowable. I suggested that as both explanation and scientific 
theory change over time we should be cautious not to rule out speculative theory 
that atempts to explain anomalous phenomena such as psi. 
Concluding remarks 
It has been shown during the course of this thesis that a blanket argument against the 
plausibility of psi based on explanation theory is unwarranted. Instead assessment 
of psi requires genuinely open-minded epistemic assessment of both the body of 
evidence for psi as wel as the theories that atempt to explain the phenomena. 
However, due to the anomalous nature of the phenomena the process should be open 
to revisions as both scientific and philosophical explanation theories change and 
develop. The assessment of psi cannot be undertaken by a once-off argument that 
deals conclusively with al the evidence and theories at any one time. Updates and 
checks of the status of theory development and epistemic status of the evidence 
should be undertaken; philosophical discussion of the nature of explanation of 
anomalous phenomena should inform the discourse. Currently, .al three hypotheses 
have more work to do in this regard: the skeptic hypothesis to develop accounts for 
how fraud, fluke or flaky methodology can realy account for the phenomena; and the 
psi realist accounts need to develop a more plausible working theory that explains 
the phenomena substantialy. 
My assessment is that Smal Change hypotheses, more particularly the 
quantum-theory based explanations, show the most promise. I base this on the notion 
that quantum theory poses more general problems to theories in science, philosophy 
of scientific explanation and mind theory. The area appears to be one of contemporary 
cross-disciplinary interest between physics, cognitive science, and philosophy and 
I anticipate interesting future developments in this area of inquiry that might be 
pertinent to quantum-based psi theories. I concede though, that this is an issue that 
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wil have to be revisited and revised in the light of future developments. Whether 
or not this turns out to be the case, it is hoped that the ground has been prepared 
for further discussion regarding al three competing hypotheses. Developments 
in science, psi theory and philosophy are bound to impact on the discussion. 
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Beyond Beliefs: Appendix I 
The jstor database of journals [htp://www.jstor.orgi  was searched in order to assess the mainstream 
representation of psi, especialy in philosophy, between the 1920s and 1980s. Istor is an online searchable 
catalogue of arts and science journals. Access was granted through the University of Tasmania's library. 
The entire catalogue contains 729 titles can be viewed at: htp:/www.jstor.orgiaboutial.list.html. 
I wil list the main arts and science catalogue that is most pertinent to this thesis. 





The Philosophical Review 
Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences 
Philosophical Transactions: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences 
Philosophy 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
Philosophy and Public Afairs 
Philosophy East and West 
Philosophy of Science 
Arts and Science I 
African American Review 
The American Economic Review 
The American Historical Review 
American Journal of International Law 
American Journal of Mathematics 
American Journal of Political Science 
American Journal of Sociology 
American Literature 
American Mathematical Monthly 
The American Political Science Review 
American Quarterly 
American Sociological Review 
The Annals of Applied Probability 
Annals of Mathematical Statistics 
The Annals of Mathematics 
Annals of Probability 
Annals of Statistics 
Annual Review of Anthropology 
Annual Review of Ecology, Evolution, and Systematics (In 2003, the Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics became the 
Annual Review of Ecology, Evolution, and Systematics. Volumes published under this new title do not yet appear in JSTOR as our 
coverage presently ends at 2000.) 
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Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 
International Family Planning Perspectives 
International Organization 
Journal of African American History 
The Journal of American History 
Journal of Animal Ecology 
Journal of Applied Econometrics 
Journal of Asian Studies 
Journal of Black Studies 
The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education 
The Journal of Business 
Journal of Ecology 
The Journal of Economic History 
Journal of Economic Literature 
The Journal of Economic Perspectives 
The Journal of Finance 
The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 
Journal of Health and Social Behavior 
The Journal of Higher Education 
The Journal of Industrial Economics 
The Journal of Military History 
The Journal of Modem History 
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Beyond Beliefs: Glossary 
This is a glossary of terms that have been used specificaly to highlight approaches or arguments that are 
discussed in this thesis. It also includes definitions of psi phenomena and psi-specific words and terms that 
were clarified in the introduction and used subsequen* in the thesis. 
Anti-psi proponent 	 A psi researcher who maintains that psi is best explained by normal means 
such as fraud, flukes of coincidence or flaky experimental methodology. 
Big Change Natural 	 Psi phenomena are genuinely anomalous and best explained by introducing 
hypothesis (BCN) 	 new ontological categories in order to account for the phenomena. 
Clairvoyance 	 Information gained about an inanimate object or event without the use 
of the five senses. 
Modern Miracle 
Argument (MMA) 
The argument, based on Hume's miracle argument, that because we know men 
cheat and lie and can be self-deluded and we know that psi contravenes 
severely what is thought possible according to curent science, psi phenomena 
are best explained as products of fraud or self-delusion. 
Put forward by George Price in 1955 in Science. 
ESP 	 Extrasensory perception, anomalous communication. Commonly divided into 
three subcategories: telepathy; clairvoyance and time-displaced psi such as 
precognition and retrocognition. 
The argument that we know people cheat and dissemble, but we don't know 
there are psi phenomena (in fact psi phenomena are unlikely) therefore fraud 
is the most rational explanation for psi. Put forward by Keith Campbel in 1970 
in Body and Mind. 
An account of the history of the explanation of psi as once supernatural. Points 
out that psi is curently considered paranormal because the curent limits 
of science were informed by the modern world view which were in turn 
influenced by an explanatory scheme that contained both supernatural and 
scientific explanatory categories. Contemporary mainstream science contains 
only one, scientific, which is important to understanding the anomalous nature 





PK Psychokinesis, anomalous action at a distance. 
The causal influence of an organism on the physical world without any known 
physical interaction. 





Information about a person or event in the past (retrocognition), or future 
(precognition) without the use of the ordinary five senses. 
An ilegitimate Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) which has been 
undertaken without atending suficiently to the examination of the body of 
body of evidence in question and without compiling the requisite hypotheses 
with suficient atention to available plausible theories. 
A psi researcher who maintains that the evidence for psi is indicative of an 
anomalous phenomena and should be explained by developing new theories. 
A general umbrela term for anomalous phenomena associated with either 
anomalous communication (ESP) or anomalous action at a distance (PK). 
Coined in 1942 by B.P. Wisner and R.H. Thouless. Psi can be used as either a 
noun or adjective. It is the 23 leter of the Greek alphabet 
A journalist or author who comments on psi, usualy in the mainstream press. 
A professional who undertakes research into psi. 
Psi is best explained by fraud, flukes of chance or flaky experimental 
methodology. 
Psi phenomena are genuinely anomalous and best 
explained by using or extending curent scientific theory. 
Psi is best explained with by ascribing the phenomena to a God, Gods, demon, 
spirit or other divine entity. 
Information gained about another mind or minds without the use of 
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